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Abstract:  South Sudanese refugees are strongly motivated to effect change in South 
Sudan. After resettlement to the US, this motivation has resulted in much 
transnational political activism on their part. In Australia, Sudanese refuge s have 
concentrated primarily on domestic political and social integration. Why? In this 
project I examine the possible causes of this difference, including the institutons, the 
policies, and the agents who implement settlement programs. I argue that refugee 
settlement policies of host countries directly shape the political activities of their 
refugees. When a host country provides assistance to integrate refugees, the 
government's policies and the individuals who implement policy (professional 
service providers and volunteers) influence what activities refugee lead rs re likely 
to pursue. I find evidence that professional service providers are more likely to 
channel refugees toward domestic political goals, especially when they are 
implementing specific refugee capacity building programs. In contrast, volunteers 
are more likely to support refugee leaders in the political activities that the leaders 
themselves are eager to pursue. Due to different levels of centralization and 
institutionalization across these two host country contexts, they have different 
compositions of policy implementers and utilize capacity building programs to 
differing degrees. These factors play a significant role in shaping the direction of 
South Sudanese political activities. I use evidence from examination of institut onal 
policies and semi-structured interviews of Sudanese refugees, professional and 
volunteer service providers, and government officials in the USA and Australia. 
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Preface 
This dissertation project has evolved not from a desire to know about 
different refugee settlement contexts, but rather to understand more about the 
politicization of the South Sudanese men and women I first met in the Fall of 2006. 
At the time I was a political science graduate student and coordinator of a conflict 
resolution student organization. I was leading a conflict resolution training session 
with about 30 members of the Lost Boys living in Syracuse, NY. When I met them I 
was blown away. These young men, mostly between 20 and 30 years old, were more 
politically charged than any Americans I knew, including those in my program. Our 
training objectives were to teach them how to listen better, and to assert their feelings 
and wants more clearly. These young men were not so interested in conflict 
resolution at this level. Instead they asked to discuss the Sudanese Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement and theories about war and international conflict resolution. They 
wanted to discuss ways in which Americans could help them protect and develop 
South Sudan and its people. It was this encounter that catalyzed this dissertation 
project.  
At the time I had no idea about refugee settlement policies, but I was learning 
about international and domestic politics, including the role of states, institutions, 
policies and non-governmental actors in politics. So, when I first began interviewing 
South Sudanese refugees in the summer of 2007, I was fascinated by the fact that the 
relatives, and fellow Lost Boys, were also being resettled to Australia and Canada. It 
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was then that I wondered, “What is it like for these South Sudanese refugees in other
places?”  
Over the course of this research, I understood that although the Lost Boys are 
unique, their drive to protect and care for their people, and to effect change in South 
Sudan is common to the broader South Sudanese population. These motivations have 
played out in the contexts to which these communities were resettled. The work of 
the leaders of this community, as Chapter 3 underscores, is driven by their heartfelt 
‘duty’ to protect and care for their people – a duty that has been instilled by 
unimaginable hardship and socialization by their country’s past leadership. Sure, 
there are also ego-related factors in some instances, including the desire for tatus 
and power, but this is not the main thrust of the political motivations of the South 
Sudanese refugees I interviewed.  
In each context, these leaders, motivated by these duties, have interacted with 
the policies and policy implementers they have encountered and have responded by 
taking the political actions highlighted by the empirical puzzle. Each country’s 
approach to settling refugees, a result of their social and political histories, has 
established set programs, rules and structures of policy implementers. It ha  laid the 
ground for specific individuals to implement these programs and follow these rules. 
Refugee leaders, newcomers to these host communities, have taken these different
settlement journeys, received divergent resources and met different people. 
Consequently, their political activities have taken certain nationally specific shapes. 
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It is important to note that the data pertaining to this empirical puzzle 
represents social phenomena at a specific point in time. Domestic-focused refugees 
in Australia, once they are established in the policy and political circles, are quite 
likely to engage in transnational endeavors. And, I have no reason to think that 
transnationally focused Sudanese refugees in the US will overlook domestic-related 
concerns, or will not take organizational steps to remedy them in the future. As each 
of these communities becomes more and more established in these host countries 
(and less and less the recipients of settlement policy), it is likely that their social 
networks and resource reservoirs will be complete and diverse enough to 
accommodate whatever political action they think is worth pursuing. What 
“national” patterns this will take will likely depend, like most things, on the specific 
events of their communities in each country, as well as the situation in South Sudan. 
These findings, while certainly specific to South Sudanese refugees, also have 
implications beyond this community, both theoretically and practically.  
This project would not have been completed without the support of the many 
South Sudanese men and women in the US and Australia who welcomed me into 
their lives wholeheartedly. It is my sincere hope that the new Republic of South 
Sudan will be led by individuals with as much integrity, smarts and heart as they all 
have. I am thankful too for the many service providers, government officials and 
volunteers who spoke frankly about the realities of refugee settlement in their 
countries. Their work is hard, and goes unnoticed. Thank you. 
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I have also been lucky enough to be surrounded by individuals whose support 
exceeds anything imaginable. I am indebted especially to two central advisers, 
Professors Kristi Andersen and Hans Peter Schmitz at Syracuse University. From the 
project’s inception, they have been enthusiastic about its potential while 
simultaneously asking pointed questions to ensure its success. I am grateful not only 
for their academic support, but also for their friendships. This process was more 
smooth and enjoyable because I was able to work with them. I am grateful too forhe
support of Professor Matt Cleary, whose sharp eye and frankness pushed me to be a 
better writer and communicator. For pointed comments that brought the dissertation 
into fruition and into its current form, I am thankful for Professors Elizabeth Cohen, 
Seth Jolly, Sarah Pralle, Audie Klotz, Jennifer Hyndman, Suzanne Mettler, Margaret 
Hermann and Ann Mosher. Much thanks is extended to Professor Bill Coplin for 
participating in this research and for chairing the defense of the dissertation. I would 
also like to thank faculty in the Program for the Advancement of Research on 
Conflict and Collaboration (PARCC), especially Catherine Gerard. I am grateful for 
her persistent enthusiasm for my life adventures.  
I am also incredibly blessed to have the support of so many dear friends 
whom I met at Syracuse University, including Haley Swedlund, Heather Pincock, 
Angela Narasimhan, Deepa Prakash, Nadine Georgel, Jessica Boscarino, Seth 
Fischer, Ryan McKean, Mark Hibben, Rob Alexander, Dana Hill, Carolyn 
Danckaert, Aaron Smith, Jesse Lecy, Ryan Sullivan, Shawn Rowlin and Nadia 
Greenhalgh-Stanley. Thank you to my teacher, Sri Dharma Mittra and the extend d 
Dharma Yoga community, particularly Lorie Bebber. The struggles of this 
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dissertation process where mainly in my own mind. I am so thankful to have found a 
lifelong sanctuary behind the tussle and chatter of the mind with your sincere help. 
And finally, I am blessed to be a part of my family. I could not have finished 
this dissertation without the support of my darling partner and best friend, Jesse 
Bricker. Thank you for reminding me that this project was interesting and dynamic, 
and that the person writing it was not only capable of such a feat, but even good at it. 
To my parents, Sallie and John, thank you for listening through all the ups and 
downs. Your consistent cheerleading (and expression of worry just amongst 
yourselves) was essential. I am grateful for the support throughout the many years of 
my undergraduate and graduate education provided by my grandparents, Philip and 
Alice May Cordes. These efforts would have been unimaginable without you both. 
To my late grandmother, Margery Foltz Allerdice, I am grateful for the 
unquantifiable faith and love she emanated. Finally, to John, my father, editor-in-
chief, confidant and counselor, I am so thankful for you. Thank you for accepting it 
all: the grammatical errors, the unfinished thoughts, the confusing academic jargon, 
the missed deadlines, the fear and anxiety, and the joy and successes. You took it all 
in with grace, and returned it always with love. I wish that everyone had a father and 
teacher like you. What a world this would be. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction: The Puzzle of Refugee Political Activities 
1.1: The Purpose  
 The settlement policies of host countries directly shape the political activities 
of their refugees. When a host country provides assistance to enable newly arrived 
refugees to get on their feet and to integrate into their new society, the 
government's policies and the agents (service providers) who implement them 
channel the refugees toward particular political goals.  In this dissertation, using 
evidence from examination of institutional policies and semi-structured interviews of 
Sudanese refugees, professional and volunteer service providers, and government 
officials in the USA and Australia, I propose to demonstrate how settlement policies, 
and policy implementers in these two countries channel them (directly and 
indirectly) toward different political activities. I argue that due to different 
approaches to managing the implementation of refugee settlement policy – more 
institutionalized and centralized in Australia and more laissez faire and decentralized 
in the United States – refugee leaders interact with divergent policy implement rs 
and are more or less privy to their different specific programs. These policy
implementation factors influence the direction of refugee political activities.  
On the whole, South Sudanese refugees are quite transnationally motivated. Due 
to four key factors, they are motivated to contribute to the social, economic and 
political development of their home country. First, many have known nothing but 
war and devastation as a part of the decades of civil war between North and South 
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Sudan. This experience has resulted in unimaginable suffering, but also a strong 
desire to establish peace and prosperity for their people and country. Second, due to 
mobilization on the part of elites, particularly by former Vice President of Sudan, 
John Garang and their elders, these refugees have been socialized to believe that due 
to their access to the West (and its education and resources), they will be able to 
rebuild South Sudan. Third, the vibrant connections that refugees have maintained 
with their families, still residing in the country of their origin, encourage n nduring 
relationship with their country. Finally, the recent referendum for South Sudan 
independence, a formal act of self-determination reinforces the first three 
motivations to effect change in this new country.  
My research indicates that this urge to participate in South Sudanese 
development is true for refugees no matter where they live. It is no surprise then that 
Sudanese refugees in the US have become quite involved in transnational political 
activism. In Australia, however, Sudanese refugees have concentrated primarily on 
domestic political and social integration.  
What explains these national differences? In this project I examine the possible 
causes of this difference, including the institutions, the policies, and the agents who 
implement settlement programs. The crux of my findings suggests that several 
factors specific to the strategies and implementation of refugee settlemen  policies 
directly and indirectly shape the political activities of South Sudanese refugees, 
particularly the target of their activities. More specifically, I find that across these 
two countries, differences in two areas of settlement policy are quite important: a) 
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the structure of the policy implementers and b) the relative influence of refugee 
organization building programs. These institutional factors derive from the general 
social policy approaches that each country applies to their citizenry. In Australia, 
refugee settlement policymaking, managing, and funding is centralized at the level of 
the Commonwealth, while in the decentralized system of the US, the federal 
government and key non-profit organizations have established a public-private 
partnership where these roles are shared. Similarly, Australia has a highly 
institutionalized settlement program. Relative to the US, its program provides mor  
comprehensive services that are funded predominately by the federal government. 
The laissez faire styled US program provides less social services, leaving refugees 
more autonomous with regard to meeting their needs. These factors are significant 
because they determine with whom refugees are likely to interact – professional 
service providers or volunteers – and the extent to which they will be involved in 
certain settlement programs that provide material and social prerequisites for 
political activities.  
I demonstrate in Chapters 5 and 6 that in the US, these policy factors have 
encouraged South Sudanese refugees to engage in the transnational political 
activities that they have desired to do. This is due in part to two key factors: a) 
refugees in the US interact with volunteers who are also interested in transnatio al 
activities; and b) refugees have been less likely to have been nudged to engage in 
domestic political activities. The opposite is true for South Sudanese refugees who 
have resettled in Australia. These refugees have been supported primarily by 
professional service providers who are implementing policy programs that channel 
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refugee leaders toward building organizations that influence the wellbeing of 
refugees currently residing in Australia (and away from transnational endeavors) (see 
Figure 1.1). 
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Figure 1.1: Trajectories of Sudanese Refugee Political Paths 
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In the dissertation, I also discuss the broader implications of refugee political activities 
and political self-determination in this regard I investigate how policies and 
policymakers, while seeking to develop the capacities of refugees, may indirectly dis-
empower them. When prevented from participating in the development and realization of 
the full range of their political aims, refugees can feel unheard, unaccepted, controlled, 
and invisible. This reduces the efficacy of refugee leaders, generates tension and 
ultimately strains the process of integration.  
1.2: The Empirical Puzzle 
I have examined the cases of southern Sudanese refugees living in two main 
resettlement countries, the United States and Australia. Despite similar pol tical 
motivations of South Sudanese refugees, the patterns of their political activities in 
these two different countries diverge. My comparative research, described in d tail in 
the following chapters, demonstrates clear differences in the targets, or directions of 
the political activities of the refugee groups in these two nations. In the United Stat s 
I find that 75% of Sudanese refugees’ organizations have as their principal mission 
effecting change in Sudan, referred to in the literature as transnational political 
activities. These activities include advocacy toward political officials to stem 
violence in their country and international development work, such as building 
schools and health clinics in southern Sudan. In Australia, in contrast, 70% of 
Sudanese-led organizations primarily aim to effect change within the Sudanese 
community that is resettled (what I refer to as domestic political activities). Efforts 
on the part of the southern Sudanese refugees to integrate themselves into their new 
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host community, such as establishing community centers to support refugees through
settlement, are the main types of “domestic” political activity I find.  
Why are there these differences, especially if these refugee communities share 
similar motivations and other key characteristics? The communities in each country 
consist of over 20,000 resettled South Sudanese, with over half in each population at 
working age. Most refugees have come in with families and arrived under similar 
resettlement programs. Transnationally motivated Sudanese refugees are strongly 
engaged in transnational political activities in one country but not so much in the 
other. Why? This is the empirical puzzle at the heart of my research. 
1.3: Terms and Definitions 
To clarify my use throughout this dissertation of key terms crucial to this 
research I have provided several definitions here. First, this research focuses on 
refugee settlement, including settlement policies and agents who implement policies. 
Settlement governs all activities of refugees once they are physicall  in the host 
country. These policies are in direct contrast to refugee res ttlement policies, which 
govern the number of refugees that are admitted into the host country, and their pre-
travel and travel arrangements.  
Every year almost 80,000 refugees are resettled throughout the world. After first 
leaving their country of origin and finding temporary protection in a second country, 
refugees finally resettle in their new permanent homeland, the third and potentially 
final place, the “host” country. These 80,000 are the lucky ones, making up only 
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about 1% of all the refugees who need resettlement (UNHCR Global Refugee Trends 
2008). After years, even decades of living in limbo, these individuals are given 
permanent residency in a country where for the most part they can be safe and meet 
their basic needs. Over 20 countries, including the US and Australia, work closely 
with the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) to resettle 
refugees. These host countries have established procedures to process refugee and 
to transport them to their new home-sites. These host countries also have distinct 
social assistance policies and procedures to se tle refugees: to orient them to their 
new country; to meet their basic needs of shelter, food, and clothing; to connect them 
to social services that provide cash and medical assistance, education and 
employment; and to enable them to reach the ultimate goal- integration into their 
new society. My research hones in on this act of “settling” refugees to explore how it 
can influence refugee political action.  
With regard to settlement, there are several terms I utilize to describ  what is 
being examined. In general I am looking at the policies that seek to integrate 
refugees into host countries, explored in great detail in Chapter 4, 5 and 6. I also 
examine the agents who implement these policies, what I refer to as policy 
implementers. In this definition, I include both professional service providers and 
volunteers. To varying degrees, volunteers can play a significant role in providing 
refugee social assistance and this is why I include them as “policy implementers.”  
Settlement policies and policy implementers can influence refugee political 
activities in an almost infinite amount of ways. In this dissertation I hone in on one 
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particular way: the target, or direction that refugee political leaders’ political 
activities take. I examine whether their political activities are targeted toward efforts 
in their host country, what I call domestic political activities or efforts in their origin 
country, what I refer to as transnational political activities. Domestic political 
activities are activities that aim to effect change in the country they are curr ntly 
resettled in, such as extending social assistance for their refugee communities, or 
efforts to more fully socially, politically and economically integrate th ir fellow 
refugees into the host country. Transnational political activities are those actions that 
aim to effect change in the country their home country. Social and financial 
resources are often acquired from within the refugee’s host country, but are collected 
for transnational ends. Typical transnational political activities that refuge  political 
leaders are engaged in include increasing public awareness about current onditions 
in origin countries to mobilize support and resources. They also include creating 
organizations to do specific development initiatives in their home country or region, 
including building health clinics, schools and infrastructure. I describe this in detail 
in Chapter 3 where I present patterns of Sudanese refugee political activities in the 
United States and Australia.  
My work also seeks to highlight specific ways that settlement policy and 
policy implementers influence the trajectory of refugee political leader political 
activities. In so doing, I utilize terms to describe influential processes. Both policies 
and policy implementers can channel, or direct and guide, refugee leaders toward 
one type of political activity over another. This happens when policies or policy 
implementers extend resources for a certain political activity but not another, what is 
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referred to as a resource effect in the Policy Feedback literature. Similarly, when 
resources are withheld for certain activities over others, this too is a resourc  effect. 
This channeling or guiding process can also happen when refugee leaders receive 
certain messages about what is the “best” political goal to pursue, or about the 
importance of their contribution for certain activities. These more ideational 
influences are called interpretative effects. Interpretative effects can provide ideas to 
refugee leaders and can impact their political will, or motivation to achieve certain 
goals too.  
1.4: The Project’s Significance  
This project has important practical and theoretical contributions. Theoretically, 
it is important to examine these questions because the influence of receiving 
countries on refugee political activities has yet to be comprehensively understood, as 
I detail later in this chapter. Many scholars have utilized a political opportunity 
structure approach that has been too broad or vague. Additionally most works fail to 
examine specific policies and programs targeted toward migrants, with the exception 
of citizenship and naturalization policies and regulations. These are undoubtedly 
important, but for refugees in particular, citizenship policies and programs represent 
a sliver of the entire system that governs their settlement and integration. Current 
models also assume that refugee leaders’ activities are a natural consequence of their 
predetermined goals. In this view, the receiving context is solely a political 
opportunity structure that migrants navigate through in order to implement their 
goals (Koopmans 2004; Østergaard-Nielsen 2003). Factors within the context 
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therefore do not interact with refugees – but rather solely block or allow for certain 
refugee activities.  
I see the political objectives and methods of refugee community as malleable, 
and likely to take shape according to their current environment. Organizations 
implementing specific settlement policies can mold the general direction and 
methods of refugee political action. Indeed, third country settlement sites vary in 
terms of policy strategies to foster integration – particularly in the degree that 
newcomer retention of socio-cultural differences is encouraged (Valtonen 2004).
Policy programs are built accordingly. My work explores this explicitly.  
More broadly, this work engages with theory in political science and sociology 
that underscores the important role of organizations in mobilizing individuals to be 
politically active (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993).  Decades ago political partiesand 
labor unions mobilized migrants to participate in domestic-oriented political affairs; 
more recently non-governmental organizations have taken on this role (Andersen 
2008). For refugees, settlement organizations are a part of this mobilizing nexus 
(Bloemraad 2006). This research draws on this research, but expands the analytical 
lens to include transnational types of political activities. Thus, I combine insights 
from the political incorporation (Gerstle and Mollenkopf 2001; Andersen 2008; 
Bloemraad 2006) and international migration literatures (Al-Ali, Black and Koser 
2001; Basch et al 1994; Portes et al 1999; Guarnizo et al 2003; Levitt 2001). Several 
scholars have called for this theoretical move (Morawska 2003; Waldinger and 
Fitzgerald 2004). Settlement actors engage refugees from the moment they are 
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resettled. They have a distinct role in impacting what resources refugees obtain.
They orient refugees toward the receiving country context, and connect them to 
broader social networks. It is reasonable to assume that they can influence what 
activities refugees believe are possible and worth engaging in. 
Practically speaking, I directly examine migrant activities that are of key concern 
to policymakers and citizens alike. These activities include igniting violence, or 
contrarily, encouraging peace and development, in the refugees’ home country 
despite barriers of physical distance (Shain 2002). It is necessary to investigate the 
role of receiving country contexts in the formation of these political goals and 
methods, and to do so by looking at integration strategies, settlement actors and their 
practices. Secondly, this investigation has the potential to illuminate the unintended 
consequences of national integration policies on international issue areas, such as 
post-conflict reconstruction, stability and conflict. In so doing, it unearths waysin 
which governments and refugee activists collaborate (or not) on shared interests to 
stabilize and encourage development in the fragile contexts that these recently 
resettled refugees originate from, or toward their new host country. Yet, this work 
also examines ways in which receiving country contexts may unintentionally reduce 
these possibilities. As the international community comes closer the possible creation 
of a new state, southern Sudan, these political dynamics will be evermore salient. 
And, this is particularly important given the rising number of refugees whose only 
form of protection is through resettlement.1 
                                               
1 The number of refugees in need of third country resettlement will have increased almost 160%, from slightly over 
500,000 in 2009 to over 800,000 predicted for 2011 (UNHCR Global Refugee Trends 2009).  
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 Finally, with both practical and theoretical implications, I aim to broaden the 
lens that is used to study refugees to include the political nature of refugees and their 
communities. While much of the refugee studies literature concentrates on how 
settlement effects the economic and personal wellbeing of refugees, I am interested 
in the impact of settlement context on refugee collective political goals and the 
activities they engage in to achieve these goals. This is important because it directly 
relates to the self-perceived efficacy of refugees – of their own sense of power to 
change their lives in positive directions. I hope that this research can aid settlement 
policymakers and providers in creating policies and programs that build and sustain 
refugee efficacy. This can increase not only refugee empowerment but refugee 
integration. As refugee integration becomes more successful, host country citizens 
and migrants will be equally benefited. This could encourage the creation of new 
resettlement programs or expand on current ones. This research suggests also the 
importance of further studies of the effects of settlement and other social plices on 
the development of self-determination and the empowerment of individuals who are 
being served by the policies. 
1.5: Migrant, Immigrant and Refugee Political Activity Literature  
How are scholars discussing refugee political activities? What are thes  
activities, and how do they differ among various refugee groups in diverse cities and 
countries and in distinct time periods? What are the factors that influence refug e 
political activities? Does any of this scholarship identify whether or not refugee 
activities differ based upon the contexts of the varying receiving countries into which 
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they have been resettled? If so, why? Has scholarship addressed how national and 
local institutions, policies and policy implementers impact the direction of refuge  
political activities (domestic, transnational, or both)?  
1.5.1: Scholarship on Refugee Political Activities 
Refugee political activities have received scant scholarly attention. Refugee 
studies by political researchers have examined the political reasons why refugees 
have had to escape from invasion, persecution and oppression and the politics of 
their protection. In the rare instances where refugees are studied as agents, with the 
ability to effect change in their own lives, rather than as objects created by war-torn 
nation-states or as service recipients, the scholarship looks primarily at “warrior” 
refugees who are both refugee and rebel fighter (Loescher 2001).  Several notable 
exceptions prove the rule: scholars have studied Eritrean and Bosnian refugees (Al-
Ali, Black and Koser 2001), Haitian exiles (Basch et al 1994), Kurdish refugees 
(Wahlbeck 1998), Salvadorans (Landolt 1999: Guarnizo, Portes and Haller 2003), 
Vietnamese refugees (Bloemraad 2006) and refugees in Denmark (Togeby 1999).  
These studies identify a wealth of refugee political activities directed toward 
both the origin and receiving countries. Directing their energies to their origin 
countries, refugees engage in electoral politics (Al-Ali et al 2001, Guarnizo et al 
2003), membership in political parties (Al-Ali et al 2001; Guarnizo et al 2003; 
Landolt 1999) and the creation of organizations to advance socio-economic 
development in origin country towns and villages known in the literature as 
Hometown Associations (HTAs) (Landolt 1999; Guarnizo, Portes and Haller 2003). 
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Political activities directed toward receiving countries include attending political 
rallies and demonstrations, mobilizing political officials (Al-Ali et al 2001), making 
public claims regarding minority rights and discrimination (Koopmans 2004), 
becoming public officials and naturalizing (Bloemraad 2006). Within this literature, 
political activities have been defined narrowly and more broadly. More narrow 
definitions do not include financial or economic support for communities in the 
origin country as a “political” activity, while others do (Guarnizo et al 2003). In this 
dissertation, I understand political activities in the broader sense, to include activities 
such as creating organizations with the objective to raise funds for specific 
development objectives in the origin country (along with more conventional political 
activities).  
The enormous body of literature on immigrant and migrant political activities 
more than makes up for the limited examination of refugee political activities. These 
include activities of migrants directed both toward the receiving country known as 
“immigrant political incorporation” (see Ramakrishnam and Bloemraad 2010 for a 
review) and the origin country, referred to as “migrant transnationalism” or 
“transnational political participation” in the literature (Basch et al 1994; Levitt and 
Jaworsky 2007 and Guarnizo, Portes and Haller 2003 for reviews). There are good 
reasons to analytically differentiate refugees from immigrants based upon the 
differences in their reasons for leaving their countries, the minimal amount of 
resources refugees bring with them compared to what immigrants can bring (Sherrell 
and Hyndman 2003), and the higher levels of support received if refugees arrive with 
formal refugee status (Bloemraad 2006). Nevertheless, migrants, of all types, are 
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newcomers who are connected to two countries – their origin and receiving 
countries. This literature therefore offers important insight into what types of factors 
may impact the political actions of refugees.  
Political incorporation scholars ask what explains the domestic-focused 
political activities of migrants in their receiving countries. They have found that 
migrants are more politically active in their receiving countries, (1) as the levels of 
their income and status grow, (2) as the lengths of their residencies increase, (3) 
when they have previous political experience upon arrival, (4) when they are allowd 
to engage in political activism, and (5) when they are mobilized by outside agents 
such as organizations, political parties, unions, etc.  
The migrant transnationalism literature arose in part in reaction to the 
assimilation theory in this former literature, particularly the underlying presumption 
that migrants would inherently lose the social, political, emotional and cultural ties 
that they had with their country of origin  (Schiller et al 1995). Thus, the lens of 
transnational scholars has predominately focused on demonstrating the enduring 
importance of these homeland ties and explaining differences they find between and 
within migrant communities (Basch et al 1994). This scholarship points to a group of 
interrelated variables, including individual migrant demographic characteristics, pre-
migration experiences, migrant community dynamics, origin country mobilization, 
legal status and citizenship regimes in the host country and supranational 
organizations and norms (Al-Ali, Black and Koser 2001; Basch et al 1994; Portes et 
al 1999; Guarnizo et al 2003; Levitt and Jaworsky 2004; Østergaard-Nielsen 2003; 
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Faist 2000). Overall, these multiple factors intersect at the point of the individual 
refugee/migrant to shape the motivations and capabilities with which she/he will 
engage in transnational activities (Al-Ali et al 2001; Guarnizo et al 2003).  
Generally speaking, the Political Incorporation and Migrant Transnationalism 
literatures there are little synthesis. Ewa Morawska (2003) states tha, for the most 
part, scholars narrow their point of inspection: either looking at immigrant 
integration (including political incorporation) or immigrant transnationalism. 
Scholars pose their questions with one of these political activity “targets” in mind.
1.5.2: The Migrant and Context: The Importance of Multiple Levels of Analysis 
What can be learned from these literatures? Do any of these theories help 
explain the higher realization of transnational endeavors of Sudanese refugees in US 
relative to Australia? According to analyses by scholars in the field, multiple factors 
drive the political activities of refugees: on the individual, community, national and 
supranational levels. On the individual level, the personal characteristics of migrants 
independently and interactively shape levels of migrant political activism. It is not 
surprising to find that, at the individual level, the evidence from both the political 
incorporation and migrant transnationalism literatures points out that those with 
more human and social capital and those migrants who have resided in the receiving 
country for longer periods are more likely to be among those who are more 
politically active. These migrants have more resources with which to be plitically 
active – a central hypothesis in the political participation literature (Verba, 
Scholzman and Brady 1995). At the community level, the factor of participation (or 
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not) in a well-established community prior to settlement correlates with a hgher (or 
lower) amount of transnational activity (Al-Ali et al 2001) and with the degree of 
success in political incorporation (Schrover and Vermuellen 2005). At these levels of 
analysis, these theories basically suggest that migrants and migrant communities are 
more politically active if they have more resources.  
Do factors at the individual level or community level fully explain the 
empirical domestic-transnational differences in Sudanese refugee political activities? 
In other words, do these variations of the “resource theory” provide solutions for this 
empirical puzzle? To answer my question pertaining to the differences in the 
direction of refugee political activities, this literature falls short. It is unclear whether 
or not a migrant would need more resources to engage in transnational or in domestic 
political activities. It is sensible to assume that a migrant would require mo  
resources to engage in transnational activities as a migrant may need addition l 
support because of the financial and legal hurdles of helping from a distance. 
Similarly, it could require additional human and social capital to mobilize 
individuals to support endeavors that are beyond the current physical community and 
country. Yet, domestic activities like achieving social, political and economic goals 
in industrialized countries can also be quite costly. Nevertheless, even if it is the case 
that greater resources are required to engage in transnational activities, his does not 
help explain the empirical puzzle. It is not the case, that Sudanese refugee leaders
who went to the US spoke better English, had better educations or other valuable 
resources relative to those who were resettled to Australia. In fact, over the cours  of 
settlement it is more probable that a larger proportion of Sudanese have acquired 
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these types of resources in Australia as compared to those in the US because of the 
more extensive language, educational and other social services provided in the 
Australian context. In sum, it is not readily evident how exactly individual resources 
would shape the target of refugee political activities.   
Yet, perhaps more Sudanese refugees in one country are motivated to engage 
in transnational activities. Al-Ali et al (2001) highlight the significance of refugee 
motivation to engage in political activities. One central difference in the Sudanese 
cohorts across these two national contexts is the amount of the “Lost Boys of Sudan”
present in each country.2 Although I have found that most Sudanese refugees are 
quite transnationally motivated, this sub-group of Sudanese refugees was socialized 
to believe that it was their role to create a new southern Sudan: one free from wa , 
modernized and developed. As I describe in Chapter 3, the particular experiences of 
this sub-group of South Sudanese refugees has further developed their motivation to 
engage in transnational activities and provided substantial degrees of human capital. 
Do more Lost Boys reside in one context over the other, and does this explain 
our empirical puzzle? In the early 2000’s, the United States resettled approximately 
4,000 of these young men. This specialized resettlement of Lost Boys as a group was 
in addition to a regular resettlement program that involved other southern Sudanese 
from Kakuma refugee camp and Egypt (among other places). Australia did not have 
                                               
2 This cohort of refugees resided in Kakuma refugee camp for at least a decade prior to being resettled to these third 
country settlement sites. In this camp, they lived apart from the southern Sudanese families in barracks called “zones.” 
The boys had specific roles: the oldest boys were often “zone leaders,” others organized the food rations and cooked. 
They attended school (many even finished high school) and were involved in extracurricular activities such as drama, 
conflict resolution and health education. These experiences resulted in acquisition of valuable skills that has increased 
the human capital of these particular refugees. I present a more detailed explanation of the “Lost Boys” in Chapter 3. 
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a similar “group” settlement scheme specifically for these “Lost Boys” although they 
did resettle individuals included in this sub-cohort. In fact, the median age of Sudan-
born Australian residents (of whom 98% arrived through the refugee program) is 
around 26 years old, with a male to female ratio of 118:100 (Sudan-born Community 
Information Summary).3 Additionally, the majority of southern Sudanese refugees 
resettled in Australia did arrive from Kakuma refugee camp.4 This suggests the 
majority of Sudanese in Australia are these same young males. So, despitethe 
absence of a group program, these same socialized, English-speaking young males 
make up a substantial part of the Sudanese refugee communities in both countries.5 
There is no doubt that the Lost Boys contribute greatly to the political 
activities of Sudanese refugees. They are a vital sub-group of the southern Sudanese 
community in both countries and are quasi-celebrities in the United States. In both 
resettlement sites, the Lost Boys have shown high levels of personal motivation to 
incorporate effectively into their host societies as well as to assist in the development 
of their country of origin. The effects of their motivation at the “individual level”, 
given the leadership roles Lost Boys have had and continue to have in refugee 
                                               
3 Community Information Summary: Sudan-born.  
4 I do not have specific figures pertaining to where Sudanese refugees came from (i.e. Egypt, Kenya) before arriving in 
the third country resettlement site but I did find evidence that the majority of Sudanese refugees came from Kakuma. 
(Browne, 2006).  
5 Refugee leaders in both countries were predominately m n. Gender roles and their relationship to subsequent political 
activities is extremely important aspect of migrant political participation. Although not the focus of my research, I have 
found that typical gender roles, in which woman engage in less “public” activities and more “private” activities are 
being reinforced as well as challenged in Australia nd the United States. 86 “Lost Girls” (who had similar treks across 
southern Sudan and eventually found themselves in Kakuma refugee camp) were resettled to the United States along 
with the roughly 4,000 Lost Boys, and I spoke with women who defined themselves as “Lost Girls” in Australia. I 
found instances of women both creating organizations (included in my analysis) and of women who preferd to serve 
in the role of caregiver and homemaker.  
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community organizations and in the political thrusts of the Sudanese refugees, must 
be factored in. However, to say that the Lost Boys alone are responsible for th
political trajectories of their communities or that a difference in theirnumbers in the 
US and Australia provides a solution to the empirical puzzle at the core of this 
research would be shortsighted. 
Another point suggests that these individual-level models do not tell the 
entire story. I find that leaders who identify themselves as “Lost Boys” in Australia 
have experienced significant barriers when trying to engage in transnational 
activities. Due to the institutional factors I discuss below, these leaders, although 
quite political, have not been able to act on these transnational motivations or to use 
their human capital toward transnational efforts. In general, resource-based theories 
do not provide enough leverage to answer questions about the process by which 
motivated refugees make their political decisions and ultimately take on political 
activities. Such theories don’t answer: How and why, are similarly resou ced and 
motivated refugee leaders directing their political activities differently? These 
individual level analytics do not allow for an analysis of national patterns of refuge  
political activities. Refugee political activities are not simply a result of the sum of 
their individual decisions. The empirical reality – of national patterns in political 
activities- directs our attention to examine features of these two national 
environments.  
Do community-level explanations uncover the key factors influencing the 
differences shown? Perhaps one community had more time to establish transnational 
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organizations? Or one community’s demographic characteristics, such as the 
presence of more families, resulted in desires to pursue more domestic, rather th n 
transnational goals once they were resettled? The evidence suggests that these factors 
do not play a role in the empirical differences demonstrated. Sudanese communities 
in Australia and the US had their highest levels of resettlement at roughly the same 
time – the late 1990’s to mid 2000’s. In both resettlement contexts, refugees started 
without support from previously established Sudanese migrants. Additionally, the 
communities, generally speaking did not appear to have more resources than those of 
the other. These community-level theories cannot account for the marked differences 
in the trajectories of political activism that have been found.  It is certainly not the 
case that Sudanese refugees in the US had reached a degree of self-sufficiency su h 
that they could easily turn toward transnational concerns. 
What factors are present at other levels of analysis? One important factor th t 
mobilizes refugees to engage in a political activity is the degree of social pressure 
exerted by the country of origin and its citizens to remain attached and connected to 
their origin country, including the provision of resources. This can include extensive 
pressure to send remittances (Mountz and Wright 1996), to vote, to contribute 
financially to certain political parties, and to generally remain attached to efforts in 
the origin country (Guarnizo et al 2003). I find no evidence that in the US Sudanese 
refugees were pressured more heavily to send remittances (or engage in other 
transnational activities) relative to those in Australia. Although I have found no 
specific data on south Sudanese remittances, refugees in both contexts spoke frankly 
of the high degree of pressure to help southern Sudan and the myriad challenges they 
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faced in trying to effectively respond to these requests. In both sites, refugees were 
sending back funds to family members to help with repatriation processes, education, 
health services and more. And, in both contexts I found evidence that Southern 
Sudanese political leaders were (and are) mobilizing the refugee communities, but 
not in degrees differing markedly one from the other. In both contexts, high-level 
Sudanese officials visited the resettled communities, urging the refugees to continue 
working on efforts to re-build war-torn southern Sudan.  
1.5.3: Host Country Institutional Analyses 
In this section I describe and respond to current literature regarding the 
influence of host country institutions on migrant political activities. Given the 
national differences in Sudanese refugee political activities, despite quite sim lar 
individual and community characteristics, it is necessary to look at how institutional 
factors specific to the settlement context influence the political activities of South 
Sudanese refugees.  
 Institutionalist accounts make an important point: individual- and 
community-level analytics ignore the influence of social and political institutions on 
the political activities of whomever they influence – effectively de-contextualizing 
them (Mettler 2002; Bloemraad 2006). Individual-level accounts, while undoubtedly 
valuable, seem a-political because they do not acknowledge the specific political 
context in which individuals are making decisions. Nor do they factor in whether 
specific individual level characteristics interact with context-specific attributes to 
influence political activism. Koopmans highlights that within the “literature…[there] 
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has been a strong tendency to see migrants as free-floating transnational 
communities…largely independent from the policies of the receiving countries 
(2004; p 467).” With institutional analyses I turn from a focus solely on the 
characteristics of refugees as individuals and their communities to a focus on the 
settlement context in which the refugees seek to realize their political goals. It is 
within the broader institution-oriented context that individual and community factors 
can be seen to emerge (or not) as requisites to the refugees’ engagement in political 
activities.  
What institutions or contextual factors influence migrant political activities? 
And what are the mechanisms through which this influence is imparted? How do 
current theories help us understand these empirical differences in southern Sudanese 
refugee political activities?  
Current institutional analyses provide much insight into what institutions are 
important, but I argue they leave something to be desired. Scholars have identifie  
numerous factors that I group into five distinct categories: 1) immigration and 
refugee policies; 2) social policies; 3) reception; 4) national political factors; and 5) 
supranational factors. They demonstrate that influential institutions exist at multiple 
levels, including locally, nationally and globally6 (Sosyal 1994, Østergaard-Nielsen 
2003) but most work focuses on national institutions (Bloemraad 2006; Faist 2000; 
Ireland 1994; Koopmans 2004; Mountz et al 2002). In the remainder of this section, 
                                               
6 Global structures include human rights discourses and international organizations, as well as the global NGOs that 
lobby these international organizations using this human rights discourse. 
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by examining features of the US and Australia, I demonstrate how current literature 
does and does not help to explain this empirical puzzle. 
1.5.3.1: Immigration and Refugee Policies   
Policies specifically pertaining to both immigrants and refugees have an 
enormous influence on migrant political activities. Rules, regulations and programs 
for incorporating newcomers into the political, social and economic fabric of the host 
society can encourage or bar migrant access to the policy process. Citizensh p and 
naturalization policies and eligibility requirements with lower residency time limits, 
and fewer requirements ease this significant prerequisite to engaging in any type of 
migrant political activities (Koopmans 2004). Furthermore, newcomer legal status 
that places migrants in limbo, such as temporary protection status, serves to weaken
the confidence to engage in political activities (Al-Ali et al 2001; Mountz et al 2002; 
Bailey, Wright, Mountz, Miyares 2002).  
Country political incorporation ideologies, or regimes, are also highly salient. 
Countries develop strategies that “allo[w] or prohibi[t] various forms of political 
mobilization within their boundaries (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003, p 771).” And, while 
Faist 2000 argues that policies encouraging migrant cultural retention can “advace 
border-crossing webs of ties” and ultimately contribute to transnational practices, 
Østergaard-Nielsen makes a notable point: strong cultural rights can be a part of a 
political incorporation system that doesn’t allow some transnational discourses (such 
as radicalized transnational discourses) (2003). Thus, the influence of political 
incorporation regimes is not as simple as either promoting transnational social 
25 
 
networks and practices or not promoting them. Ireland (1994) also demonstrates that 
incorporation regimes can nurture (or not) ethnic-based political mobilization by 
building consultative structures based on nationality.  
1.5.3.2: Social Policies 
An additional source of contextual influence identified in the literature 
derives from the host countries’ social policy, and migrant access to it. This includes 
policy regulating education, housing, employment and social assistance, among 
others. The literature is at odds here. It argues that the presence of extensiv  social 
services for migrants results in both a diminished homeland focus (Ireland 1994) and 
as a prerequisite for transnational activities (Al –Ali et al 2001). Ireland (1994) finds 
that in French and Swiss locales with greater amounts of services, migrant guest 
workers did not have to rely on previous origin-country sources for socioeconomic 
support. When this dependency was broken, so too were homeland ties. In contrast, 
Al-Ali et al (2001) make the argument (similar to the previously discussed resource 
theory) that without economic security, transnationalism would be nearly impossible 
because of the “confidence needed to venture into transnational domains (p 588).”  
1.5.3.3: Reception 
Another significant factor associated with political participation and activities 
of migrants is the reception from the host country. Many scholars see this in a dyadic 
way, as either exclusive or inclusive (Koopmans 2004; Guarnizo et al 2003) and 
reception is generally studied at the societal level. To understand this, Koopmans’ 
2004 comparative research project of migrant political claims in the Netherlands, 
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Germany and the UK examined public discourse about minorities from key 
newspapers, arguing that in pro-minority contexts, migrants would have greatr 
opportunities to make their political claims toward the host country. Koopmans 
(2004) argues that more inclusive regimes (as operationalized by high naturalizion 
rates, pro-minority media discourse and low levels of conservatism) provide the 
opportunities for migrants to gain access to the policy process, to have their 
messages resonate with the public and appear legitimate. Guarnizo et al (2003) find 
support for their hypothesis that less inclusive regimes (as operationalized by low
levels of economic mobility) result in greater degrees of transnational activities.  
Behind this inclusive-domestic and exclusive-transnational theoretical link is 
the assumption that migrants who are not included into the socio-political fabric of 
the host country will turn back to their origin country for political validation. Those 
that are included, with be involved in domestic activities. Morawska’s work 
complicates this theory by adding an additional state of “reception”: one of being 
ignored. She finds that Polish immigrants in Philadelphia feel ignored as newcomers 
which has the effect of encouraging assimilation into the ethnic community rather 
than the broader US community (2004).  
1.5.3.4: National and Supranational Political Factors  
Two additional contextual factors scholars have investigated include national 
political factors and supranational factors. On the national front, Koopmans (2004) 
finds that conservatism has an indirect influence on migrant political claim-making. 
When leftist governments hold power, rhetoric pertaining to minorities is more 
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positive. As for supranational factors, Sosyal (1994) and Østergaard-Nielsen (2003) 
find that international discourses that promulgate universal human rights bolster 
migrant claim-making and access to political activities. Migrants that gain access to 
international non-governmental organizations involved in human rights work can 
magnify the effect of their political activities (commonly referred to as “scaling up”) 
and gain access to more political gatekeepers (Østergaard-Nielsen). Th se discourses 
effectively give newcomers a legitimate claim to attach on to.  
1.5.3.5: How do these theories help explain the empirical puzzle? 
How do these theories help us understand the empirical differences of South 
Sudanese refugee political activities? Each of these theories lends an interesti g 
perspective, but leaves something missing. Supra-national discourses and actors, 
while certainly helpful for refugees interested in engaging in transnationalism, are 
not likely to be a primary causes for these cross-national differences in refugee 
political activities. Refugee leaders in the United States engaged in transatio al 
activities certainly draw on human rights discourses for fundraising purposes and 
some are collaborating with transnational NGOs like Catholic Relief Services, but 
these supranational tools are utilized after these leaders are already engaged in 
transnational, rather than domestic activities. National contextual variables re more 
likely to be the source of these differences. These contextual factors do not explain
why similarly motivated, similarly resourced refugees from the same camp, who 
share such similar pre-migration histories, would engage in different political 
activities. Neither does the level of political conservatism. In both countries, fa rly 
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conservative national governments were in power during the initial settlement 
periods of these refugees – George W. Bush in the United States and John Howard in 
Australia.  
Of these institutionalist accounts, the next three theories provide the most 
important insights, but still do not completely solve the puzzle. A close examination 
of the reception/inclusion-exclusion model reveals that it is relevant but incomplete. 
Was one country more inclusive or exclusive of southern Sudanese refugees and did 
this impact the direction of their political activities? It was found that both countries 
had instances of exclusion in their reception toward southern Sudanese, although 
Australia’s exclusionary events were more politically salient and influe ced the 
political activities of refugee leaders. Both countries sought to include and 
incorporate the refugees into their societies. The difference in directions of political 
activity found was a result not so much of general levels of inclusion or exclusion, 
but rather of other institutional causes.  
My research also suggests that the transnational motivation found in both 
refugee populations was not derived from an aspect in the settlement context. The 
motivation preceded settlement. Thus, Sudanese refugees were not directly pushed 
by the government in either country through inclusive or exclusive policies toward 
transnational endeavors. In fact, it appears that, in Australia, they were guided 
through policy initiatives to focus on domestic activities.  
The reception/inclusion-exclusion model remains incomplete in that it is 
underspecified. Who does the actual including or excluding? And through what 
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mechanisms does reception impact refugee political activities?  The theory as it 
stands misses the central importance of the institutions and agents who are actively 
involved in including or excluding refugees.  This theory does not factor in the 
interactive nature of individuals and their environment – it assumes that refugee 
communities will all respond to exclusionary or inclusive contexts in the same way. 
Perhaps the most prominent example of exclusion in Australia came in 2007 
when former Immigration Minister Kevin Andrews publicly stated that Sudanese 
refugees were not integrating well. This act could certainly contribute to a feeling of 
exclusion on the part of southern Sudanese refugees. Using Koopmans’ model, one 
would predict a turn toward transnational activities after such a high profile event, 
but the exact opposite happened. Sudanese leaders mobilized, gained media attention 
and demonstrated that they were integrating as well or better than other similarly 
situated refugee groups. Leaders I spoke with boasted that their actions helped oust 
the conservatives. Similarly, despite the anti-minority rhetoric from natio l 
officials, local officials were supportive of Sudanese refugees. Indeed, local police 
officials publicly described the key ways in which Sudanese refugees w re 
integrating.  
In the United States, Sudanese refugees received a generous welcome from 
many communities. Before this refugee group arrived, refugee service organizations, 
particularly faith-based organizations, engaged in education campaigns to prime 
potential American supporters. These campaigns involved videos and speeches that 
described the lives of southern Sudanese refugees and detailed their hopes for 
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education. The statement made by some of these refugees that “education is their 
mother and father” became a motto of these refugees and the volunteers that helped 
them. Newspapers were filled with articles describing their situation (R bins 2003). 
Refugee service organizations all described that massive financial, material nd 
volunteer support was provided for this refugee group in particular due to media 
attention and these education campaigns. Given the state of reception, it would be 
easy to conclude that southern Sudanese refugees would not look back. Upon their 
arrival, they would integrate and engage in activities that were directed at this new, 
welcoming country. While it is true that many leaders are engaged in domestic 
activities, directed at the United States, this has not stopped them from creating 
organizations, creating networks and mobilizing resources to effect change in 
southern Sudan.  
Is it just the case that for these Sudanese refugee populations outcomes 
opposite to those predicted by the reception theory model are true? Perhaps an 
exclusionary environment resulted in a turn toward domestic political activities, and 
an inclusive one allowed them to focus on their original goals? Australian-based 
southern Sudanese refugee leaders responded to anti-minority rhetoric by ramping up 
their involvement in domestic political activities. And many American-based 
southern Sudanese refugee leaders responded to a pro-refugee reception by 
eventually engaging in transnational endeavors. From these empirical findings, it 
would be possible to reason that positive reception brings forth transnationalism 
while a negative reception brings forth a focus on domestic political activities 
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(because the refugees have to focus their energies there). This is plausible b t also 
incomplete.7  
As I demonstrate in the following chapters, while reception factors certainly 
played a role in defining the political events refugee leaders were involved in, they 
weren’t as impactful as the daily interactions that these leaders had with policy 
implementers in each context. This evidence suggests that “reception” has in 
influence in more complex institutional ways. Sudanese refugee leaders in Au tralia 
with transnational motivations similar to those in the United States were channeled 
to put these domestic activities ahead of their initial transnational desires. This 
channeling took place in the context of specific policies aimed to help refugee 
communities form organizations (Chapter 6). Furthermore, without the support of 
volunteers, mobilized primarily by faith-based refugee service organizations in the 
United States, refugee leaders would have been less successful in their transnational 
endeavors (Chapter 5). In both contexts these policy implementers were key actors 
‘receiving’ refugees.   
Social policies or specific policies pertaining to immigrants undoubtedly 
influence the direction of refugee political activities. But again, what policies and 
ideologies are important and how? Upon third country resettlement to Australia and 
the U.S., Sudanese refugees share similar legal statuses: they are formal refugees 
with permanent residency, with little reason to believe that any transnational 
                                               
7 It is not likely that all refugee communities would behave in the same way. Some communities may have retreated if 
such a high profile political official made those claims. And some communities would not have sought out 
transnational activities after being so warmly accepted into a new country. 
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connection they may pursue could result in deportation. Australian and US 
naturalization policies are quite similar as well – the former having a residency 
requirement of 4 years and the latter 5 years. Additionally, because of their 
permanent residence status, these refugees are entitled to receive similar basic 
services to meet their material needs. Yet, in Australia, due to its much more 
substantial social safety net, refugees actually receive more extensive social services 
in the long-term (up to 5 years after settlement) than in the US. For example, 
refugees in Australia are provided with a minimum of 510 hours of English 
Language instruction and more extensive integration services. This is more than 
what is offered in the US. In both contexts, refugees are able to work immediately 
and receive similar material assistance until they are employed (although it is 
generally longer and more generous in Australia). It would be expected, given the 
greater material resources made available to the Australian refugees, that they would 
be more able and more apt to engage in transnational activities, which is not the case. 
Neither institutionally based laws regarding refugee status nor the difference in 
material services provided through the institutions of the host countries appear to be 
the determining institutional factors  (among those that Østergaard-Nielsen and other 
scholars speak of) which account for the differences of political activity tha  are 
found in the refugee communities that have been examined in this study. 
Social policies and ideologies of incorporating refugees into US and 
Australian societies are likely more salient institutional factors influe cing the target 
of refugee political activities. But, again, current theories may miss important 
sources of institutional influences. The literature suggests both that the presence of 
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multicultural policies can “advance” transnational activities (Faist 2000), and that it 
is unclear if it will advance these activities or not (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003). 
Østergaard-Nielsen makes the point that it is important to investigate a country’s 
multicultural policies in greater detail because their message can be more nuanced – 
allowing for some activities but banning others (Ibid). Faist’s notion that 
multiculturalism advances transnational ties does little to help us understand the 
differences seen in Australia and the US. Sudanese remain quite connected to their 
homelands in both contexts despite differences with regard to explicit multicultural 
policies, and despite these similar ties, more refugees are engaged in transnational 
activities in the US. 
Australia has a formal multicultural policy in which they explicitly target 
newcomer communities based on their nationality for government intervention 
including practices such as ethnic community capacity building (Galligan and 
Roberts 2003; Lopez 2000; Klymicka 1995). In the United States, while there is 
certainly political acceptance of diversity, it is based on race rather than culture or 
nationality. This means that ethnic communities and the unique obstacles they face 
due to different cultural norms and languages are not remedied by large-scale 
government intervention (see Bloemraad, Chapter 3 for full discussion). Policies and 
programs that celebrate culture difference are more widespread in Australia relative 
to the US. Given these realities, it is reasonable to assume that southern Sudanese 
refugees in Australia would be more heavily supported in retaining their cultu e. 
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I find evidence that suggests that both countries’ interventions to incorporate 
refugees are nuanced and complex. It is the case that both the US and Australia seek 
to incorporate refugees into their host country rather than to advance transnational 
ties or activities. Yet, what are the practices of incorporation, and how do they 
influence? The implementation of settlement policy is in effect a key component f 
refugee incorporation into the host country. As I describe below, the policy feedback 
theory can help us understand the more nuanced impacts of reception, political 
incorporation and social policies on refugee political activities.  
 These current institutional analyses begin to help us explain the national 
patterns of Sudanese political activities discovered in my research but leave 
important questions unresolved. What does influence the direction of refugee 
political activities? What aspects of settlement institutions – what policies and policy 
implementers – influence whether or not refugees are included or excluded? What 
are the interests of these institutions and actors and how do they jibe or not jibe with 
refugee leader interests? How does this “channeling” of activities occur? In the next 
section I make the case for utilizing a particular means of institutional analysis, a 
Policy Feedback theoretical perspective, to examine the national differences of 
Sudanese refugee political activities.  
1.6: Utilizing the Policy Feedback Theory 
For this dissertation, to investigate Sudanese refugee political activities, I 
utilize a specific form of institutional analysis: policy feedback theory. This lens 
provides ample theoretical and practical insight primarily because it is less vague 
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than the previous institutional analytics. It focuses on how policy designs impact 
mass politics (or the political activities of “ordinary” people) (Mettler 2002; Pierson 
1993; Schneider and Ingram 1993). This analytic’s added value is that it connects 
specific policy design attributes to the subsequent political behavior of those who are 
direct recipients of the policy – it is in many ways a political policy analysis. It 
makes the claim for what makes common sense: that policies are a fundamental part 
of a policy recipient’s political experience. It is at the level of policy and its 
implementation where government and individuals who are governed interact. The 
design of policy will therefore influence the political activities of those individuals 
who are impacted by it. The policy feedback analytic offers a pointed analysis of the 
institutions that play such important roles in the newcomers’ lives. The policy 
feedback model thus differs from the Political Opportunity Model8, which takes on 
far too much of the context at once, rather than specifically focusing on critical 
aspects of the institutional context. Policy feedback scholars analyze the attributes of 
policy design and examine each policy’s political effects in terms of the policy’s 
resource and interpretative influences (described earlier in this chapter) on recipients.  
Utilizing this model of analysis has many advantages. First, it is a theory 
about context, but it targets a critical aspect of the context. Second, it asks scholars to 
examine unintended consequences of policies, to effectively look beyond the policy. 
                                               
8 Much institutional analysis implicitly or explicitly falls into the political opportunity model theoretical camp. These 
models argue that contextual factors create opportunities or barriers to political activities for migrants, or citizens, 
depending on the research subject. The institutional scholarship in this chapter has primarily ascribed to this model 
(Koopmans 2004, Ireland 1994, Østergaard-Nielsen 2003 for example). 
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Third, it highlights two distinct ways or mechanisms through which policies have 
these second-order effects: through interpretative and material effects.  
By examining how particular government policies influence the political 
activities of the policies’ beneficiaries this model focuses our awareness. Take for 
example several policies in the history of the United States that have been studid
using the Policy Feedback Theory. It was found that the U.S. G.I. Bill increased the 
political participation of military veterans  (Mettler 2002).  The introduction of 
Social Security benefits resulted in an increase in the political activity of the elderly 
(Campbell 2002). On the other hand, recipients of welfare benefits in the US were 
more likely to experience government in ways that lowered their political 
engagement (Soss 1999). None of these policies were designed with the intention of 
producing such effects.  Despite the relatively apolitical goals of these policies and 
programs, they proved to have political effects on their recipients.  
Such unintended consequences characterize refugee settlement policy as well. 
Political sociologist Irene Bloemraad has found that the high levels of naturalization 
among migrants in Canada relative to similar communities in the US are due to the 
presence of policies and settlement service apparatuses that mobilize migrant 
communities toward these ends (2006). The types of political activities in which 
refugees engage in are not only a result of their individual characteristics or goals. As 
policy feedback scholars pronounce, they are also due to the “interactions between 
institutions and citizens” (Wichowsky and Moynihan 2008; Mettler and Soss 2004).  
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Bloemraad’s work, what she calls a Structured Mobilization approach, uses 
an institutionalist account but identifies specific contextual factors that are far 
narrower than traditional Political Opportunity Structure models. She argues that 
immigrant (or newcomer) political incorporation is a ocial process that is nested in, 
or structured by government interventions including bureaucratic procedures, 
settlement policies, and strategies to managing diversity such as multicult ral 
policies. This social process is one in which immigrants learn about and are 
mobilized to engage in political activities (or not). Learning and mobilization 
happens through ethnic and host country intermediaries, including ethnic leaders and 
community-based organizations. The symbolic and material resources provided by 
government interventions, put into motion particular learning and mobilization 
dynamics. These policies send messages about how immigrants should view and 
value citizenship and political engagement. Through instrumental means, vis-à-vis 
organizations and programs, government intervention also directly impacts 
newcomer mobilization and political participation. She finds that for Portuguese 
immigrants the US system, which does not promote citizenship, nor provide 
substantive amounts of funding to immigrant communities, promotes newcomer 
political apathy and alienation. In contrast, the Canadian system, which includes a 
lively system of citizenship education and mobilization including funding for ethnic 
communities, encourages political integration. Additionally, she finds that due to 
greater degrees of services for Vietnamese refugees (due to more substantive 
settlement services for refugees as compared to immigrants) in the United Sta s, 
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they are more likely to have received messages and resources that encourage 
political participation (2006). 
My work utilizes Bloemraad’s framework but asks a slightly different 
question. Rather than focusing on quantity of political participation (more or less 
political incorporation across these two countries), I ask: do settlement policies and 
policy implementers influence the direction of Sudanese political activities – toward 
their home country or toward their host country.  
In Australia, the system to settle refugees seeks to ensure full access to the 
Australian welfare state. Thus the system builds refugee skills for an exte d d period 
before expecting them to be self-sufficient. To this end, the country provides more 
extensive social services including language services, employment skill train ng and 
job seeking services, healthcare and longer access to financial assistance. E h ic 
community capacity building programs help refugee communities mobilize together, 
form organizations and help themselves. From this more organized place, these 
communities are encouraged through various consultative channels to be apart of the 
policy-evaluating and policy-making processes in Australia. As I demonstrate in 
Chapter 6, these greatly influence the domestic-focused trajectory of southern 
Sudanese political activities in Australia. 
In the United States, economic integration and self-sufficiency of refugees is 
emphasized. The program does not systematically include migrant organizational 
development programs. The underlying assumption of this settlement model is that 
refugees who are on their feet financially will be able to meet other integration goals, 
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such as physical and financial security, healthcare and connection with citizens and 
host country institutions. These programs, while present in the United States are not 
prioritized. Thus, many refugees do not receive government-support to create 
organizations. One unintentional effect of this lack of management of refugee 
political organization in the United States is that refugee leaders are free to do what 
they want with the organizations that they create, so long as they are able toget them 
off the ground.  
Across these receiving country contexts, the nature of actors engaged in 
settlement services and their relationship with the national government also varies.
Australian and Canadian settlement service providers are primarily secular non-
governmental organizations that have historically-rooted institutional and 
contemporary financial connections to the national government, thus providing real 
and perceived barriers to autonomy in settlement practices. In contrast, the U.S. 
sector is comprised overwhelmingly by religious organizations, with social networks, 
funding streams and mandates that expand beyond the purview of the national 
government (Nawyn 2006). It is possible then, that these organizations (relative to 
their Australian and Canadian counterparts) may be more open to reconstruction and 
development goals of refugees. These specific policy and policy implementer 
attributes will be explored in this dissertation. In the following section, I detail two 
sets of specific research questions that guide the project. 
1.7: Research Questions 
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To solve this empirical puzzle, I ask several questions. First, what is the 
institutional structure of host country refugee settlement programs, and what, if any, 
host country institutions directly impact refugees? Sosyal (1994) suggests that 
settlement policies and the subsequent activities of refugee and migrant communities 
“reveal how host states and their foreigners encounter each other (p5).” How does 
this encounter influence refugee leaders? Does it directly structure thei  activities, 
mold leaders and impact what political goals they pursue? Do policies or policy 
implementers influence the target, or direction (domestic or transnational) of refugee 
leaders’ political activities? Second, do these institutions also influence the political 
efficacy of refugee leaders, a critical political pre-requisite? How d  these 
institutions impact refugee leaders’ understanding of their own sense of power and 
ability to achieve their goals?  
With regard to the first research question, I seek to understand settlement 
institutions in each country and unearth the political effects of these institutions. This 
is not an analysis of the effectiveness of settlement policies. I do not ask if settlement 
policies effectively settle refugees. Instead, how do these policies structure, channel 
or otherwise mold refugee leaders and their political activities? How do settlem nt 
programs and policy implementers influence the trajectory of refugee political 
leaders’ activities? What is their effect on the direction of refugee political activities: 
toward their country of origin or receiving country? Arguably, it is through these 
specific aspects of settlement policy that host state-foreigner encounters occur and 
through which the activities of refugees can be shaped.  
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With this second set of inquiries, I ask whether or not specific policies and 
policy implementers empower or dis-empower refugee leaders. If institutional 
arrangements privilege certain refugee activities over others, such a domestic-
oriented over transnational activism, how does this influence a refugee’s political 
efficacy? If pre-established institutional orientations ignore the deep, enduring 
connections refugees have toward origin country families and communities, and if 
they somehow dissuade refugees from maintaining these connections, will the
political will of refugee leaders be extinguished? And again, could this matter for 
specific refugee settlement goals such as integration? In the next chapter, I describe 
the methods utilized to answer these questions. First, I provide a roadmap for the 
entire dissertation.   
1.8: An Overview 
In this dissertation, I demonstrate how settlement policy has impacted the 
direction of political activities of Sudanese refugees in the US and Australia. To do 
so, I present the empirical puzzle, describe the subjects and contexts of the puzzle, 
Sudanese refugees in the US and Australia, and then demonstrate two important 
causal processes in which refugees are shaped toward divergent paths of political
activities in each country. In the next chapter I discuss the research design and 
methods I used to explore the political activism of the resettled Sudanese (Chapter 
2). I then describe the empirical puzzle, one that presented itself in the course of my 
research, in more detail. I discuss the reasons for and processes of southern Sudanese 
refugee protection, and include an examination of the Lost Boys of Sudan (Chapter 
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3). This is followed by an in-depth comparative description of the histories and 
current designs of settlement policy in Australia and the US. I analyze the specific 
policy design attributes that prove to influence most keenly the political activities of 
the Sudanese refugees (Chapter 4). After this chapter I turn to the two most 
influential institutional processes that resulted in the different South Sudanese 
political activities I identified. In Chapter 5 I discuss the roles of professional and 
volunteer policy implementers. I examine how the relative influence of thesepolicy 
implementers results in significant differences in refugee social networks and 
subsequently, in the refugee political activities. Here I demonstrate how the 
connections that strong faith-based volunteers have formed with southern Sudanese 
refugees have been a critical aspect of the high degree of transnational political 
activity emanating from the refugees in the United States. In Chapter 6, I show how 
in Australia the prioritization of one specific type of program, what I refer to as 
Refuge Organization Building programs, has had a significant impact on the 
trajectory of Sudanese refugee political activities there. These programs and the 
individuals implementing them have effectively nudged refugee political leaders 
toward domestic activities. In both chapters 5 and 6, I demonstrate how settlemen  
policy has material and symbolic effects on refugees and upon their ambitions to 
engage in specific types of politics. I also investigate the deleterious effects of 
excessive channeling that have resulted in instances of the disempowerment of 
Sudanese refugees. I conclude the dissertation with a review of the political effe ts 
of settlement policy and the significance of these effects on the Sudanese refugees, 
on the refugee settlement programs in the US and Australia and the connection 
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between migration and international development. I also discuss the implications of 
these findings for current theory (Chapter 7). 
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Chapter 2: Research Design, Data Collection and Analysis 
2.1: Introduction 
The political activities of refugees have yet to be fully theorized or analyzed, as I 
demonstrated in the previous chapter. Scholarship has been mainly theoretical (Faist 
2000), descriptive (Al-Ali et al) or not focused on refugees and the policies and 
practices aimed at them in particular (Ireland 1994, Sosyal 1994, Koopmans 2004, 
Østergaard-Nielsen 2003). Projects that do have a specific eye toward refugees 
conceptualize institutions too abstractly and are absent any analysis of causal 
mechanisms (Guarnizo et al 2003). These research projects contribute to our 
understanding but lack the research design to understand how institutions targeting 
refugees impact refugee political activists.  
Like Bloemraad, I focus on an “empirical process,” and explore how settlement 
institutions influence refugee leaders, including settlement policies, programs and 
policy implementers. I provide evidence based on data about Sudanese 
organizations, analysis, documentary material and semi-structured interviews. In this 
chapter, I detail the data collection methods that produced this evidence. The 
project’s key design consists of two comparisons: a broad comparison of Sudanese 
refugee activities in the US and Australia, and a more specific comparison of one 
sub-cohort of Sudanese refugees, the Lost Boys of Sudan, across these two countries.  
2.2: Cross-national comparison of Australia and the US  
2.2.1: Generating middle range theory using comparative case design 
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 A theory pertaining to the influence of refugee settlement institutions on 
the target of refugee political activities does not yet exist. Thus, this project utilizes a 
comparative case research design and inductive methods to generate middle range 
theories about just how settlement institutions influence refugee political leaders. 
The case study design allows deep analysis of each country case to explorethe 
mechanisms of influence, thus allowing me to generate new understandings about 
the specific influences within cases and compare these influences and interactions 
across cases (Gerring 2004). I am able to “ask whether change in the independent 
variables in fact preceded change in the dependent variable and more significantly, 
by what process change in the independent variables produced the outcome” (Munck 
in Brady and & Collier 2004; p 112). Rich contextual analysis allows me to draw 
inferences about dynamics and processes that are (and are not) shared across these 
two contexts. This “fine-grained, contextually sensitive” approach does allow a more 
extensive analysis into complex social and political dynamics (Brady an  Collier 
2004; 10).  
2.2.2: US and Australian Similarities and Differences  
These two countries provide an ideal comparison. The United States and 
Australia have the world’s largest refugee resettlement programs. Both countries are 
western, industrialized democracies with institutionalized approaches to managing 
and settling refugees.9 Both countries’ pasts are based on immigration and each has 
contemporary experience with ethnic and minority politics. While this is much more 
                                               
9 Sudanese refugees have settled in countries througout the world, including Cuba, Egypt, Sweden, Canad , the 
United States and Australia. 
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developed in Chapter 4, it is important to note here that both countries had periods of 
outright racism in their policies towards immigrants10 and both struggled to find 
ways to include ethnic populations into their political fabric. These shared 
characteristics allow me to examine the more subtle aspects of each country’s 
settlement policies. As Lipset (1990) notes (and Bloemraad aptly cites), “the more 
similar the units being compared, the more possible it should be to isolate the factors 
responsible for differences between them (Bloemraad 2006).” 
Similar numbers of Sudanese refugees reside in each country (20,086 in 
Australia and 23292 in the US)11 and were settled at similar times (within the late 
1990s and early 2000s). Because the size of refugee populations and the amount of 
time they have had to settle in their new environments can shape the amount of 
resources that refugee communities have for overall levels political partici tion, this 
is an important similarity (Schrover and Vermuellen 2005). Since the two Sudanese 
communities have been settled for approximately the same amount of time, this 
variable cannot explain different forms of activism in the two communities. 
Despite their similarities, Australia and the U.S. differ in important ways. Their 
overall approaches to settling refugees vary due to their different historical and 
political trajectories. Therefore the policy programs employed to enact these 
approaches and the policy implementers who enact them vary as well. This is the 
heart of this project, and these differences will be described in detail in Chapter 4.   
                                               
10 Both countries also had racist policies against non-whites (African-Americans and other minorities in the US and 
Aboriginals in Australia). 
11 UNHCR Global Refugee Trends 2006. Figures represent arrivals from 1999 to 2006.  
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2.2.3: Limitations of this comparative case research design 
There are several key limitations to this case design including those typical of 
comparative research designs and those specific to this project. The project compares 
only two countries, which limits the extent to which I can generalize these findings 
beyond these two cases. This is not simply a matter of depth versus breadth, as it is 
possible to draw out additional aspects within each context to allow for additional 
variation in this project. For example, it could be possible to find sub-national 
locations in the United States where the policy programs look similar to Australian 
programs, but where the actors remain distinctly American-like. Where possible I 
have tried to draw out these inferences, but I was not able to systematically do this 
given constraints on time and resources.  For example, it was not possible to speak 
with settlement staff and refugees in each of the US states where refugees were 
resettled.  
2.3: Sudanese refugees and the Lost Boys of Sudan 
The choice to compare first Sudanese refugees, and then the Lost Boys of Sudan 
is a direct response to contemporary methodological weaknesses, and makes the 
project distinguishable from many research projects within the international 
migration literature. Much contemporary migration studies examine migrant 
communities that share a similar national origin but have varied pre-migratory 
experiences (for example, Basch et al 1994, Guarnizo et al 2003, Koopmans 2994; 
Østergaard-Nielsen 2003). The migrant communities that have been researched are 
comprised of people who came from different origin country communities, with 
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diverging political, cultural and economic experiences, who had different migration 
paths and who had different legal statuses once they resettled. These contemporary 
works draw conclusions regarding refugees’ wellbeing, and the social, cultural, 
economic and political activities of large groups of refugees (based on their 
nationality), despite the refugees’ quite divergent histories prior to third country 
resettlement.  
This choice is often made because of the obvious difficulties in both uncovering 
these divergent pre-migration histories prior to conducting research with these 
communities and having a large enough samples for certain research designs. Yet, 
these are quite important. Pre-migrant histories determine the levels of education and 
resources with which refugees arrive for resettlement. Socio-cultural norms acquired 
by groups of migrants and refugees who experienced similar trajectories are unique 
to them and can have significant influences on the newcomers’ settlement 
experiences. For instance, refugees who have lived in camps may have different 
political desires and goals, and different attitudes and behaviors, than those who have 
lived as asylum-seekers in border countries.  
To overcome this obstacle, I utilized a cross-national comparison first of the 
political activities of southern Sudanese refugees and second, the “Lost Boys of 
Sudan,” in the U.S. and Australia.  The majority of Sudanese refugees settled in the 
US and Australia are from South Sudan, share experiences of migration to several 
countries before settlement in these final host countries, share similar socio-
economic backgrounds (in subsistence farming or cattle rearing) and share an int nse 
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motivation to see independence, peace and development in South Sudan. The bulk of 
this population living in the US and Australia comes from the same socio-economic 
background.  
By further narrowing the focus to the Lost Boys of Sudan, I can control for even 
more variables. Obviously individuals still have divergent life histories, experiences 
in their shared communities and are born with different traits. Yet, this “narrowing” 
down rules out important alternative explanations, at least in so far as social analysis 
is able to. The Lost Boys of Sudan do not vary along nationality, political, cultural 
and economic experiences, migration path and newcomer legal status, and thus, it is 
possible to rule such factors out as possible explanations for the cross-national 
variation seen. In so doing, I bypass a prominent methodological difficulty in this 
scholarship. Narrowing down allows me to separate out the specific influences of 
receiving country factors from other factors such as refugee community 
characteristics, origin country mobilization, and migration path experiences.  
2.4: Data Collection and Analysis 
I utilized three research methods to collect data. First, I collected descriptive 
data on Sudanese-created organizations in both of these national sites. Second, I did 
an in-depth analysis of settlement policies, procedures and programs, utilizing policy 
and programmatic documentation collected during fieldwork and through Internet 
research. Third, I utilized semi-structured interviews with key players involved in 
creating policy (government officials), and implementing policy (government 
officials, settlement administration and staff) as well as those who were the subjects 
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of the policies (refugees). The data was analyzed in two distinct sections: 
organizational and interview research.  
2.4.1: Organizational Research  
Sudanese refugee leaders have created organizations to meet their social, 
political, economic and cultural goals. I collected information about these 
organizations and coded the data according to the specific targets, or goals of the 
organizations. This provided evidence that there was variation in the patterns of 
Sudanese refugee activities across these two national settlement sites. 
2.4.1.1: Finding Sudanese Organizations 
 I attempted to collect data on the histories, programs and the targets of the 
programming of all organizations of Southern Sudanese in the U.S. and Australia.  I 
found a combined total of over 260 organizations in both countries, which at best 
represents a sample of entities that are more institutionalized.  I conducted a basic 
search of the Internet for these organizations, utilizing the Google search ngine. 
Straightforward search terms including “Sudanese”, “Sudan”, “Lost Boys” and “Lost 
Girls” with the terms “Community,” “Organization” and “Association” were used to 
find these organizations. I examined the first 40 – 50 sites that were found matching 
the terms. Toward the end of data collection, this dwindled to the first 20 websites 
because either the sites were repetitive or clearly irrelevant. Most organizations were 
discovered because they had their own website, or were affiliated with an 
organization that had its own website. Others were discovered because they were 
listed as recipients of grants from national or local governments. This was primarily 
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the case for organizations in Australia (which makes sense, given the nature of the 
settlement policies and actors there). I found additional organizations from 
documents or lists found on the websites of other organizations. I first compiled a 
complete list of all of the organizations and their basic contact information. In an 
effort to compile the most complete list possible, I crosschecked this list with lists 
prepared by southern Sudanese refugee groups and informational websites, including 
The Lost Boys National Network and Gurtong Trust12 and with the non-profit data 
bank Charity Navigator. 
Organizational characteristics data was collected on 181 organizations. I 
could not find any data on the target and purpose of 86 organizations (or 30%). 
These organizations were not coded because they lacked either a website or 
information on any other document. A typical organization’s website contained 
information about their histories and founders (“about us”), their activities (“what e 
do”), ways that they mobilize volunteers and donors (“get involved”; “donate”) and 
media about their events and plans (“newsroom”). I also read organizations’ nnual 
reports and other documents found on their websites. Through descriptions of 
organizational functions found on grant recipient lists posted online by local 
governments, I was able to discern this information for some organizations without 
websites.  
2.4.1.2: Coding Organizational Patterns  
                                               
12 This is a website made by and for south Sudanese living outside of South Sudan. http://www.gurtong.net/. 
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After the organizational data was collected, I constructed one main variable: 
the target of the organization. By “target”, the main organizational characteristi  of 
interest, I refer to the aim, or direction of the organization’s activities.13 I categorize 
“target” four ways: (1) “transnational,” an organization whose goals wereto effect 
change in southern Sudan; (2) “domestic,” an organization that aimed to effect 
change in the resettlement country; (3) “both”, an organization with both of the 
previously discussed goals and (4) “transnational through domestic,” an organization 
whose goals were “transnational,” but that aimed to do this by bringing services to 
southern Sudanese in the resettlement country. An organization with goals to build a 
school, or health clinic in Southern Sudan is an example of a “transnational” 
organization. Organizations with goals to bring services, such as literacy skill 
building, integration initiatives or driver’s education to southern Sudanese who 
reside in the same third country resettlement site as the organization are examples of 
“domestic” organizations. In this category, I also include organizations with cultural 
and social purposes, such as bringing the Sudanese resettlement community together
to enjoy similar cultural practices and events.  
The coding of these organizations was fairly straightforward, and therefore 
did not present issues of coder validity. The target of an organization’s activities was 
in most cases clearly domestic or transnational – either geared toward South Sudan 
                                               
13 It would certainly strengthen the project to have information pertaining to the organization’s overall assets or levels 
of membership. Unfortunately this was not feasible, as this data is not systematically available for the majority of these 
organizations. It is not likely that this data, if available would change the general pattern of the findings. For example, 
several well-funded organizations with a large membrship in one country could be fairly equivalent to many smaller 
organizations with less financial resources in the other. I did not find this to be the case with these organizations. Most 
of the organizations in both countries are small and led by a small number of Sudanese refugees.  
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and its people, or to the US or Australia and the Sudanese living there. Thus, there 
were not instances of ‘edge’ cases, or cases where it was difficult to discern the 
target of their activities. In cases where organizational activities were explicitly 
geared toward both domestic and transnational activities, these were coded as “both.” 
Additionally when organizations engaged in ‘domestic’ activities in order to effect 
change in South Sudan, these were coded as “transnational through domestic.” For 
example, when an organization with goals to reconstruct southern Sudan by 
providing an education to refugees within a resettlement site, who can then return to 
their homeland with this human capital, refugees are engaging in a political activity 
that is transnational through domestic means.14 
2.4.1.3: Limitations of Organizational Research 
Gathering data on Sudanese organizations primarily through Internet research 
has several limitations. These limitations derive mainly from the fact that 
organizations, (migrant-created or not) often fail to update their websites regarding 
the status of their programming and organization more broadly. Thus, it is possible 
that I have collected inaccurate information, and perhaps even included organizations 
that no longer exist.15 The first factor is more of a concern, if, for instance, a 
“domestically-focused” organization has begun to take on transnational activities, 
but has not yet updated its website. It would still remain categorized as a 
                                               
14 For these reasons I did not find it necessary to do intercoder reliability checks.  
15 Migrant organizations, in general, have precarious histories, so it is highly unlikely that an entire universe of cases 
(organizations) could be discovered. Migrant organiz tions arise and dissolve quickly (Schrover and Vermu llen 2005). 
Some organizations are created but their founders take no further action to implement programs. Although many 
organizations do have quite sophisticated websites (with detailed information on the mission, history, current 
programming and contact information), a considerable number of them do not. 
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domestically-focused organization. Similarly, it is possible that a transnationally-
focused organization has started bringing services to its refugee resettlemen  
community, but has yet to note this on its website. I do not have any particular 
reasons to believe that the data would be skewed toward one target or another, 
however. The fact that some of these organizations may no longer exist is actually 
not that important to my argument. Despite an organization’s dissolution, the fact 
that it was targeting southern Sudan, or its resettlement community in a particular 
resettlement context is the most relevant empirical data to capture, as it is  data 
point suggesting what the refugee leaders’ political focus was. 
Assessing the organizations that Sudanese refugees have created enabled me 
to examine the presence or absence of patterns regarding the targets of refugee 
political activities – i.e. did refugee activities take a definitive shape in different 
national contexts? These organizations demonstrate most clearly where the refuge s 
place their political energy and political desires.  The organizations show what 
refugees value in terms of where they give time and resources. Their organizations 
connote quite directly for whom, and for what region the refugees want to effect 
social change. 
2.4.2: Documentary Data  
I analyzed Australian and US government documents as well as those 
produced by policy implementers and some personal and professional documents 
prepared by refugee leaders. These documents provided two types of information. 
First, much of the documentary data provided background information about the two 
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contexts that served to establish a solid understanding about each country’s 
settlement programs. These documents also served as a review of the discursive 
focus or emphasis that each country placed on particular aspects of their program. 
For example, documentary data derived from grant announcements by both the US 
State Department and Office of Refugee Resettlement repeatedly state the main role 
of settlement programming is refugee employment. In comparable Australian 
documents, the significance of employment, while not discursively sidelined, 
appears just as frequently as other objectives, such as social integration.  
 I reviewed government-sponsored public papers, published policy reports, 
refugee community surveys, and documents pertaining to grant announcements, 
bureaucratic procedures, funding and contract management. I examined the annual 
reports, programmatic documents and policy responses prepared by policy 
implementers as well as refugee advocates. I read life histories, reports, presentations 
and poetry prepared by southern Sudanese refugees.  
2.4.3: Semi-structured Interviews 
Data from websites and documents offer little information about how settlement 
contexts and actors influence the goals and methods of refugee activism. For thisI 
sought to identify and understand processes – i.e. how one actor or institutional 
structure impacted another actor or structure, which then impacted another actor and 
structure (and so on). In particular, I sought out information about how national 
settlement policies were implemented on the “ground level” by policy implementrs, 
and how they influenced refugee participation. Through semi-structured interviews, I 
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sought out evidence of specific mechanisms by which the general settlement 
approach, settlement programs and policy implementers influenced the political 
activities of the Sudanese refugees. I utilized an interview protocol created according 
to the specific type of interview subject (refugee, professional service worker, 
government official, advocate and volunteer). Although I deviated from the protocol 
when the interview subject brought up an issue that seemed relevant to the research, I 
always asked a certain line of questions to each interview subject type. For exampl , 
to service providers, I asked questions about the characteristic of the organizations 
(mission, funding sources, etc), about the types of resources their organization 
provided to refugees, their interaction with other service providers and with refugees 
(see Appendices A, B, C and D for all of the interview protocols). I employed semi-
structured interviews with key informants to gain deep familiarity with these 
mechanisms within these two country cases.  
In total, I interviewed 56 people in Australia and 43 people in the United States, 
for a total of 99 interview subjects (see Table 2.1). In Australia, 30% of subjects 
were Sudanese refugees, 54% were professional settlement service workers, 9% 
were government officials working on refugee settlement programming and 7% were 
advocates or volunteers. In the United States, 35% of subjects were Sudanese 
refugees, 33% were professional settlement service workers, 16% were govenment 
officials that dealt with refugee settlement and 16% were volunteers or advcates 
(Table 2.1).  
Table 2.1: Interview Subjects 
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 Australia United States 
Refugees 17 15 
Service Providers 30 14 
Government Officials 5 7 
Advocates/ Volunteers 4 7 
TOTAL  56 43 
Note 1: In several interviews with service providers in Australia, 4-5 providers were present. I 
included each individual in the figure listed above.  
Note 2: In many instances, particularly in Australia, many refugees were also service providers.   
When I discussed their own experiences with settlement, I included them in the ‘refugee’ category.   
 
Informants were individuals extensively involved with refugee settlement and 
often with this particular group of refugees, including members of the Lost Boys, 
other Sudanese leaders, settlement service workers and administrators, government 
officials, professors, community members and refugee advocates. I used two 
strategies to contact informants. Most refugees I interviewed were relatives or 
friends of an earlier refugee contact.  I also met some refugees at settlemen  service 
offices. Other refugees were sought out specifically because of their leadership roles 
in the community. Regarding the other categories of informants, I tried to speak with 
as many as possible in order to ensure I heard as many perspectives as possible. I 
often sought out people who worked specifically with Sudanese refugees.  
The refugees whom I interviewed included some that were quite active politically 
(as demonstrated by their leadership roles), some who were only moderately so 
(were political active but did not hold leadership roles), and some with low levels of 
political participation (those that directly stated they were not active). It was 
important to interview politically active refugee leaders as well as members of their 
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organizations. Through a snowball sampling method, I procured additional refugee 
interviews. This ensured interviews with both refugee informants who had some 
affiliation with organizations or participation in other political activities as well as 
those who had none. Interviewing refugees with lower degrees of political activism 
can shed light on the barriers to participation in political activity, the presence or 
absence of relationships with settlement service providers and volunteers, and the
dynamics of service provider-refugee relationships.  
Policy implementers and policymaker informants were contacted for interviews 
through various means. First, I sought out settlement service workers and 
administrative staff with leadership roles and those that were working specifically 
with south Sudanese refugees, as well as refugee advocates. These participants 
advised me to speak with specific people, and often had rosters of individuals that 
were involved in the settlement sector, in many cases with the settlement of 
Sudanese refugees and the Lost Boys. I spoke with as many people as I could and 
sought to interview people with divergent perspectives due to their different 
positions in the settlement matrix. Government officials often saw things differently 
than settlement service workers, whose insights differed from refugees and their 
advocates. The system of refugee settlement involves a large number of individuals, 
including social service providers (police, therapists, educators, health departmnt 
workers, court officials, etc.) and community members. Thus, I was obviously not 
able to speak with everyone, nor even to sample along all the various types. Instead, 
I chose to interview those who worked with refugees the most, as it is through policy 
implementers that policies and approaches make an impact. This research does not 
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aim to be the definitive statement regarding settlement policies and refugee political 
participation. Thus, I have sought to develop an understanding of settlement 
structures, refugee political participation and the relationships between them through 
a process of “saturation”16. In so doing, my analysis provides an evidence-based 
interpretation about how settlement institutions and policy implementers influence 
refugee political activities.  
2.4.3.1: Analyzing Processes and Dynamics  
After each interview, I prepared memos to identify significant themes of the 
interview, for example, “domestic channeling of refugee leaders” or “refuge  
distrust.” The audio taped interviews were transcribed. These memos and interviews 
were placed into Atlas TI and coded again into themes such as “community capacity 
building,” “policy implementer competition,” “donor constraints,” “Lost Boy 
political activities” and “refugee visa status.” Certain themes, because of th ir 
saliency among the different types of informants, became the foundation of the 
dissertation chapters.17 
I analyzed the data drawing heavily from grounded theory methods (Glaser and 
Strauss 1967). In each step of this process, I engaged in what grounded theorists call 
                                               
16 By saturate I mean that I sought to interview informants until what I heard was no longer new to me. This is a 
specific technique utilized in Grounded Theory practices. 
17 In two distinct phases of the interview analysis I broke the data into themes. I did this first when I created memos 
following the interviews, and then again during my review of the interviews in Atlas TI. This saturation process both 
narrowed my vision, because the data was organized into themes, but also deepened my understanding about specific 
ways in which policy and policy implementers influenc d refugee activities. This provided the necessary tructure and 
focus during different stages of the project. I used ATLAS TI in a somewhat simple way, to code the data into themes, 
in order to organize the near 100 interviews. This allowed me to see the saliency of the themes, and to organize the 
themes for the write up.  
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“constant comparison” – continually ensuring that the data led my conjectures about 
appropriate themes and categories (i.e. grounding the conjectures, or hunches, in the 
data). From several interrelated themes, I created categories that were the foundation 
for the middle-level theories about how settlement institutions influence refugee 
political activities found in Chapters 5 and 6.   
This process was especially useful for this project because it utilizes an inductive 
analytical process and allows for the development of middle range theories. Using an 
inductive analytical process was necessary given the lack of scholarship perta ning to 
the influence of settlement policy on refugee political participation. Additionally, the 
grounded theory method is structured around the notion that “process” and change 
are always evident in social phenomena, and therefore middle range theories are 
about as good as we can get. This is highly compatible with this project, as I am 
looking at policies, programs, policy implementers and service recipients that 
influence one another and change. This has two important implications for a 
researcher. First, it is necessary to look for this “interplay” between conditions and 
actors/people to examine how these conditions change, and how actors respond to 
this. Also, it requires the researcher to make only tentative conclusions about the 
environments and people studied (Corbin and Strauss 1990).  
2.4.3.2: Benefits and Limitations of evidence from semi-structured interviews  
The semi-structured approach enabled a considerable amount of flexibility in 
terms of where the interview conversation could lead, and what new factors could be 
explored. Basic questions provided a structure, but unique follow up questions and 
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discussions developed out of them according to each informant’s responses. This 
level of discretion enabled me to become familiar with the roles and practices of 
each of these actors, as these participants understood them. Ultimately, this allowed 
me to draw new insights beyond what my original questions would allow. For 
example, I learned how a settlement service worker’s western style of running 
meetings caused refugees to feel cut out of some decision-making processes. This 
example arose out of semi-structured conversation, and could not have been learned 
through a more structured interview process. Additionally, this format ensured that I 
did not entirely dictate the interview experience, but enabled greater participation by 
the informants. The decision to interview in this manner encouraged stronger 
relationships between participants and me and ultimately facilitated greater 
understandings.  
Nevertheless, there were prickly aspects to the data collection process. I ho e to 
examine the effects of settlement on Sudanese refugees, especially the Lost Boys of 
Sudan. This population is no longer the central population of concern for settlement 
actors in either the United States or Australia. The sector’s energy moves quickly 
from one population to the next- as quickly as a new group of refugees arrives. There 
can be quite a great deal of turnover in the sector. These factors can hinder data 
collection.  Fortunately, I was still able to speak with many who worked with 
Sudanese refugees and the Lost Boys. Another factor was that settlement workers 
and refugees themselves depend in large part upon their memories to relate the ways 
they interacted with one another; and, memories, can change or fade over time.  
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2.5: Conclusions 
 To review, I utilize a qualitative, case study analysis of two national contexts: 
Australia and the U.S. The overall design of the research, which includes an 
examination of the Lost Boys of Sudan, shares some characteristics with a natural 
experiment, and therefore is distinguishable from many research projects within the 
international migration literature. These two host countries also share a similar 
immigrant-nation history, and social and economic characteristics particular to 
advanced welfare states. This research design allowed a more pointed analysis of the 
settlement sector in particular.  
To gain deep familiarity with these cases I employed semi-structured 
interviews with Sudanese refugee leaders, settlement sector staff, efugee advocates 
and government officials in these settlement contexts. Through these interviews, I 
found evidence of the specific causal mechanisms and processes through which 
settlement policies, funding and policy implementers influenced Sudanese refugee 
political activities. In-depth examination of policies, procedures and programs of 
refugee settlement across these national and local contexts provided the necessary 
background of these two contexts and discursively illuminated the main foci of these 
two settlement programs. These combined efforts have allowed me shed light on the 
reasons why these two different patterns of Sudanese refugee political activities are 
seen, and specifically the ways that settlement institutions and policy implement rs 
influence these social phenomena. 
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Chapter 3: Sudanese Refugees and their Organizations 
3.1: Introduction 
The objective of this chapter is to present evidence of the empirical puzzle 
presented by this dissertation project and to examine factors relevant to its resolution. 
First, provide a description of the background of southern Sudanese refugees, their 
migration paths and the demographic composition of Sudanese refugees in the US 
and Australia. I review the decades-long civil war, which has dispersed thousands of 
South Sudanese across the globe and brought many to new homelands in Australia, 
the US, and elsewhere. Included as well is an exploration of how this experience has 
instilled in the refugees a desire to effect change in South Sudan and for South 
Sudanese globally.  
The findings in this chapter highlight that while Sudanese refugee groups in 
the US and Australia do share patterns of political participation, distinct national 
trends in Sudanese refugee political activities also exist and are quite complling. 
Sudanese refugee organizations in both countries are linked to a South Sudan 
identity by which these activists feel that it is their duty to help their country a d 
their country’s people. Secondly, these organizations are created with the support of 
nationals in each of these sites. The exchange of ideas, money and time between 
Sudanese refugees with American and Australian nationals is evident. But, the data 
demonstrates clear differences across these resettlement sites in the organizational 
target, or direction of activism toward the homeland or toward the refugee 
resettlement community. The goals of organizations in the United States are more 
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likely to be aimed at effecting change in southern Sudan. Roughly 50% of 
organizations are aimed at providing services solely to their communities in southern 
Sudan, while another 25% have both domestic and transnational goals. Thus, about 
75% of organizations created by Sudanese who have settled in the United States have 
transnational ambitions. In Australia the efforts of southern Sudanese refugees are 
aimed primarily at softening the challenges of settling into a new country by 
providing additional settlement services and support. A very small proportion of 
organizations are engaged in international development projects to effect change in 
southern Sudan. Approximately 70% of organizations are formed to provide services 
to the Sudanese community who was settled in Australia.  
3.2: Background of South Sudan and its people  
January 2011’s South Sudanese Referendum saw an almost unanimous vote 
in favor of South Sudanese independence from the Republic of Sudan. This will 
break up Africa’s largest country, and the 10th largest country in the world (Gurtong 
Trust 2011). After six decades of conflict and a tenuous peace between the North and 
South, in July 2011 the international community will welcome an additional country 
into its club of sovereignties, the Republic of South Sudan. 
This is a bittersweet moment in the lives of the more than 8 million South 
Sudanese, many of whom have known nothing but conflict and struggle for their 
entire lives (Gurtong Trust).18 Following the movement for self determination and 
                                               
18 The 8 million figure comes from the 2008 Sudanese census that is disputed by the South. Some southerners believe 
this grossly underestimates the South’s population and is simply a tactic to reduce the South’s share of power and 
wealth as laid out in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (Gurtong Trust).  
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decolonization among colonized African countries, Sudan was free to govern itself 
after the abolishment of a joint condominium between Great Britain and Egypt that 
had ruled the area since 1898 (Deng 2010). This was not real independence for 
southerners. The colonial practices of Britain (and to a lesser extent, Egypt) in Sudan 
kept intact a widely segmented Sudan,19 heavily privileging the north and employing 
strict regulations on interaction between the two regions.20 These practices include 
the greater development of economic and political resources in the North. Due to 
this, political, economic, human capital and political incorporation disparities are 
vast between the North and other regions throughout Sudan (UK Sudan Country 
Profile). 
It was primarily northern Sudanese who catalyzed the call for self-
determination and independence, and they, along with the British discouraged 
southern Sudanese participation. The lack of political involvement of Southerners 
meant that the process of independence was essentially dominated by northern 
political elites. Given vast, untapped resources in the South, Northern elites remained 
tied to a unified Sudan.21 Southern calls for increased autonomy were deemed 
unacceptable and encouraged authoritarian practices on the part of the North to 
ensure that secession and instability would not occur. This set in motion a dynamic 
                                               
19 Roughly understood as an Arab, Muslim north and a black African, animist and Christian south. 
20 This resulted in very different social, economic and educational contexts. Please see Archippus 2005 for a 
description of the extent to which separation policies encouraged disparities. The Sudan Tribune 
http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article11970  
21 This included Jaafar Muhammad al-Nemieri and Omar Hasan Ahmad al-Bashir. Ideational and material motivations 
encouraged interest in Sudanese unity, including oil reserves found in the south and the desire to imple ent 
fundamentalist Islamist practices statewide.  
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whereby violent or coercive measures to obtain political authority were utilized 
rather than non-violent measures (de Waal 2007). These include rebel movements 
and four military coups (de Waal 2007; Deng 2010).  
Almost immediately after independence, the first of two civil wars broke out, 
following the same issues that would characterize most of Sudan’s conflicts in the 
20th and 21st centuries: “regional discontent with exploitation, of both people and 
resources, by the central government in Khartoum (de Waal 2007).” South Sudan 
was rightfully scared that British colonialism would be replaced by northern 
Sudanese Arab exploitation. Following independence, northerners implemented 
Arabization and Islamization policies throughout the country (Deng 2010). This war, 
lasting from 1956 until 1972, ceased with a North-South compromise, the Addis 
Abba Agreement. This allowed southern regional autonomy and recognition of their 
belief systems (Ibid). The second civil war began in 1983 when President Jaafar 
Nimeiri implemented the September Laws. In an effort to assuage Islamist political 
elites in northern Sudan, he placed all of Sudan under Sharia law. Southern leader, 
John Garang, who became the figurehead of an autonomous, developed and educated 
southern Sudan, led the Sudan People’s Liberation Army and movement (SPLA/M) 
against Khartoum and its militia forces. Rather than secession, however, the stated 
objectives of the SPLA were “liberation of the whole country from the Arab-Isl mic 
domination and the creation of a New Sudan in which there would be no 
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discrimination due to race, ethnicity, culture, religion or gender (Deng 2010, pp 7-
8).”22  
In January of 2005, after 22 years of conflict, the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement (CPA) was signed, establishing one country, with two governance 
systems. This ensured self-governance for south Sudan, including the ability to 
determine its own development budget and laws and laid out a plan for equitable 
wealth distribution and demarcation of disputed borders. It created the Government 
of National Unity in which al Bashir was President and John Garang was Vice 
President.23  
These wars wreaked havoc on the Sudanese population and on the political, 
economic and social development of southern Sudan. All parties were guilty of gross 
human rights abuses, including indiscriminate killing of civilians, slavery, 
kidnapping and torture.  Land mines were laid; villages were looted and destroyed; 
land and cattle were stolen. Over two million people were killed or died from causes 
related to the war and thousands were abducted and enslaved. Millions were 
internally displaced and became refugees (Deng 2010). Famine and disease due to 
the civil war amounted to over half of the deaths. In 1994, over 40% of the children 
were undernourished, a figure “among the highest ever documented” in the region 
                                               
22 The diversity in Sudan makes Arab-Islamic domination untenable. Over 600 ethnic groups (HRW 1994) exist and 
400 languages spoken in all of Sudan (Gurtong). Sudanese are generally grouped into Arab-Muslim northerners and 
African southerners who practice indigenous, animist religious practices or Christianity (following conversions by 
British missionaries) (Deng 2010). 
23 Garang’s SPLA held 28% of the National Assembly and Cabinet votes (de Waal 2007) 
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(Human Rights Watch 1994). Southerners’ main sources of food and income, 
subsistence farming and cattle rearing, were entirely disrupted.  
Following the CPA, large challenges loomed for South Sudan, including lack 
of stable government institutions, basic human services, navigable roads and other 
infrastructure and near absence of human capital. The region is acutely 
underdeveloped. Development statistics demonstrate the dire situation. 90% of its 
population is impoverished; 48% of children are malnourished; there is an illiteracy 
rate of 70%, and only a 20% primary education enrollment rate (Sudan Multi Donor 
Trust Funds First Progress Report 2006). National, regional and local government 
institutions are being established but remain in their infant stages. Violence still 
characterizes the country, including the well-known Darfur conflict and in North-
South border regions such as Abyei, where untapped oil reserves are a source of 
conflict. Nevertheless, Sudan, including southern Sudan successfully completed 
national and state-level elections in April 2010, the first in 24 years (2011 UNHCR 
country operations profile – Sudan) and a peaceful referendum this past January.  
Despite years of conflict, destruction and underdevelopment, there are 
reasons to be hopeful about the fate of South Sudan. These events, however, have 
resulted in massive South Sudanese internal and external migration. 
3.3: South Sudanese Migration  
 South Sudanese are scattered throughout the East African region and around the 
world. Four million Sudanese were uprooted as a result of the wars (United Nations 
Mission in Sudan). During the second civil war Southerners scattered to Uganda, the 
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Democratic Republic of the Congo (formerly known as Zaire), Ethiopia and Kenya. 
Hundreds of thousands lived in transition zones between the north and south and 
millions in the greater Khartoum area in shantytowns. Indeed, an estimated 3 million 
people are expected to return to southern Sudan from the north or from abroad 
(UNFPA Sudan General Profile). The UN estimates that anywhere from 500 
thousand to 2 million South Sudanese live outside of their country (Sexton 2011). 
The bulk of South Sudanese living outside of their country are in Australia, Britain, 
Canada, Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda and the United States (Ibid). In the 
following section, I detail the history of the Lost Boys of Sudan, one sub-group of 
South Sudanese refugees. 
3.3.1: The “Lost Boys of Sudan” 
The “Lost Boys (and Girls) of Sudan” make up a sub-group of the displaced 
southern Sudanese. They have been resettled to Australia, Canada and the U.S., 
among other places. Prior to resettlement, in the mid to late 1980’s, these refugees, 
aged roughly 4-13 migrated on foot from small villages and towns in southern Sudan 
to Ethiopia, where makeshift refugee camps were run by the SPLA/M. In 1991, 
when the Mengistu government in Ethiopia was overthrown, they were forced to 
Kenya. The Lutheran World Federation, overseen by the UNHCR, established 
Kakuma refugee camp for the children who survived starvation, conscription into 
rebel forces, attacks from northern Sudanese forces, Ethiopian fighters, wild animals, 
and disease (Verdirame 1999). Approximately 7,000 (Verdirame 1999) to 20,000 
(U.S. Office of Refugee Resettlement, 2002) survived this journey. They include 
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both females and males, despite the attention placed on “Lost Boys” (McKelvey 
2003).  Some have been a part of a cohort of roughly 4,000 persons scattered 
throughout the United States. Others are in Australia, Britain, Canada and Cuba.  Of 
the rest, some remain in Kakuma refugee camp in northwestern Kenya, while others 
have moved to Nairobi, Kenya or have returned to southern Sudan.  
This sub-group of refugees is remarkable in important ways, including their 
access to and acquisition of human capital and their intense desire to rebuild southern 
Sudan. First, resettlement in Kakuma refugee camp as children set this population 
apart from the broader southern Sudanese refugee population. The male children 
were placed in a distinct housing system, where they lived in zones apart from the 
larger community. Their housing system was mixed-tribe and mixed-region and 
mixed-age. Girls without families were taken in as foster children and often were 
treated like domestic servants. 
Kakuma refugee camp, while desolate in many ways, did provide a formal 
education and other educational experiences that have facilitated the development of 
refugee human capital. Kakuma is home to 343 youth training centers and primary 
schools, 21 secondary schools, two high schools and two technical colleges. 
Individuals are taught a Kenyan national curriculum, which includes instruction in 
English. Arabic courses are also taught. (Perouse de Montclos and Kagwanja 2000). 
This is incredibly gendered however. Many of the male (and only some female) 
children completed primary and secondary education sponsored by the UN and 
Kenya. Children and young adults also participated in extracurricular activities such 
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as debate club, choir, church activities, drama, health education and conflict 
resolution. Some held leadership positions in these activities. Many westerner hav  
been quite surprised by the English fluency, educational attainment, leadership 
capacities and social skills of refugees who came from this camp.24 Overall, it is 
incorrect to present the situation of Kakuma refugee camp as being without any 
social and educative value. 
Leadership skills, such as decision-making, problem-solving, advocacy and 
organization were developed through experiences as zone leaders, leading the choir, 
developing and coordinating a Young Christian Student Organization, a drama club 
and debate club and through holding hired NGO and UNHCR positions organizing 
youth cultural affairs for the camp. These experiences often developed the social 
skills of the refugees, enabling them to make connections with community members, 
representatives of NGOs and visitors. The refugees learned important cultural 
practices. Their training increased the likelihood that they would have opportunities 
to learn additional skills, such as oratory, computer and IT, as well as to learn the ins
and outs of international organization and non-governmental organizational 
operations on the ground. Awareness of critical issues including gender equality and 
HIV/AIDS were also developed by these activities. Many of the young refu e s 
acquired advocacy skills and the ability to present their needs to outsiders through 
making claims to the UNHCR regarding food and physical security in the camp and 
through interacting with visitors to the camp (see Harrell-Bond 2002). 
                                               
24 According to the U.S. Office of Refugee Resettlement, in relation to the self-sufficiency goals in the US, males are 
doing better than the average refugee and national (although there is wage differentiation of course). Females from this 
same resettlement cohort are not doing as well – and are below female refugees and nationals (2005). 
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Second, like most Southerners, the Lost Boys have a strong desire to see an 
autonomous, developed South Sudan.   Many in this sub-group are driven by this 
motivation to unusual heights.25 As boys, these men were specifically charged by 
political elites and by elders in their communities with the task of remaking their 
country. The late Vice President John Garang himself largely initiated this 
connection of transnational activism with education of the Lost Boys.26 Garang made 
this link to Southerners loud and clear, including the thousands of boys living in 
refugee camps.27 “Garang was telling each of us, that you have to have education,” 
noted one refugee, saying that Garang told them that, “we are being defeate  by 
Arabs because of lack of education, but if there were education the war would have 
been easy (Interview Subject 1, July 2007, Syracuse, New York).” Another 
interviewee told a story of a spontaneous arrival of Garang to an Ethiopian refugee 
camp. He describes Garang handing out pencils, and telling the boys that they must 
gain an education to be the future of southern Sudan. The lack of education, they 
were told, is the central reason for the civil war, the oppression and the 
marginalization of the southern Sudanese. The boys should attain an education to 
become the “seeds” of a new Sudan (Interview Subject 2, August 2007, Syracuse, 
New York).  
                                               
25 Again, to reiterate, this is not to say that the Lost Boys are the only transnational South Sudanese. The wider 
population of Southerners living abroad is known to be highly politically active. Indeed, some have suggested that 
Northern political officials didn’t want South Sudanese living abroad to vote in the referendum because they are so 
politically active (Sexton 2011). 
26 Prior to overseeing the SPLA/M, Garang received a doctoral degree from Iowa State University. 
27 Although many of these refugees were also seen as soldier-commodities for the SPLA, John Garang also emphasized 
their education. 
73 
 
This link between education and activism for southern Sudan is epitomized in 
the saying of so many Lost Boys: “education is our mother and father.” When 
opportunities for resettlement to western industrialized countries surfaced, third 
country settlement became an integral part of this mission to remake their homeland. 
Places like the US and Australia would be the sites for gaining a western education 
and the necessary starting places to rebuild southern Sudan.  
The Lost Boys of Sudan are a unique sub-group. Many of these displaced 
South Sudanese are better educated than the average South Sudanese, speak English 
and have unique experiences that bolstered their human capital. It is important to 
look specifically at their political activism, as well as the activism of S uth Sudanese 
in general. I turn to this now. 
3.4: South Sudanese Refugees in Australia and the United States 
The Sudanese communities in the United States and Australia are quite 
similar (see Table 1). As is shown below, each resettlement country has settled 
approximately the same number of refugees from this source country. Differences in 
the political participation of these communities would not derive from the size and 
thus relative amount of support within the communities. Second, The sizes of the 
cases that have been resettled are almost identical: roughly one third of the Sudan se 
who were resettled to both countries came without any other family members. 
Furthermore, in both communities, roughly half of the Sudanese are working-age 
adults.28 These community characteristics could be quite significant if differences 
                                               
28 This does not take into consideration variations in Sudanese health conditions across these two countries.  
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across these two countries were evident. For example, if one country settled mainly 
single men or women, without families, while the other settled families, one 
reasonable argument for these empirical differences could be related to differing 
interests and obligations of the refugee populations. These characteristics are similar 
across these two countries and cannot explain the empirical differences evident 
across these countries.  
Table 3.1: Demographic Characteristics of Sudanese refugees 
 Australia  United States 
Community Size  20186 23292 
Individual or Family Unit   37 % Individual  31% Individual 
Average Age ~56% Aged 18 - 64  51% Aged 21 - 64 
Visa 74% Special Humanitarian  79% Priority 1 
Note 1: Figures represent all arrivals from 2001 - 2006 in Australia and from 1998 – 2011 in the United 
States, except a) figures for the size of the community is from 1999 – 2006 and b) Individual or Family 
Unit US data is from 1998 - 2011. Australia’s large-scale Sudanese settlement took off in 2001.  
Note 2: By ‘Individual’ or ‘Family Unit’ I refer to whether or not a person came alone or with family 
members.  
Note 3: All Australian figures derive from DIAC’s Sudanese Community Profile (2006) and from the U.S. 
Department of State’s Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration. The one exception is the size of the 
community, derived from UNHCR global reports.  
 
3.4.1: Resettlement Processes  
How did Sudanese get to the United States and Australia? Perhaps 
differences in the individuals who were selected for resettlement would account for 
these empirical differences. 98% of the Sudanese refugees coming into Australia 
come through the Humanitarian Program, specifically aimed at serving migrants in 
great need. As depicted in Table 3.1, over 74% of these Sudanese newcomers arrived 
under the Special Humanitarian Program (SHP). Individuals living in refugee-like 
situations are eligible to be considered for a SHP visa if an Australian citizen 
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proposes their entry. These individuals are not necessarily refugees, but oftentimes 
have the same life experiences as refugees. They must be “subject to substantial 
discrimination amounting to a gross violation of their human rights in their home 
country” (Australian Department of Immigration and Citizenship). The other 26% 
came primarily through the ‘Refugee Visa,’ and were referred by the UNHCR to the 
Australian government.29  
In the United States, 79% of Sudanese were established as Priority 1 
refugees.  Sudanese refugees entered in a similar fashion to Australia: many were 
referred to the US government through UNHCR referrals (although NGOs and 
embassies can also refer refugee cases to the US Refugee Assistance Program). In 
these instances, overseas State Department officials reviewed these referrals to 
ensure that each particular case constituted a legitimate humanitarian concern 
according to US law.30. 
Would these differences in refugee resettlement processes result in this 
project’s empirical differences? In the case of Australia, although SHP visa holders 
are not always classified by the UNHCR as refugees, these individuals often have 
quite similar backgrounds to those who were classified as refugees and referred by 
                                               
29 Other visas provided in Australia’s humanitarian (rather than economic migrant) program include the ‘Emergency 
Rescue Visa’ for refugees who are in need of urgent resettlement and the ‘Women at Risk Visa,’ for females refugees 
who are referred generally to the Australian governme t by the UNHCR. See Australian Department of Immigration 
and Citizenship’s Refugee and Humanitarian Entry to Australia: Refugee and Humanitarian Visas.”  
30 For cases in the Priority 2 category, the State Department’s Population, Refugee and Migration’s (PRM) Assistant 
Secretary determines if a group is of special humanitarian concern to the United States. If a group is de ignated as a 
Priority 2 status, the entire group is eligible for processing. Additionally, for Priority 3 cases, the PRM Assistant 
Secretary allocates which nationalities should have access to refugee admissions processing for family reunification 
purposes. See US Department of State, PRM, 2006.  
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the UNHCR. In fact, it is notoriously difficult to take the steps to become a 
‘refugee.’ Often individuals who are, for all intents and purposes, a refugee do not 
have resources to access the process to become a refugee (see Hyndman 2006). 
Additionally, if the resources are available, because of lengthy processing times,
individuals will often engage in several processes to get resettled. They may have a 
claim for refugee status with the UNHCR while simultaneously being engaged in 
other paths to resettlement, such as a SHP process applied for by their relative in 
Australia. Therefore, for this project it is less important to consider what their 
classification was. Instead it is important to consider whether or not these differ nt 
visas resulted in different services, and refugee-settlement environment policy 
implementer interactions.  
When comparing SHP-visa holders to refugees settled on any of the 
priorities, these different visa classifications do not result in a significant level of 
differences at the service provision level. The 74% of Sudanese refugees in Australia 
that were processed as SHP visa holders were ‘proposed’ for residency in Australia 
by a relative. This relative was required to provide much of the short-term support, 
including airport pick-up, initial accommodation and provision of basic needs. But, 
SHP refugees have access to key services and providers, including cash assistance, 
employment services and English Education. Therefore, while there are differ nces 
between refugees in Australia, it does not negatively impact our comparison of 
Sudanese refugees in these two country cases.  
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In this section, I have demonstrated the shared similarities of Sudanese 
refugee communities in Australia and the United States. They are alike in size, age, 
gender and share similar resettlement processes. In the following section, I turn to an 
examination of the political activities of these Sudanese refugees, the data that lays 
out the empirical puzzle.  
3.5: The Empirical Puzzle: Comparing South Sudanese 
Organizations 
In this section I describe the organizations that Sudanese refugees have 
created in the United States and Australia. I hone in on the target or the direction of 
their organizational activities - transnational or domestic.31 I also describe other 
patterns that arose during the collection of the organizational data, including a) the 
significance of a South Sudanese identity; and b) the frequent collaboration with 
Australian and US nationals. I turn first to our main variable of interest (the basis for 
the empirical puzzle): the target of Sudanese refugee organizations.  
3.5.1: Organizational Targets 
The targets of South Sudanese organizations take on national resettlement 
trends: those in the US are predominantly oriented toward transnational goals, while 
most in Australia have domestic goals. In this section, I present broad trends of the 
                                               
31 The reader will note that the majority of ‘domestic-focused’ organizations focus on efforts to integrate Sudanese 
refugees into the settlement country, although there are a handful of organizations whose activities extend beyond only 
the Sudanese community. I have chosen to name these organizations ‘domestic-focused’ rather than ‘integration-
focused’ to avoid confusion for the reader. If the categories were integration- vs. –transnational-focus, the reader may 
assume that the Sudanese communities are either integ ating or to seeking to remain tied to their homeland. Generally 
speaking, Sudanese refugees had strong motivations to both integrate into their new countries and to remain tied to 
South Sudan. The targets of the organizations they create are not directly associated with the extent to which they are 
integrated or not.  
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targets.  Before presenting this data, I first turn to a description of organizatio al 
goals and activities. 
3.5.1.1: Descriptions of Organizational Targets  
What are the activities and goals that make up the organizational ‘targets’ 
that I coded? What are the actual transnational-oriented and domestic-focused 
activities that Sudanese refugees are engaged in?  
3.5.1.1.1: Domestic-focused organizations 
On the domestic-focused front, organizations are mostly engaged in work that 
encourages integration of Sudanese refugees into the fabric of their resettlement 
country. For example, in the United States, the Southern Sudan Community 
Association cites as its goals: “building welcoming communities,” and actions that 
“assist, educate & empower refugees” and encourage “cross-cultural understa ing” 
between Omaha residents and refugees. This particular organization achieves this 
through offering refugee driving courses, English-as-a-Second-Language courses, 
Interpretation services, refugee legal assistance and employment service . They also 
provide orientation and short-term settlement services as well as long-term 
integration activities such as mentoring with volunteers, tutoring and clothing 
drives.32 The Sudanese Community Association of Illinois also provides settlement 
needs such as housing and employment services, as well as services for educational, 
                                               
32 This particular organization, which at first was only servicing Sudanese refugees, has now become a part of the US 
VolAg, the Ethiopian Community Development Corporation, as an affiliate. They have now opened their servic s to all 
refugees. 
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cultural, social and economic advancement and counseling. They have established a 
community center where refugees can gain information about accessing services and 
resources. It also provides an advocacy hub for the Save Darfur Network in their 
area.  
Australian-based Sudanese Community Association of Australia focuses on a 
plentitude of domestic-focused activities. The organization provides settlemen  
services and helps ‘propose’ Sudanese nationals abroad for SHP visas as well as 
providing loans to reimburse refugee travel costs. They engage in community 
development work and arrange social events such as cultural festivals and a New 
Year’s Celebration for Sudanese settled in Australia.33  They also see themselves as 
the advocacy body for the Sudanese community in Australia. To this end, they 
promote Sudanese culture in Australia and lobby the Commonwealth to increase 
Sudanese refugee intake. They also communicate with other officials when nec ssary 
(such as the police). The Sudanese Jieng Association, another domestic-oriented 
organization provides settlement services, and developed a Family Law workshop to 
educate Sudanese refugees about the Australian family laws and norms.  
The Sudanese Community Association in South Australia provides similar 
settlement services to the community in that region with the help of an Australian-led 
migrant service organization, the Australian Refugee Association. The Bhar El 
Ghazal Youth Union, established by youth from the Bhar El Ghazal region of South 
Sudan holds cultural events for the purposes of bringing about unity among 
                                               
33 The first of January is also Independence Day for Sudan. 
80 
 
Australian-settled Sudanese tribes from that region. The Youth Union also prepared 
an issues report regarding drug and alcohol abuse in the Sudanese refugee 
community in Australia, among other domestic-focused activities. The Australian 
Sudanese Students Association promotes education, sports and integration of 
Sudanese students into Australian multiculturalism by providing tuition and 
homework assistance, sporting activities, peer mentoring, career advice and 
academic information for Sudanese in the country.  
The Equatorial Association of Queensland, Inc. brings members of the 
Australian and Sudanese communities together around cultural festivals where South 
Sudanese (particularly Equatorial) traditional dances and concerts will be performed. 
They have sought funding to provide three educational workshops, where speakers 
from a range of areas including law and community services will deliver speeches on 
similarities and differences of Australian social norms and laws and Sudanese 
cultural norms. They plan then to have a joint informal recreational gathering “where 
friends and neighbors come together to develop friendships and share information.”  
As is evident in these examples, the South Sudanese refugee organizations 
have been involved in a plethora of activities focused on integrating South Sudanese 
into their host communities. In the next section, I describe organizations focused on 
social, economic and political change in South Sudan. 
3.5.1.1.2: Transnationally-focused Organizations 
Transnationally-focused organizations work to assist Southern Sudan in a 
variety of issue areas including healthcare, education, economic development and 
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political advocacy. The John Dau Foundation has created a health clinic in Duk 
Payuel in the State of Jonglei, South Sudan that provides basic medical services and 
training for health professionals. The Lost Boys Rebuilding Southern Sudan 
organization is currently working on building high schools throughout South Sudan. 
The group also coordinates donations of clothes, computers, cars, books, furniture, 
and household supplies. Additionally, members of this refugee organization have 
partnered with local organizations and donors to send their relatives who are left in 
the refugee camp to boarding schools outside of the camp, and to assist in providing 
tutoring and assistance with schoolwork, computer maintenance and car repairs.  
The Valentino Achak Deng Foundation has also sought to bring education to 
regions of southern Sudan. They have created the Murial Bai secondary school, just 
one part of a larger education center. They seek to create the first high school in t e 
region. They have other community development goals as well, including developing 
a Community Center, fostering sports and health education, and promoting 
employment initiatives through micro-credit loans to a small number of Marial Ba  
citizens. In the US, the founder, Valentino Achak has presented at numerous 
speaking engagements to increase awareness of the state of South Sudan and have 
created a '10 things you can do for Sudan' backgrounder for those who seek to help 
Sudan.   
The Sudan Scholarship Foundation seeks to educate southern Sudanese who 
are refugees living in Kenya and Uganda. In January 2009 they provided 
scholarships to refugees toward their educational goals. The members of New Sudan 
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Generation, another US-based organization, have two current projects. First, they are 
drilling boreholes for harvesting rainwater. They are exploring other areasto access 
water as well. Second, they seek to create a community resource center equipped 
with clean water and sanitation, to provide civic education, vocational training, and 
health education.  In the past, they have supported the education of young girls and 
established solar-powered satellite linkages for Internet access at St. Bakhita School 
in Narus, South Sudan. They developed a sewing co-op for Sudanese women in 
Nimule, Sudan, and have conducted trauma-healing workshops in South Sudan and 
in Northern Uganda refugee camps. Additionally, they conducted trainings for South 
Sudanese on rehabilitation of boreholes.  
Australian Sudanese-led organizations are engaged in similar projects. 
Timpir, previously known as Panhom, seeks to enhance education and health in 
Southern Sudan. To do so, the organization plans to develop a primary school and a 
water hole in the Aweil area. It has also developed a birthing kits drive for South 
Sudan and a “Christmas gift program” in which South Sudanese children are 
sponsored by Australians. Another organization, KADI Australia, proposes projects 
in numerous issue areas, including health, education, environment, spirituality and 
communication. The Australian Good Samaritan Christian Brotherhood of Orphans 
of Africa, led by Southern Sudanese men and women in Victoria, focuses on South 
Sudanese orphans as well as education and health in their homeland. The National 
Democratic Alliance of Sudan of Oceania engages mainly in high-level political 
advocacy and seeks to bring Sudanese political parties together to oppose the current 
Sudanese regime.  
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3.5.1.1.3: Transnational through Domestic Activities 
The Lost Boys and Girls of Sudan: National Network seeks to bring together 
Lost Boys and Girls in the US and to help them help themselves as well as give back 
to South Sudan. To this end, the organization, at a 2009 Conference in San Diego, 
placed much emphasis on a US national bill, to help Sudanese refugees attain their 
education and return to South Sudan to help in reconstruction efforts. The group also 
provides resources to South Sudanese refugees   to assist with educational attainment 
and health concerns.  In an effort to foster collaboration among South Sudanese 
organizations in the US, this organization generated a contact list of all 
organizations. 
3.5.1.1.4: Domestic and Transnationally Focused Organizations 
Several organizations have both domestic and transnational goals. The South 
Sudanese Development Association, or SSUDA, is one such organization. Its work 
includes ensuring the wellbeing of southern Sudanese in Australia and doing 
humanitarian and community development work in South Sudan. Its domestic-
focused activities include integration services such as creating a Youth program 
called "Moving Forward: South Sudanese Youth Leadership and Mentoring 
Program" which was funded by the Commonwealth’s Department of Immigration 
and Citizenship. This was an 8-week program that provided life skills such as 
awareness of health issues, the role of the police and law, and learning negotiation 
and conflict resolution skills. SSUDA also seeks to build primary schools and health 
centers in the Upper Nile region of South Sudan.  
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The Tomorrow Foundation of Australia has also targeted its activities to both 
the domestic settlement context and South Sudan. This organization’s main purpose 
is to provide financial and other capacity-building support to organizations in Sudan 
as well as Australia.  It has provided this support to Australian organizations for 
travel to Sudan.   It helped fund a 2006 Youth Conference and a community dinner 
program. Another Sudanese-led organization, African Refugee Artists Club and 
Youth Development developed a 30-day Arts education training for refugees in 
Kakuma refugee camp. This has promoted the mental health of South Sudan refugee 
artists in the US as well. The organization has sought out venues to display art in the 
US and has connected artists in the camp with those settled elsewhere. 
 Sudanese-led organizations are involved in a variety of activities to effect change 
for their country and people. They have taken on activities that focus on advocacy, 
and have sought to educate and build awareness of the state of Southern Sudan. They 
have also honed in on specific development issues, such as education, employment, 
health and basic needs. Their organizations seek to remedy these problems by 
providing the necessary infrastructure, on-going resources and by developing human 
capital. In each resettlement country, refugees are leading organizatio s that target 
the resettlement community, South Sudan and both. I now describe the relative 
proportion of these divergent targets in each country. 
 
3.5.1.2: The Comparative Differences in Organizational Targets 
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Despite having organizations of each ‘target’ within each resettlement 
country, there exists a significant difference in the relative number of organizations 
focused on domestic versus transnational activities. The majority of organizatio s in 
Australia aim to effect change for the Sudanese refugee communities in Australia. 
Almost 70% of the organizations have these resettlement country goals. In contrast, 
the majority of organizations in the United States aim to effect change in southern 
Sudan. Over 40% were solely formed to effect change in southern Sudan, while an 
additional 26% have goals in their homeland and in the resettlement country Thus, 
66% of organizations created by Sudanese who have settled in the United States have 
transnational ambitions (see Table 3.2 and Chart 3.1). Finding the whys and the 
wherefores for these comparative differences will bring us to the resolution of our 
empirical puzzle.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.2: Sudanese Organizational Targets 
TARGET OF 
ORGANIZATION 
UNITED STATES AUSTRALIA  
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Note: These figures were derived from the author’s research as described previously. 
 # % # % 
Domestic  27 25 51 69 
Transnational 47 44 10 14 
Both 27 25 13 18 
Transnational through 
domestic 
6 6 0 0 
     
ORGS coded 107 70 74 64 
ORGS not coded 45 30 41 36 
Total ORGs located 152 100 115 100 
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Chart 3.1: Sudanese Organizational Targets  
United States
T through D
6%
Both
25%
Transnational
44%
Domestic
25%
 
Australia
Both
18%
Transnationa
l
14%
Domestic
68%
T through 
D 
 
                       Note: T through D stands for transnational through domestic activities. 
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3.4.2: The South Sudanese Identity 
Despite the differences in organizational targeting across these two 
resettlement contexts, Sudanese organizations are, without exception, driven by 
Southern Sudan national and sub-national identities. They are created by and for 
southern Sudanese, to better their livelihood, and to change the trajectory of southern 
Sudanese development for future generations. As previously described, because of 
experiences and socialization, many south Sudanese refugees believe that effcting 
change for their country and country’s people is a duty.  
Many see themselves as the generation that will bring development, peace 
and autonomy to the south. Organizations are a natural extension of this sense of 
national duty. A cursory survey of organization titles illustrates this.  These titles all 
utilize signifiers of Sudan, south Sudan, towns in South Sudan and particular tribes: 
HOPE for Ariang, Southern Sudanese Community Association, Sudanese Women's 
Welfare Association, South Sudan Development Agency International, Dinka 
Language Institute, River Niles Villages Sudanese Education Project, Children of 
Southern Sudan Education Fund, and HELP Sudan.  
 Refugee organizational websites provide a plethora of additional evidence of 
the South Sudanese identity. Many websites had the South Sudanese map and flag or 
used the flag colors as the main colors in their website design. There were photos of 
Sudanese at key national celebrations for the anniversary of Sudanese Independence 
and of the late John Garang’s birthday. There were photos and pictures of cultural 
events, traditional clothing and traditional dancing as well as those of current living 
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conditions in small villages in South Sudan. Some websites included links to other 
South Sudanese organizations and had a 'Recent news from Sudan' section. Many 
sites had stories about the South Sudanese civil war and migration.  
Political participation of the refugees in both of these contexts focuses on the 
wellbeing of the people of their nation of origin. Organizations target change for 
southern Sudanese people living in Africa, such as building schools and health 
clinics and providing clean water in south Sudan, and caring for Sudanese refugees 
in neighboring countries. Additionally organizations seek to enable South Sudanese 
refugees to access social services, to organize as a collective political unit in the 
resettlement country as well as to increase the literacy of resettled southern Sudanese 
in their own languages. In the following section, I describe another commonality 
found in the analysis of these organizations: collaboration with Australian and US 
nationals. 
3.5.3: Collaborating with Australian and US nationals 
A second common thread of Sudanese-led organizations in the US and 
Australia is that they were often created with the help of resettlement cou ry 
nationals. This duty toward South Sudan renewal could not be fulfilled without the 
support of American and Australian nationals.  
The imprint of the exchange of ideas and resources between Sudanese 
refugee leaders and resettlement nationals is evident in organizations arisi g from 
both of these resettlement sites. Professors, church and community members and 
settlement service staff sit on organization advisory boards, Boards of Directors and 
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serve as co-founders in some instances. For example, in the case of the John Dau 
Foundation, one of the most successful Sudanese-created organizations, two local 
church congregations were critical players in its initial development and continue to 
be a source of funds for the organization. The Foundation's Chairman of the Board is 
Professor William Coplin of Syracuse University. He has organized students and 
part-time workers to complete the main fundraising tasks, including “public 
relations, web design and maintenance, donor relations, video design and other 
fundraising activities (JDF website).” Hope for Humanity, Inc in Richmond, Virginia 
was founded by Maker Mabor Marial (another ‘Lost Boy’) with help from a local 
churchwoman, Jennifer Herst. Herst and her husband developed relationships with 
Sudanese refugees through their church’s services to newly resettled refugees. This 
meeting spurred a trip to southern Sudan and the creation of the humanitarian 
organization to support educational scholarships to Sudanese living in the US and 
abroad. The Makol Ariik Development Foundation of Utah and Rebuild Sudan, of 
Wisconsin, are also the results of Sudanese refugee – American citizen collaboration. 
Valentino Achak’s relationship with writer Dave Eggers, and their novel provided 
the financial impetus for a subsequent organization. When these relationships 
develop, innovative fundraising projects have ensued, such as middle school students 
creating projects to fundraise throughout their school and communities. Professors 
and church members join the board of advisors of organizations. Community 
members travel to Sudan on assessment trips. Schools are built, uniforms are sewed 
and southern Sudanese children start their first primary school courses.   
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Some Americans, after building relationships with this cohort of refugees 
have created organizations to better serve them in the United States, including 
Sharon Shivol’s Bridges to Sudan and Joan Hecht’s Alliance for the Lost Boys of 
Sudan. Although these organizations are obviously not included in the organizational 
analysis, they are indicative of the degree to which Sudanese refugees and 
Americans are connecting. As I more fully describe in Chapter 5, these conn ctions 
are often made because of the way that resettlement policy is implemented in th  
United States: through a public-private partnership that relies on community 
members to serve refugees.  
In Australia, organizations are also the result of successful collaborations 
between Sudanese refugees and nationals, especially settlement service staff. These 
staff members receive funding from the federal government to mobilize and trai  
refugee community leaders to create organizations that will foster integration. I 
develop this theme in detail in Chapter 6. The following examples make this point 
clearly. The Ecumenical Migration Centre (EMC), a Melbourne organization that 
provides social services to migrants and refugees, was instrumental in the 
development of the Sudanese Lost Boys Association of Australia (SLBAA). When 
Akoc Manheim, a young, prominent South Sudanese leader in Melbourne began 
providing services to the Sudanese community on his own, the EMC stepped in and 
began providing office space to help Akoc and the community. They worked with 
him and other members of the SLBAA to procure funding for their organization, to 
plan fundraising events and to ensure the provision of continued services. Anglicare, 
another settlement service organization was instrumental in the founding and 
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continued support of the Southern Sudanese Community Association of Australia. A 
Migrant Resource Center in Sydney, the BHHPMRC helped the SLBAA establish  
chapter in Sydney. In so doing, they provided office space and leadership training to 
Sydney Sudanese leaders. This MRC auspices34 many other refugee organizations, 
including another south Sudanese organization led by Equatorials. The Southern 
Sudan Development Agency International was given organizational support, 
including help with writing initial grants and provision of office space by the New 
Hope Foundation, a migrant service provider. In the summer of 2008, the Bor 
Community Association was just beginning the process of incorporation through the 
auspices of the Migrant Resource Center of Eastern Melbourne. In addition, I located 
one organization, SAIL, created by Australian nationals to ease Sudanese integration 
into Australian society.  
In both of these resettlement sites, Sudanese organizations are the outcome of 
collaborations between refugees and nationals. As becomes clear in chapters 5 and 6,
this is not coincidental. These connections are driven, directly or indirectly, by social 
policy relating to the resettlement of refugees in Australia and the Unitd States. In 
Australia the federal government explicitly seeks to organize refuges through 
capacity building programming. In the United States, where capacity building 
remains but a small part in the resettlement scheme, the creation of organizations 
often occurs as a consequence of the interaction between policy implementers and 
refugee leaders. These actors include local church congregations and volunteers with 
                                               
34 This is a word Australian’s use to describe the process of mentoring organizations, both educationally and 
financially. 
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humanitarian motivations. Often enough, these encounters, between American 
nationals and Sudanese refugees, ignite the goals and passions in both parties.  
3.6: Conclusion: Explaining the Empirical Puzzle 
The empirical evidence presented here highlights the similarities and 
differences of Sudanese refugee organizations created in the United States and 
Australia. These organizations are outcomes of the strong ties that the Sudanese 
refugees have to their original homeland and to its people. As much contemporary 
scholarship has shown, refugees’ identity and motivations do considerably shape 
their political activities. The organizations are also created and sculpted by he
collaborations that Sudanese have with Australian and American nationals. To be 
further explored in Chapter 5: the role of these nationals in mobilizing and 
redirecting political participation. 
  As earlier noted, while Sudanese refugee groups in the US and Australia do share 
patterns of political participation, distinct national trends in Sudanese refugee 
political activities also exist and are quite compelling.  The data demonstrates clear 
differences across these resettlement sites in the organizational target, or direction of 
activism toward the homeland or toward the refugee resettlement community. The 
goals of organizations in the United States are more likely to be aimed at effecting 
change in southern Sudan.  In Australia the efforts of southern Sudanese refugees are 
aimed primarily at softening the challenges of settling into a new country by 
providing additional settlement services and support. These findings, in conjunction 
with the evidence that the two Sudanese communities share similar demographic 
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characteristics, suggest that the host country environment of the refugees has 
influenced refugee political activities. I now present the settlement environments in 
each country to more fully explain and resolve the empirical puzzle. 
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Chapter 4: Comparative Settlement Environments  
4.1. Introduction  
In this chapter, I describe and compare the settlement environments in 
Australia and the US, including settlement policies, sources of funding and policy 
implementers. As I demonstrate in Chapters 5 and 6, these aspects influence who 
refugees are interacting with, and what programs they are privy to and as a 
consequence, what political activities they engage in. Despite sharing histories of 
mass immigration and formal refugee resettlement programs, Australia and the 
United States have different environments for settling refugees. Each country utilizes 
a distinct strategy to ‘settle’ refugees, resulting in diverse refuge  policies and 
programs. They differ in terms of amount and sources of funding for their refugee 
settlement programs. Additionally, the composition of policy implementers is unique 
in Australia and the U.S.  
The plan of the chapter is as follows: first, I provide historical backgrounds 
of the US and Australian refugee programs, demonstrating how divergent historical 
paths have led to the development of different settlement environments. Second, 
using governmental documentary evidence, I detail and compare the three key 
factors of settlement environment that influence refugee political activities: 
approaches, funding and policy implementers. This contrast highlights the salient
differences in each country that influence refugee political activism. I conclude this 
chapter by delving into the specific mechanisms through which these settlement 
environment factors influence refugee political activities.  
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4.2: Histories of Australian and US Refugee Settlement Programs 
The historical trajectories of the US and Australian settlement programs have 
much in common. Both countries’ programs were catalyzed following World War II 
displacement. Over several decades of the last half of the 20th century, each country 
slowly developed, piece-by-piece, formal policy to deal with processing requests for 
resettlement and for settling refugees once they had arrived. Until the 1970’s and 
1980s, these piecemeal approaches were often reactions to specific events rather than 
a premeditated effort to establish policy and procedures to deal with refugees.  
Nevertheless, distinct shapes of refugee settlement policy and procedures 
took form in each country. An examination of these histories reveals that the 
Australian program developed mainly through top-down initiatives of the 
Commonwealth government while in the US, the relatively stronger influence of 
civil society organizations resulted in a more formidable public-private partnership. 
Additionally, the US program rallied around getting refugees into work and off the 
dole, whereas the Australians sought to ensure that their program encouraged equal 
access to the benefits of the Australian welfare state. These differences continue to 
shape current approaches to settlement, and subsequently current programs and 
policy implementers. The more government-managed Australian program and more 
decentralized US program are significant influences on refugee political activism.  
4.2.1 The History of Settlement Policy in Australia 
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Australian settlement policy has evolved through three different periods 
including: 1) its assimilationist beginnings in the 1940s; 2) a multicultural turn in the 
1970s; and 3) a business-model restructuring in the 2000s. Each of these periods left 
enduring marks on the demographic make-up of Australia, on the lives of newcomers 
and on the character of refugee settlement policy. Its historical trajectory has resulted 
in a government-directed, tightly managed refugee settlement program that seeks to 
ensure all newcomers, regardless of socioeconomic characteristics, have access to 
the services of the state.  
4.2.1.1: Australia’s Assimilationist Beginnings  
The concern with equal access was not present in the beginning of Australia’s 
program. Like many developed countries during the mid-20th century, Australia 
sought to control what people entered their country based on race and nationality. 
From 1901, until the early 1970’s, the country’s immigration policies centered on 
excluding all non-Celtic-Anglo Europeans, a policy known as the White Only 
Policy.35 Following the original settlement of aboriginals thousands of years ago, and 
of European settlement as a penal colony in the late 1700s, it wasn’t until the 1800s 
that the country had formal policy to encourage migration, or provide assistance to 
newcomers. At that time, some ‘assisted passage schemes’ for free settlers were 
provided to immigrants from Britain and Ireland. Only some of these received initial 
accommodation provided by the government and assistance from voluntary agencies. 
Most received no support (Review of Settlement Services 2003). During the 19th 
                                               
35 This policy did not begin after WWII. Its origins began with the Immigration Restriction Act of 1901 (Jupp 2002). 
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century, an influx of a diverse group of immigrants arrived however due to the Gold 
Rush (Ibid).  
The inception of Australia’s large scale, formal immigration scheme arose 
out of social and political realities that followed World War II. The demand for labor 
in Australia and the supply of displaced individuals from Europe coalesced to result 
in a massive influx of newcomers in the mid-1940s.  Following WWII, Australia, 
having lost 60,000 men in the war, had a significant shortage of labor. Western and 
Central-Europeans were displaced and unemployed, so many were seeking life 
opportunities in other places. Australia, as a signatory to international migration 
treaties, and a collaborator with the International Refugee Organization, was one 
such destination. Australia’s formal immigration program began with the 
establishment of the Department of Immigration in 1945, which was charged with 
overseeing entry and stay of newcomers (The Department of Immigration and 
Citizenship).  
Post-WWII labor shortages induced a relaxation of the White Only Policy, 
allowing individuals without Anglo-Celtic ethnic backgrounds permanent resident 
status in Australia. This resulted in waves of Italian, former Yugoslavian, other
southeastern European and some Middle Eastern immigrants coming to Australia a  
‘honorary whites’ (Adelman, Borowski, Burstein and Foster, eds1994; Lopez 
2000).36  
                                               
36 This was also due to the reality of mass displacements of Eastern Europeans. Approximately 181,700 from this 
region were resettled in Australia following WWII.  
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At this time, in line with White Only policy, the Australian program 
established two classes of migrants according to their nationality. A non-British 
newcomer received ‘Alien’ status until they received Australian citizenship. This 
status came with reduced rights, reduced access to occupations and reduced social 
security benefits. The British, in contrast, were considered Australian as soon as they 
entered the country, and were given many privileges, including (in many cases) 
access to public housing (Jupp 2002). Nevertheless, aliens were still able to thrive in 
the plentiful Australian labor market at the time. 
This post-WWII newcomer selection criterion was coupled with domestic 
settlement policy that sought to assimilate all migrants. During this period migrants 
were expected to learn English, adopt cultural norms, and basically become 
indistinguishable from Australians. Services from government were quite minimal, 
but included temporary housing at migrant hostels where English language courses 
were taught. While migrants were expected to take the first job that came their way, 
a strong economic atmosphere boded well for these newcomers.37 In 1953, the 
Department of Immigration started administering services to assimilate migrants into 
Australian cultural practices. To these ends, the Commonwealth organized regional 
coalitions of nonprofit organizations called ‘Good Neighbour Councils’ to serve 
newcomers (Jupp 2002; Good Neighbour Council)  
For the majority of the 20th century, Australian immigration and domestic 
settlement policy was not institutionalized. In the 1950s and 1960s, Australia 
                                               
37 This is not to say that all migrants found settlement easy. Some Eastern Europeans even had experiences similar to 
those of indentured servants for their first 2 years (2003 Report; Jupp 2002). 
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continued to admit individuals from Eastern Europe, including about 14,000 
Hungarians and 6000 Czechs. Nevertheless, an Australian-made comprehensive 
approach to deal with international refugee protection and a strategy to handle the 
domestic settlement process was in its making (Hinsliff 2007). The lack of structure 
and adequate services provided fodder to critics of the Australian immigration 
system. This eventually resulted in a turn toward policies that were both more 
inclusive and more responsive to newcomer needs. 
4.2.1.2: A Multicultural Turn 
Australian immigration and settlement policy went through perhaps its most 
significant transformation around the late 1960’s and early 1970s which resulted in a 
system concerned with equity of services and one that is managed from the top 
down. Like many countries during this era, Australia made dramatic changes 
regarding minority rights. These greatly influenced immigration and settlement 
policy. This shift was marked by the establishment of a framework for Australia to 
contribute to the international refugee protection regime, through establishing 
procedures to resettle refugees. Additionally, at this time two key domestic policy 
changes reflected a turn toward multiculturalism. First, with the Racial 
Discrimination Act of 1975, the White Only Policy was formally abolished (Jupp 
2002). Determinations of eligibility to immigrate to Australia could no longer be 
based on race or nationality.38 British migrant privileges were discarded and the 
                                               
38 The Immigration Minister determines the size and composition of the Humanitarian migrant program. Until present-
day, Australia bases its selection of refugees on three key criteria. First, the level of need, based upon recommendations 
that the UNHCR makes and mainly following global conflict trends and particularly egregious situations for refugees. 
This is followed by the extent to which humanitarian migrants have social links to individuals with permanent 
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eligibility time limit to wait for citizenship for non-British citizens was reduced to 3 
years after arrival.  
Second, the Commonwealth created a framework of institutions and 
programs to integrate migrants including the Special Humanitarian Program and the 
Special Assistance Category. In so doing, the government publicly recognized that 
settlement was a difficult, lengthy process and that newly arrived migrants did not 
automatically relinquish their home country ties. In this way, the strategy to 
assimilate newcomers was publicly acknowledged as defunct. Instead, government 
strategies needed to be more responsive to migrant needs by expanding English 
language education and other services. At this time, an increase in migrants (those 
originating from Southeast Asia) required increased services from government. 
Mainstream services were increasingly provided to service a diverse population. The 
rise of ethnic community councils and organizations in each province provided the 
opportunity for strong political influence to be exerted by diverse communities. 
Accordingly, resettlement procedures and bodies were established, including the 
Determination of Refugee Status Committee and the Thailand Task Force (Hugo 
2002). 
This turn to policies and practices of multiculturalism was driven by 
intellectuals and implemented once policymakers were convinced. Several 
investigations verifying the failure of assimilationist policies underpinned th se 
changes. These were catalyzed primarily by the lobbying efforts of intellectuals who 
                                                                                                                                            
residency in Australia and abilities to integrate into the Australian economic and social landscape (Hugo 2002). 
Sudanese refugees were resettled predominately under the first two selection criteria. 
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aimed their assault against assimilation toward national political leaders nd 
government departments (Lopez 2000).39 Indeed, neither broad public sentiment, nor 
ethnic community leadership were catalysts for such a change (Galligan and Roberts 
2003). During this period, notions of multiculturalism became embedded in national 
political circles and therefore in policy relating to migrant services.  
Several investigations uncovered the failures of assimilationist policies. Th  
1966 Henderson Inquiry, Zubrziski Report and the 1973 Inquiry into the Departures 
of Settlers encouraged policy shifts. These reports highlighted the various 
shortcomings of the assimilationist approach, with resultant high rates of poverty, 
low rates of naturalization and unresolved issues in schooling, employment and 
housing for migrants. It was found as well that complications arose because of low 
levels of education and training prior to migration. These reports supported the 
notion that the government must intervene in order for migrants to settle successfully 
(Jupp 2002). 
At this point, the Commonwealth government took an even more active role 
in settlement and the contours of a government-managed settlement service system 
concerned with migrant access to services began to take shape. The Department of 
Immigration put officers in migrant hostels to handle migrant concerns pertaining to 
accommodation and welfare. A ‘Child Migrant Education Service’ was established 
to help children of migrants succeed. A mechanism to certify migrant qualifications 
                                               
39 Broad sociological shifts and Australian political hanges, such as anti-Vietnam sentiment, the feminist social 
movement and the Whitlam Labor government coming into power further enabled such a shift, but without these more 
pointed elite-led efforts it is doubtful that such a shift would have occurred (Lopez 2000). 
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was put into place. Additionally, migrants were allowed to pursue English language 
study on a full-time basis with a living stipend. And, in response to low English 
proficiency, a telephone interpreter service was established.  
The Commonwealth also established the ‘Grants in Aid Scheme,” which 
created an institutional structure for settlement service provision for the first time. 
The Scheme provided funds to volunteer organizations to provide welfare services to 
newcomers. The government then looked to these organizations to implement 
successful settlement through ‘self-help’ programs. New orientation programs were 
established and linked with migrant hostels. Interest-free loans to help migrants 
move from hostel to private homes were created. The Adult Migrant Education 
Program was expanded. Multicultural Education Programs for Australian children 
were placed into schools. A Special Broadcasting Service was created for migrant 
education.  
Institutions to oversee settlement policy also sprung up. The Australian 
Institute of Multicultural Affairs (which later became the Office of Multicultural 
Affairs) was created to generate policy advice at the federal level. In each t rritory, 
an Ethnic Affairs Commission and Migrant Settlement Councils were established. 
The latter coordinated settlement services of government and voluntary 
organizations. 
At this time, settlement policy became a key priority of immigration 
governance. It became a tool whereby the Australian government could enact 
multicultural practices (Galligan and Roberts 2003). Following a review of economic 
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and social well being of migrants by Frank Galbally in the late 1970s, the 
government formally wedded multicultural practices with settlement services. This 
report argued that four guiding principles should comprise the treatment of migrants:  
• equal opportunity and access to national programs and services; 
• maintenance and appreciation of immigrant cultures; 
• general programs should meet the needs of migrants, but special programs and 
services should be formed if needed to ensure equality of access and provision; 
• immigrants should be consulted regarding programming (Galligan and Roberts 2003; 
Adelman et al 1994). 
These four aspects of settlement: equal access, including special services if 
needed, cultural appreciation, and immigrant involvement in decision-making, still 
remain potent policy drivers in Australia. As reflected in current government 
publications the concern for ‘access & equity’ to government services is the 
cornerstone of Australian settlement policy today (2003 Review of Settlement 
Services Report).40  
New institutions and services were implemented and formalized and the 
contour of Australian settlement continued to form. Special immigrant programs to 
ensure equal access to newcomer communities took shape in the form of 
                                               
40 Culturally, this aligns with the Australian notion f a ‘fair go’ – the right for all Australians to get an equal chance, or 
‘go’ at what it is they desire.  
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government-funded Migrant Resource Centres (MRC) that spanned the country.41 
The purpose of MRCs was implementation of Australian federal policy pertaining to 
multiculturalism and migrant equal access to services and programs. These cent rs
served as service hubs for migrants, regardless of their length of residence n 
Australia.  They provided a variety of services, from meeting a migrant’s initial 
settlement needs to ethnic community empowerment, as well as funding to help 
develop the capacities of these communities for self-sufficiency and advocacy 
(Australian Refugee Council Australia’s Refugee and Special Humanitarian 
Program: Current Issues and Future Directions: 2007-08). As a result of the 
Community Refugee Settlement Scheme (CRSS) in 1979, more volunteers were 
recruited to engender success in settlement objectives. Funding to ethnic 
communities and community agencies for settlement assistance was doubled. The 
establishment of MRCs and funding to other private organizations provided the 
structure through which the Commonwealth funded and managed settlement 
assistance. 
In general this shift to multiculturalism integrated refugee welfare into 
Australia’s scheme for its citizenry.42 Like other social ventures developed to service 
the poor, disabled and unemployed, this too was a top-down initiative. The 
Commonwealth government established this program, and continues to determine 
                                               
41 The Commonwealth also funded the projects of other non-profit organizations that worked closely with migrants and 
refugees. MRCs, however, were provided ‘core’ funding, which paid for staff salaries and organizational rent and 
infrastructure. In effect, these organizations were service provision arms of the Australian federal government.  
42 This particular take on settlement services for newcomers has not changed dramatically in terms of its aims, despite 
the fact that multiculturalism, as a national value has been widely contested (Brown 2006; Galligan and Roberts 2003; 
Adelman et al 1994; Lopez 2000). The concern for newcomer equal access to the welfare state remains intact today.  
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on-going settlement policies as needed, managing their implementation each st p of 
the way.  
4.2.1.3: Restructuring the Settlement Sector 
Settlement policy and the programs utilized to implement this policy did not 
change much until the Howard administration in the early 2000’s. In the decades 
following the multicultural turn and leading up to the millennium, policies pertaining 
to access and equity fortified settlement policy. In the late 1990s and early 2000s,
with reports of settlement service failures, and the change in Commonwealth 
leadership, the practice of Australia’s settlement became more business-like, tightly 
managed and more competitive. 
The cornerstone of settlement policy, and therefore settlement services has 
remained intact.43 The principles of ‘Access & Equity’, as spelled out by the 
Galbally Report decades ago have continued to guide settlement practice throughout 
the late 20th century. Migrants are provided with special services to meet their unique 
demands when they first arrive, and with continuing long-term services from 
                                               
43 Multiculturalism has never disappeared from the agnda or discourse, but it has been amended. Since the late 1980’s 
an increased attention toward the economic importance of a diverse population, (given globalizing world economic 
context) has influenced Australian social and settlement policy. This economic objective remained combined with 
values for cultural diversity and equal access to the welfare state (see the 1989 National Agenda for Multicultural 
Australia). The late 1990’s saw an increased emphasis on civic engagement and Australian citizenship as a unifying 
symbol (1999 National Agenda for Multicultural Australia). This civic duty required that all Aussies “support the 
structures and principles of Australian society which guarantee us our freedom and equality and enable diversity in our 
society to flourish (31).” Here we see a delicate maneuvering of language to allow for some hierarchy of Australian 
values. This did not negate cultural respect, social equity, productive diversity, which still “maximiz[ed]… dividends 
arising from the diversity of our population” (31). Instead, it asserted an importance to maintaining Australian 
principles in the face of diversity. This was re-asserted in the 2003 – 2004 Multicultural Australia: United in Diversity 
Commonwealth publication.  
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mainstream organizations that service the entire Australian population.44 In 1991, the 
National Integrated Settlement Strategy (NISS) was established. The Department of 
Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, previously known as the Department of 
Immigration, set up means of coordination between migrant-specific and mainstream 
service providers to ensure long-term settlement objectives were met. This requ red 
of the service providers in mainstream organizations a proficiency in working with 
culturally and linguistically diverse populations. Central to this mission was the 
inclusion of mainstream organizations in settlement planning. This goal required that 
service providers (policy implementers) clarify their roles while being ver more 
attentive to connecting their clients with migrant-specific and mainstream services. 
These efforts resulted in the creation of a framework of best practices, the 
Charter of Public Service in a Culturally Diverse Society in 1998. The Charter 
spelled out the practice of settlement service provision: ‘culturally responsive service 
delivery.” The main purpose of the Charter was to build these practices into core 
processes of service delivery. This became the primary instrument for implementing 
the principle of access and equity. All organizations receiving funds from the 
Commonwealth are required to comply with the charter.  
Nevertheless, key developments in settlement policy have occurred since the 
millennium: the settlement program has taken on a distinct structure, and has become 
competitive. The federal government tightly manages these settlement practices. 
First, settlement services were broken up into two stages: 1) intensive case 
                                               
44 This decision arose from reports from Jupp in 1986 and Fitzgerald in 1988. Jupp, an Australian scholar has written 
both academic and policy pieces on Australian immigrant and refugee policy and practices. 
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management to ensure basic material needs were met for newly arrived non-English 
speaking immigrants (primarily humanitarian entrants) in their first six months; and 
2) broader settlement services to last for the first five years of the immigrants’ 
residence in Australia. This effectively reduced the population eligible for services 
supported by the Department of Citizenship and Immigration to only migrants who 
had arrived within the last 5 years.45 This move reflected a broader trend in 
Australian social policy: “ by intervening early to address emerging social issues, 
government agencies can improve overall outcomes and make downstream savings 
by reducing later expenditure on entrenched social problems (2003 Review of 
Settlement Services Report, p. 33).” Obviously, this was connected to the 
government’s desire to be more outcome-oriented. 
Second, the funding framework was also redirected to fund particular projects 
based on a competitive contracting and tendering process, rather than providing core 
funding for established Migrant Resource Centers. The formal institutional lnk 
between the government and Migrant Resource Centers was ended. ‘Core’ funding 
to these Centers, which paid for staff and infrastructure was shut off. Instead, th se 
organizations would compete for project-based funding with all other organizations 
that could make a good case for receiving government funds. Overall, the Australian 
system turned toward business-like practices to monitor refugee settlemen  service 
delivery. The Department implemented a ‘purchaser/provider model’ of service 
delivery in which “the purchaser is the party who decides what will be produced, and 
                                               
45 This change most significantly influenced older, established migrant communities that continued to receive services 
at these migrant-specific organizations. Because thi  happened during the height of south Sudanese settl m nt, this 
population was within this 5-year settlement service window. 
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the provider is the party who delivers the agreed outputs and outcomes (2003 
Settlement Services Review, p 35).”  
Despite this recent shift, the overarching contours of Australian settlement 
remain in place. The Commonwealth continues to determine policy and manage 
implementation. The government continues to focus on providing services in an 
equitable fashion, despite shifts toward business-like management practices.  
4.2.2: The History of Settlement Policy in the US46 
Unlike the Australian program, the United States refugee resettlement 
program has never been directly tied to policies of minority rights or to equality of 
access to services.47 The US program has not veered far from its original goal of 
refugee employment. Instead, the biggest changes in the settlement context have 
been related to the amount of services and funds that refugees would receive, and 
who would be footing the bill. Additionally, relative to the role of the central 
government in Australia in servicing refugees, the US federal government has been 
much less involved in the specifics of service provision. This decentralized approach, 
coupled with a focus on employment continues to characterize US settlement today.  
4.2.2.1: Piecemeal Policymaking & the Public-Private Partnership 
                                               
46 I have drawn predominately from the Office of Refugee Resettlement website, the Refugee Council of USA website; 
and Holman 2006 (in Haines 2006), except where it’s indicated it came from another source. 
47 This is not to say the program isn’t concerned with equal access to services. My point here is that this is not the 
central focus of the US program. 
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Before the World Wars, the US also went through periods of more and less 
exclusion of immigrants from non-northern European countries. Due to the desire to 
control the ‘cultural’ integrity of the US, elites sought to control immigration. In the 
1920’s, the country explicitly controlled the entrance of newcomers through the 
Quota Act of 1921 and the National Origins Act of 1924.48 During this time, 
immigrant aid societies provided newcomer support. These societies were often 
organized around ethnic identities – Jewish, Catholic, Czechoslovakian, Polish, and 
others. These immigrant aid societies provided the private structure of support that 
still characterizes the structure of actors providing US domestic assistance. 
Starting with the entrance into the U.S. of over 250,000 Europeans, fleeing 
from Nazi persecution in the 1940s, formal policies to resettle individuals 
specifically fleeing their countries from persecution began during WWII, and in the 
US, this began a series of piecemeal policies pertaining to dealing with refugee-like 
newcomers (Holman 1996). This catalyzed the Displaced Person’s Act of 1948. An 
additional 400,000 Europeans were admitted. Another 200,000 Europeans fleeing 
from communist regimes were admitted under the Refugee Relief Act of 1953 
(Holman 1996). This unintentional piecemeal approach characterized refugee law for 
the next 4 decades (Holman 1996). Yet, private ethnic and religious organizations 
footed the bill for all domestic assistance provided to these refugees.49 The US 
government paid solely for entry, transport and processing costs. And even these 
                                               
48 I did not find literature regarding government-funded settlement services during this period. However, th  YMCA’s 
Nationalities Service Center was involved in women (and later men and families) with immigration and naturalization 
issues, and learning English (Nationalities Services Center).  
49 Religious communities were critical players in seeing that their co-religious were resettled to the US as well. 
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were contracted out to voluntary organizations, which received $40 per refugee for 
these services.  
Despite the initial development of a formal public-private partnership, the US 
government directly stated that this would not lead to further assistance for refugees 
(Holman 1996). Reluctantly, the federal government had to eat its words when large 
numbers of Cubans and Southeast Asians sought resettlement in the US. In the 
1960’s Cubans entered ‘en masse’ creating the impetus for the 1962 Migration and 
Refugee Assistance Act. This was the first legislation that included funding for 
settlement services (albeit only for Cubans).  
Thus, the American’s decentralized approach, characterized by a long-
standing formal public-private partnership between non-profit organizations and the 
U.S. government made its entrance. Prior to this Cuban inflow, refugees were 
processed in camps at the site of their initial asylum. This left ample time for 
voluntary agencies and receiving communities to prepare for refugee arrivals, 
including finding newcomer residences and employment. In December of 1960, with 
the large Cuban influx, the US government began paying for resettlement services 
completed on US soil, and in addition, began providing funds for long-term 
settlement services through the Cuban Refugee Emergency Center in Miami 
(Holman 1996). Over 1 million dollars came from the President’s Contingency Fund 
under Eisenhower. Later, President Kennedy created a nine step Cuban Refugee 
Program. In the early 1970s, a Matching Grant system was created to provide funds 
for service organizations helping refugees of other nationalities.  
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Federal intervention was prompted when, due to lack of employment and 
settlement resources in Miami, Cuban refugees were unable to access key baic 
services.50 Federal funds offset money provided for health and education services by 
private organizations, and the state, county and city-level governments. 
Eisenhower’s administration provided an extensive array of services and assistance 
including a health and dental clinic and a hospital in the Cuban Refugee Center, 
payment of half of the public school costs, financial assistance, funds for other staes 
and organizations who resettled refugees coming from Miami, English education for 
adults, vocational training for Cuban doctors, dentists and other professionals and a 
loan program for those obtaining a college education. Until 1975, this Cuban-centric 
program was the sole federal assistance program for incoming refugees.  
The arrival of hundreds of thousands of Southeast Asian refugees 
necessitated further development of the Federal government’s piecemeal dostic 
assistance program. The mid-1970’s saw the demise of several French Southeast 
Asian governments, many of which were supported politically by the US. As a 
result, over 130,000 Indochinese refugees, mostly from Vietnam, were permitted US 
entry. The Indochinese Refugee Task Force was set up as an ad-hoc, temporary 
system to ensure resettlement of Vietnamese went smoothly. In May of 1975, the 
Indochina Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1975 was enacted and provided 
assistance and services to Vietnamese and Cambodian refugees equivalent to those 
                                               
50 The Cuban program, (as it is called) brought firstp o-Batista elite, business elite and upper middle class and then 
middle and lower-class Cubans to the US. Miami was the key destination, bringing over 150,000 refugees (Holman 
2006) 
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provided to Cubans.51 Four processing centers were established throughout the US 
(and closed in December of the same year), and nine voluntary agencies (VolAgs) 
were charged with settling the refugee group.52 The Indochinese Refugee Assistance 
Program (I-RAP) was established as the first nation-wide federally funded program 
to settle refugees. Funds were given to states to provide medical assistance and social 
services such as English language and employment services. Funds were prorated 
according to each state’s Aid to Families with Dependent Children allocation. 
Refugees were also eligible to receive Medicaid and social security benefits.  
The US’s decentralized approach was evident also in their system to settle 
Southeast Asian refugees. Primarily local sponsors, resettlement agencies and their 
affiliates did the work to settle refugees, including orientation, acclimating refugees 
to new communities, and helping them gain employment. The federal government 
supplemented their work with various services, including a hotline staffed by 
refugees and other people who spoke Southeast Asian languages for educating 
refugees and referring them to mainstream services. A journal to help newly arrived 
migrants, a ‘New Life,’ was also created. Perhaps the most enduring federal service 
was the creation of a special unit to encourage the growth of Southeast Asian Mutual 
Assistance Associations. The goal of creating these associations was to promote self-
                                               
51 This was extended to include Laotians in the following year.  
52 This included four VolAgs already working with Cuban refugees, plus Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Services, 
Tolstoy Foundation, American Council for Nationalities Service, American Fund for Czechoslovakian Refug es and 
Travelers Aid International Social Services of America. State (Washington, Iowa, Oklahoma, Maine and New Mexico) 
and county (Jackson County, Missouri; Indianapolis, Indiana) and local (Chinese Consolidated Benevolent 
Associations of Los Angeles and New York; the Churc of Latter Day Saints in Salt Lake City) resettlement agencies 
also participated (Holman 2006) 
114 
 
help – to enable refugees, through increased orientation and effective support to 
develop civic participation on their own.  
The evolution of the public-private settlement partnership was furthered 
when in 1977 and 1978 roughly 21,000 Soviet Jews were resettled through the 
auspices of the American Jewish community. As with previous non-profit 
organizations, budgets were tight – prompting these bodies to seek federal assistance. 
The advocacy efforts of non-profit organizations servicing refugees demonstrated a 
somewhat discriminatory system in which VolAgs received assistance for only 
certain communities – namely Cubans and Southeast Asians. In 1979, the Foreign 
Operations Appropriations Act included $20 million dollars to fund settlement work. 
VolAgs received $1000 for each refugee who was not already involved in the Cuban 
or I-RAP programs;  the VolAgs would be expected to provide funds and in-kind 
contributions matching this amount.53 his legislation ensured that any and all 
refugees were provided assistance, despite their nationality. Thus, ‘the patchwork 
quilt of federally funded domestic programs was now complete, if somewhat 
jumbled (Holman 1996; p 12).” This also set the stage for the Refugee Act of 1980. 
4.2.2.2: The Refugee Act of 1980 
The Refugee Act of 1980 provided legislative authority for systematized, 
nationally managed settlement services. The basic advancements in the refuge  
                                               
53 This later was known as the Matching Grant Program. This program is still in operation by the Office of Refugee 
Resettlement. VolAgs such as the Hebrew Immigrant and Aid Society and the Council of Jewish Federations continued 
to utilize this programming (thus, foregoing the state-administered programming established by the Refuge  Act of 
1980). At that time, this 20 million was distributed by the Department of Health, Education and Welfar (Holman 
2006).  
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program included standardization of refugee services, definition of the ‘refugee’ in 
US law (as was previously written in the UN Protocol), establishment of provisions 
for a regular flow of admissions and emergency admission if necessary, 
establishment of a legal basis for federal assistance to refugees, and the creation of a 
legal basis for the Office of Refugee Resettlement. It aimed to “provide 
comprehensive and uniform provisions for the effective resettlement and absorption 
of those refugees who are admitted (Holman 1996; p. 13).” This legislation codified 
international refugee law into the US legal system, established the on-going 
consultation process for refugee admissions, established federal post-arrival 
assistance regardless of nationality and set goals for settlement efforts. It also 
sculpted the institutional landscape in two ways. The acts called for a US 
Coordinator for Refugee Affairs to oversee and create admission and resettlemen  
policy and established the Office of Refugee Resettlement under the Departm nt of 
Health and Human Services to administer the resettlement program.54 At this point, 
Congress expected an annual admission of 50,000 refugees, but within months of 
enactment over 125,000 Cubans from the Cuban boat lift and 40,000 additional 
Haitians arrived.  
This act also codified relationships between the federal government, states 
and resettlement organizations that had been functioning informally since WWII.55 
Prior to this enactment VolAgs were already arranging sponsorship, providing basic 
                                               
54 The Department of Health and Human Services was responsible for working with VolAgs that provided services for 
the Cuban Refugee Program. The Indochinese Program was administered by the State Department (Holman, 2006). 
55 Although the International Rescue Committee was founded in 1933 to aid victims of Nazism and Fascism. 
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needs and reception services (clothing, food, shelter) and social services (Englih-
language training, employment services and access to jobs). Three federal agencies 
were responsible for administering the resettlement and settlement opera i ns. The 
State Department managed initial settlement, essentially contracting wi h VolAgs to 
perform reception and placement of refugees. The Department of Justice through the 
Immigration and Naturalization Services handled refugee status determinations ( nd 
also managed much of the Cuban and Haitian resettlement). The Department of 
Health and Human Services administered domestic assistance programs (including 
establishing a Public Health Service for refugees). The act made a point to give states 
a central role in the management of funds and service provision of domestic 
assistance programs.56 To receive federal funding, a state was obligated to assign a 
State Coordinator to oversee its refugee operations. States received 85% of 
appropriated funds, which were allocated according to the number of accommodated 
refugees.57States were required to plan settlement, but were not required to adopt an 
identical package or model of services.  
The act spelled out many programs to receive and settle refugees. These 
included, in order of priority: 1) unaccompanied minors program; 2) cash and 
medical assistance: this provided 36 months of funding for state AFDC and 
Medicaid funds provided to refugees (Refugee Medical Assistance, RMA & Refugee 
                                               
56 This was in contrast to the previous relationships that the federal government had established with more local 
entities. Local governments receive federal funds through the Targeted Assistance Grant program, but these funds are 
first funneled to the state (who must in turn, give localities 95% of the grant money). This program supplements local 
and state services when an influx of refugees has arrived in a particular locality (Office of Refugee Resettlement). 
57 The Office of Refugee Resettlement establishes this figure. They average the number of refugees in a given 3 fiscal-
year period. 
117 
 
Cash Assistance, RCA); 3) Social services including English language training nd 
employment attainment and retention to ensure   “refugees…become self-supporting 
and contributing participants in U.S. Society” (Holman 1996).; 4) targeted assistance 
program; 5) preventive health, including medical screenings abroad and funds to 
states for screenings post-arrival; and 6) Voluntary Agency Matching Grant
Program.58         
4.2.2.3: Assistance and Services to Refugees since the Refugee Act of 1980
Throughout the 1980’s, policy regarding refugee domestic assistance evolved 
due to the changing landscape of social policy in the US. In particular, a concern for 
welfare dependency resulted in a sharp reduction of funds and services for refugees, 
as well as the creation of an additional alternative program. In 1982, Congress added 
new language specifying that refugee attainment of immediate employent was the 
key objective of refugee settlement. This redirected social service funds toward 
employment services and required that English language classes were to be during 
non-work hours. Additionally, it established a system of case management to see that 
these ends were met. In 1984, the Wilson-Fish Program was added to the ORR 
repertoire. Like the Matching Grant program, it was an alternative program to 
establish employment for refugees to prevent them from having to go on the ‘dole.’ 
Congress established this, fearing rising levels of welfare dependency on the part of 
refugees. These funds were directed to VolAgs, rather than states.  
                                               
58 This originated from the 1975 federally funded program for non-Cuban, non-Southeast Asian refugees. Now it is an 
alternative to state-administered programs and is given to refugees in the 2nd month of settlement. Basically it provides 
funds to organizations to provide services to help r fugees become self-sufficient without using welfar  programs. 
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Due to these dependency concerns, in the mid-1980s, spending on refugee 
domestic assistance relative to the number of admitted refugees declined. This 
shifted costs to the states and, in general, decreased the availability of cash and 
medical programs for refugees. The Balanced Budget and Emergency Defiit
Control Act of 1985 limited spending for many federal programs, including refuge  
resettlement. This reduced the amount of time that the federal government was 
required to pay for state cash and medical programs for refugees. This requirement 
was reduced in 1986 from 36 months to 31 months, and down to 24 months in 1988. 
This trend continued throughout the 1980s and into 1990, when the federal 
government withdrew the federal commitment to funding Refugee Cash Assistance 
(RCA) and Refugee Medical Assistance (RMA) entirely – a move that many st tes 
claimed was an “abrogation to a ‘federal compact with the states” (Holman 1996; p. 
23). Congress responded, asserting that the original 36-month limit was never an 
entitlement, but a maximum amount.  
The dependency concern may not have been entirely unwarranted. The ORR 
substantiated these claims and asserted that not only refugees, but service providers 
too, had thought of the program as an entitlement. The ORR claimed that this 
resulted in deferment of employment in order for the refugees to gain education and 
training. Indeed, these findings caused the ORR to reduce payments to 18 months, 
independent of Congressional action in 1982. The ORR reduced federal 
contributions to RCA and RMA again in 1988, and once more in 1991, where the 
current time period of 8 months remains, despite the lack of federal requirement for 
such contributions. The 1990s saw relatively little change in terms of resettlem nt 
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and settlement funding and institutional landscape. The Bush, Sr. administration 
attempted to drop all federal funding, but ultimately was not successful.  
Overall, US settlement policy has not veered far from its original goals or far
from its original structure. The program seeks to integrate refugees by helping them 
attain economic self-sufficiency and achieves this through a decentralized nd laissez 
faire approach of managing the program. More evidence of this is shown later in this 
chapter. 
4.2.3: The Histories Reviewed 
Studying the histories of settlement policy in these two contexts provides us 
with a background with which to examine the settlement of Southern Sudanese 
refugees in the US and Australia.  Clues arise regarding the empirical puzzle I seek 
to resolve. I note that in each, systems of policies and programs evolved as 
governing bodies sought to deal responsibly (and as advocates pressured these 
bodies) with the events and circumstances of immigration as they unfolded through 
time.  
The basic elements of settlement policy have been formed in each country. 
Welfare assistance at different levels of government to meet refugee needs has been 
established. In both countries, the public and private sectors have particular roles to
play; these roles provide a framework for the distribution of funding and key actions 
of service-provider personnel. Yet, as shown in the historical descriptions above, 
given the different historical factors of each nation, different settlement 
environments have taken shape in the US and Australia.   The evolution of US 
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refugee settlement policy has resulted in a pointed focus on refugee economic 
integration. In contrast, Australia’s settlement policy history has resulted in a focus 
on refugee access to the Australian welfare state. Additionally, while the Australian 
program was created and is managed by the Commonwealth, the US system is 
marked by decentralization and heavy involvement by private organizations.  
The varying influences in these two environments have helped shape 
different trajectories of political activism of the Sudanese refugee communities in the 
US and Australia. Within these environments refugees have been privy to divergent 
social networks and programs which have played a significant role in refugee 
political activism Having examined the historical roots of these two differing 
settlement environments I will now discuss in more depth these key institutional 
variables: settlement strategies and policies, funding, and policy implementers. 
4.3: Differences Between the Settlement Environments  
Both the US and Australia aim to help refugees become self-sufficient, or 
self-reliant. Yet, the long-term strategies and the specific settlement programs that 
they have utilized to realize this goal have important differences. Additionally, the 
policy implementers, including both service providers and volunteers who do the 
day-to-day work of settling refugees, vary in significant ways. The Australian model 
provides generous social services for a relatively extensive time to ensure refug es 
have access to services in a manner equal to citizens. Thus, more extensive, long-
term services including community capacity building, youth programming and civic 
education as standard programming are in the Australian context. Policy 
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implementers there are comprised mainly of secular, non-profit agency staff whose 
programs are funded primarily by government agencies. In contrast, the United 
States’ key strategy for settling refugees is to see that they are mployed quite early 
on in the settlement process. Additionally, due to the strong public-private 
partnership in the US, non-profit agencies obtain a substantial amount of material 
support from private sources, thus supplementing US government funds. US policy 
implementers include more people from faith-based organizations and a greater
number of volunteers.  These settlement characteristics, the variables of strategy and 
programs, funding, and the composition of policy implementation staff, are major 
factors which account for the differences in terms of refugee political activism found 
in the two settlement contexts. In this section, I discuss each one of these attributes 
(see Table 4.1). 
Table 4. 1: Comparative Settlement Environments 
 Settlement Strategy Funding Policy Implementers 
Australia Equal Access to State 
Benefits 
Mostly government-
based 
More secular, Non-
profit staff 
United States Quick Employment Greater private 
support 
More faith-based, 
more volunteers  
 
4.3.1: Settlement Strategies and Subsequent Programs 
The United States and Australia have alternative strategies to settle refug es. 
These strategies, or settlement policies, are social policies that define th  way the 
country works with or supports refugees to integrate into the social, economic and 
sometimes political fabric of their new country. In practice, these policies guide the 
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creation of packages of services provided to incoming refugees to help them meet 
their short- and long-term needs.59When developing these policies, countries make 
choices about what resources to distribute to refugees and how much will be 
distributed. 
Each settlement country has engineered its unique settlement policies in a 
way that reflects its basic approaches to meeting  its own citizens’ basic needs. In the 
US settlement policy is centered on finding employment for refugees as soon a  
possible and is achieved through minimalist support that aims to stimulate refugees 
to helping themselves. The Australian approach is much softer. Refugees are 
provided long-term access to health services, cash and employment assistance, and 
extensive English education. Programs to build the capacity of emerging refugee 
communities are given greater importance in Australia. These approaches matt r 
significantly when it comes to what services refugees will receive, and with whom 
they interact with. 
4.3.1.1: The Institutionalized Australian Approach  
The Australian program combines extensive short-term and long-term 
services to refugees to help them “rebuild their lives and become fully functioning 
members of the Australian community (Department of Immigration and Citizenship 
                                               
59 Again, each country’s basic social policy approaches set the parameters of refugee settlement environments. In 
Australia, the government takes a more interventionist social policy approach evident in their national programs for 
welfare and employment, vocational training and healt c re. The US is much less interventionist. Due to fear of 
government largesse, individual abuse of government programs and dependency on government rather than individual 
self-reliance, the US has historically engaged in far less large-scale social interventions. But these social policy 
approaches are not in and of themselves the only force behind these settlement program differences. These approaches 
are reinforced and perpetuated through time by the public and private actors involved in planning and implementing 
refugee settlement policies. Australia’s restructuring of settlement policy is a good example of this. 
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Fact Sheet 66).’ The Australian program does this by prioritizing a variety of 
services, rather than focusing in on employment. In general, these programs "focus 
on building self-reliance, developing English language skills and fostering links with 
mainstream services. (3)" (New Beginnings: Supporting new arrivals on their 
settlement journey – 2006 – 2007). This wider breath of services as meant that most 
newcomer needs are met and provided in full by the settlement system. For this 
reason, I characterize the Australian settlement system as ‘institutionalized.’ 
Refugee needs are met through programs were codified under the National 
Settlement Strategy Scheme and are structured into two key elements: the Integrated 
Humanitarian Settlement Strategy and the Settlement Grants Program. The former 
provides initial support for at least the first six months of a refugee’s settlem nt, and 
if necessary for a year. Refugee needs are assessed and services are provided, 
including a) case management and referrals; b) reception and assistance upon arrival 
(housing, orientation, food, clothing, emergency needs); c) accommodation services; 
and d) torture and trauma services (counseling).60  
After this initial six-month period, refugees are then referred to migrant and 
refugee service organizations that are funded through the Settlement Grants Program 
(the SGP).  The SGP is a Commonwealth grant program that funds migrant service 
organizations to help new arrivals settle.61 The program aims to support projects to 
“help clients to become self-reliant and participate equitably in AUS society as soon 
                                               
60 In practice, as discussed in Chapter 3, Special Humanitarian Program entrants generally receive less intensive 
services, as their sponsor is required to serve as the primary caretaker. 
61 This began in 2005 after a comprehensive review of settlement services and management. 
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as possible after arrival.”  The main types of projects that are funded fall into 3 
categories: a) Australian orientation, aimed to provide “practical assist nce to 
promote [refugee] self-reliance”; b) Developing Communities, or fostering 
community organization and self-reliance; and c) integration services, which seek to 
increase refugee inclusion and participation in Australian society (Settlem nt Grants 
Programme 2008-2009 Application Information Booklet).62  
The Developing Communities component of the Settlement Grants program 
aimed at “develop[ing] [refugee community] capacity to organize, plan and advocate 
for services to meet [the refugees’] own need[s]”. This is especially important to 
examine given this dissertation project’s goals. Program initiatives involve 
connecting refugee leaders with service providers and “foster[ing] the ability of 
newly arrived communities to organize and engage with governments, service 
providers and the Australian community at large” (New South Wales: Settlement 
trends and needs of new arrivals 2007; p.8). My interview research indicates that 
Developing Community programs include training in leadership, writing grants, 
fundraising and organizational incorporation. Office space is often provided for 
                                               
62 The orientation program seeks to build skills and provide information to enable refugees to ‘operate ind pendently,’ 
and have access to mainstream services. Funding extends o projects that provide information and referals and conduct 
case management. Ethnic community capacity building projects aim to help developing communities to ‘identify 
common goals and interests and develop a sense of id ntity and belonging.’ Settlement Grant Program funding is 
provided to projects that are focused on developing community leadership and skill building, and that elp migrant 
leaders to promote their communities positively to Australian society. Finally, the Integration-Inclusion and 
Participation funding is given to projects that encourage interaction of arrivals and members of the local community, 
and broader local community receptiveness and responsiveness to migrants. Initiatives often include int raction in 
sports, schools, help with starting up small businesses and cottage industries, and driver’s education. Specialist 
counseling, professional translating or interpreting a d multicultural events are not funded because these services are 
the responsibility of other agencies or specialist services. In practice migrant service organizations administer a variety 
of programs under these rubrics, including Australian cultural and social training, parenting courses, additional 
language training, and access to community college courses.  They link refugees to ‘mainstream services,’ as well as 
give material assistance for refugees’ rent and other bills when needed. The package of services varies depending on 
the expertise of the organization, and refugee needs, as assessed by the Department of Immigration and Citizenship. 
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settlement organizations. 63 As I demonstrate in Chapter 6, these projects are 
prioritized in Australia and neglected in the US, relatively speaking. 
4.3.1.2: The US’s Laissez Faire Approach 
The US program, like Australia, also provides short-term and long-term 
programming, yet aims to settle refugees by focusing predominately on refugee 
employment, and leaving most other matters up to refugees and their private 
supporters. Employment is emphasized almost immediately. Other programs, while 
present, are sparse relative to the Australian programs, and are not prioritized. 
Overall, this means that relative to Australia, the US program does not meet all of the 
needs of newcomers.  
The basic structure of the settlement program is similar to the Australian 
program. It has two components, a short-term program to meet basic refugee needs, 
the Reception & Placement Program (R&P); and programs for more long-term 
assistance, Domestic Refugee Assistance Programs. For the R&P program, refugees 
receive services to meet their basic needs for the first 90 days. Organizations 
providing these services officially ‘sponsor’ the refugee,64 do pre-settlement 
                                               
63 The Australian Department of Immigration and Citizenship prioritizes communities with the greatest needs, those 
who have permanent residence status and that have arri d in the last five years. Programs to assist ‘new and emerging 
communities’ with needs such as organizing, planning a d advocacy for settlement services and who are still receiving 
new arrivals are also included in the Settlement Grants Program. Objectively, temporary protection visa holders or 
asylum seekers are in just as much, if not greater ne d. However, they are not serviced through these programs (except 
in rare cases, mainly in rural or regional areas). This has been the source of conflict between the Department of 
Immigration and Citizenship, migrant settlement organizations and the migrant advocacy community.  
64 This term is a bit confusing. It means that the VolAg accepts initial responsibility for the refugee. The VolAg is 
officially claiming that their affiliate organization is able to provide these initial services for them, mainly by having 
the language capacity and health facilities for incoming refugees. 
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planning to determine where the refugee will be placed, welcome them at the airport 
and transport them to their new residence, and provide for their basic needs including 
housing, furnishings, food, clothing, community orientation, referral to social service 
providers, healthcare, and employment. Much of this work is also organized around a 
case management system that tracks the refugee anywhere from 90 to 180 days. This 
quote, taken directly from the US State Department’s Reception and Placement 
“Funding Opportunity Announcement” demonstrates the pointed focus on economic 
integration: 
“The purpose of the R&P program is to promote the successful resettlement of all persons 
who are admitted to the United States under the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program,” by  
“assist[ing] refugees to achieve economic self-sufficiency as quickly as possible.” 
The Domestic Refugee Assistance Programs, funded and administered by the 
Department of Health & Human Services’ Office of Refugee Resettlment (ORR), 
are long-term efforts to assist refugees to become “integrated members of American 
society.”65 While the majority of funds are provided to pay for refugee cash and 
medical assistance (through the US states), many of these programs have, as their 
main focus, economic integration, or at least employment and income generation 
(Office of Refugee Resettlement). Secondly, funds in the form of discretionary 
grants are also provided to states and private, non-profit organizations to administer 
programs that are predominantly geared towards  promoting refugee employability. 
They include the Agricultural Partnership, the Cuban and Haitian Program,66 
                                               
65 From the Office of Refugee Resettlement website. 
66 The description of the programmatic aims begins with employment: “Program objectives are to support employment 
services, hospitals and other health and mental health c re programs, adult and vocational education services, refugee 
crime or victimization programs, and citizenship and naturalization services.” Office of Refugee Resettlement.  
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Individual Development Accounts, the Matching Grant67, Microenterprise 
Development, the Preferred Communities Program,68 the Social Services Program69 
and the Wilson-Fish Program.70 
Although economic integration is the main priority, other programs help with 
general and specific refugee needs. For example, general programs include the a) 
Preventive Health program, aimed at providing access to immediate healthcare 
services to reduce the spread of infectious disease; b) the Health Marriages program, 
to foster healthy marriages and families; and c) the Repatriation program, which 
helps refugees return to their country by providing travel loans. Specific sub-
populations of refugees are also targeted to meet their specific needs, including 
unaccompanied refugee minors, older refugees and survivors of torture and trauma.  
The US and Australian programs do share the same general mission: to 
integrate refugees into their new countries, and to do so by supporting them to 
                                               
67 The Matching Grant aims to “assist qualifying populations in attaining economic self-sufficiency within 120 to 180 
days from their date of eligibility for ORR funded services. Self-sufficiency must be achieved without accessing public 
cash assistance.”  
68 This program’s goal is “to support the resettlement of newly arriving refugees in Preferred Communities where they 
have ample opportunities for early employment and sustained economic independence and, to address special 
populations who need intensive case management, culturally and linguistically appropriate linkages and coordination 
with other service providers to improve their access to services.”  
69 “This program supports employability services and other services that address participants’ barriers to employment 
such as social adjustment services, interpretation nd translation services, day care for children, citizenship and 
naturalization services, etc. Employability services are designed to enable refugees to obtain jobs within one year of 
becoming enrolled in services. Service priorities are ( ) all newly arriving refugees during their first year in the U.S. 
who apply for services; (b) refugees who are receiving cash assistance; (c) unemployed refugees who are not receiving 
cash assistance; and (d) employed refugees in need of services to retain employment or to attain economic 
independence.”  
70 Taken directly from the website: “The purpose of the WF program is to increase refugee prospects for early
employment and self-sufficiency, promote coordination among voluntary resettlement agencies and service provider 
and ensure that refugee assistance programs exist in every State where refugees are resettled. 
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become self-reliant. But, as demonstrated, each country takes a somewhat different 
approach. Within each country, the levels and sources of funding for refugee 
settlement also differ. 
4.3.2: Funding Amounts and Sources  
Refugee settlement policies and programs are funded in both countries by 
public and private sources. However, the relative levels of funding by these sources 
differ considerably in the two contexts. Australia’s Department of Immigration and 
Citizenship oversees both refugee resettlement and settlement services and provides 
the lion’s share of funds for settlement programs. In the United States funding is 
more equitably distributed between both private and public sources due to an 
established public-private partnership. The State Department, through the Bureau of 
Population, Refugees and Migration, oversees and funds refugee resettlement and 
partially funds initial refugee settlement services. The Office of Refugee 
Resettlement, in the Department of Health and Human Services provides funds for 
limited refugee cash and medical assistance, and longer-term social services.  
 The federal government provides the majority of support for refugee settlm nt in 
both the United States and Australia, but again the private sector provides more 
support for refugee settlement in the United States relative to Australia. This is 
demonstrated in the evidence below. Eighty percent of organizations servicing 
refugees in Australia (Figure 4.1) and only 60% of organizations in the US receive 
the majority of their funds from federal government sources (Figure 4.2) (as 
represented by the yellow portion of the figures).  
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Figure 4.1: Australian Settlement Organizations' Amount 
of Revenue from the Australian Federal Government
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Note: These figures were derived by collecting data pertaining to funding on settlement organizations 
funded by the Settlement Grants Program. For full list of these organizations from 2007 to 2011, 
please see www.refugeecouncil.org.au/docs/resources/SGP_2007-11.pdf 71 
                                               
71 Due to the extensive amount of migrant service organizations that receive funding for refugee settlement work in 
Australia, I sampled from lists of organizations funded by the SGP grant. By this, I mean that I firstdivided the group 
of organizations according to their regions. Within each region, I divided the organizations into 3 equally sized groups 
according to the amount of funds they received from the SGP grant. I chose 2 organizations on the top-end of the 
funding list, 1 from the middle and 1 from the end (5 total). Then, I gathered information from their websites about 
their sources of funding. Most organizations did not have annual reports or specific figures about their funding sources. 
They did, however, have claims about their sources of funding. For organizations that I labeled as receiving a ‘a lot’ of 
funding from the government, their websites made claims similar to this: "The centre has a variety of funding sources; 
however it receives the majority of its funding from the Department of Immigration, Multicultural and Indigenous 
Affairs." For those in I labeled ‘some,’ they claimed to have wider sources of funding. For example, this organization 
stated: " Programs are funded by both the ACT and Australian Governments,” and they had information about 
receiving revenue from fees and investments too. For those I labeled ‘a little,’ they actually had figures that were under 
33% of total funding.  
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Figure 4.2: US Settlement Organizations' Percentage 
of Revenue from US Federal Government 
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Note: This data is derived from IRS 990 tax forms and Annual reports from all of the VolAgs 
in the US. The percentages represent the amount of to al funds that they received from the 
government. 
 It is likely too that the US figures underestimate the percentage of resourc  
received by private sources because unpaid volunteers provide much of the legwork 
involved in settlement services there. This is discussed in the next sub-section.  
These findings are not surprising given the historical trajectories of the 
development of settlement policy and the entire settlement system in these two 
countries. Australia’s top-down approach has resulted in more substantial funding for 
the program, while the US’s public-private partnership has engendered a 
commitment on the part of refugee service organizations to establish their own 
sources of funding.  
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  The general discourse of settlement organizations substantiates this evidence. 
While many US organizations publicly display and note with praise their plethora of 
donors,72 Australian organizations make different claims. Most are similar to this 
example: 
The Fairfield Migrant Resource Centre is funded principally by the Department of 
Immigration and Citizenship to deliver settlement services to newly arrived migrants, 
humanitarian entrants and refugees to improve access to services, address special 
settlement needs and help develop skills and confide ce (Fairfield Migrant Resource 
Centre).  
Overall funding per refugee by federal government sources, including the 
Department of Immigration and Citizenship in Australia and the US’s State 
Department and the Office of Refugee Resettlement highlight this trend as well ( ee 
Figure 4.3).73   
                                               
72 In the International Rescue Committee’s (IRC) latest annual report, 9 pages (of the 38 total) list private donors. 
Granted, the IRC’s work extends far beyond only refug e resettlement and includes a variety of humanitarian efforts 
including international development and post-conflict reconstruction, and international refugee protection work.  
73 It is important to note that US refugee inflows are much higher than in Australia. The lowest amount of refugees, 
26,807 was resettled in 2002, the year following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 – when th US almost 
completely shut down its resettlement program. Australia’s highest level of refugees resettled during this period, 13,061 
in 2004, is still less than half of the US’s lowest amount (see Appendix F for numbers of incoming refug es in each 
country). 
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 Figure 4.3: Annual Government funding per incoming refugee 
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Note 1: Australian data derived from the Department of Immigration and Citizenship 
Annual Financial Statements (2000 – 2006) Please see 
http://www.immi.gov.au/about/reports/annual/. US data derived from aggregation of of 
funds spent by the US State Department and the Office o  Refugee Resettlement (2000 – 
2006). Please see http://www.state.gov/g/prm/ and 
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/orr/data/arc.htm.  
Note 2: US data in the year 2000 includes funds to the IOM for transporting and 
processing refugees to the US 
 The US’s per refugee expenditures come close to Australia’s expenditures in only 
one year, 2003,. In all other years, the Commonwealth far exceeds the US federal 
government, and in some cases is almost double (2006) and quadruple the amount 
(2001).74 These contextual differences influence the political activism of Sudanese 
refugees. As I demonstrate in Chapter 6, these different sources and levels of funding 
play a role in how settlement policy implementers channel, or guide refugee leaders 
toward specific political goals. In Chapter 5, I show how these attributes may 
determine whether or not industrious refugees seek out private support on their own. 
                                               
74 In January of 2010, the US State Department increased the amount of funds in the Reception and Placement 
program. Widely celebrated by the refugee settlement s rvice sector, refugees now have twice the amount f funds 
given for their basic needs in the first 90 days, and settlement service providers were given additional funds to provide 
these services. Obviously, this recent change will not impact the Sudanese community explored in this project. 
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I now turn to a description of refugee settlement policy implementers in both 
countries. 
4.3.3 Refugee Settlement Policy Implementers 
The people who implement settlement programs, whom I call policy 
implementers, vary across these two countries. Two key differences stand out. First, 
the Australian program includes many more professional policy implementers 
relative to the US. Second, in both countries these policy implementers are 
comprised mostly of staff of non-profit organizations. However, in the United States, 
the majority of organizations servicing the refugees are faith-based, while in 
Australia they are secular. Examining who these actors are is important because 
these providers are often the first to greet, and to orient refugees to their new 
communities; they can also bridge social gaps and expand refugee social networks. 
They are information sources, linking refugees to resources, which can meet their 
basic needs. The policy implementers also assist the refugees in the achievement of 
their longer-term goals, such as education, naturalization and more sophisticated 
political aims. In many respects they are the key Australian and American nationals 
with whom refugees interact.  
Over 180 organizations implement refugee settlement policy in Australia, 
including both short and long-term programs. These organizations include generalist 
migrant service providers and multicultural and community development specialist 
organizations, ethnic-based organizations and associations, large and small faith-
based charitable organizations, and for-profit organizations. Only 10 organizations 
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do this work in the US, although they oversee the work of over 400 affiliate offices 
spread through the country. They are Church World Service, Ethiopian Community 
Development Council, Episcopal Migration Ministries, Hebrew Immigration Aid 
Society, International Rescue Committee, Lutheran Immigration and Refugee 
Services, the U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigration, the U.S. Conference of 
Catholic Bishops, World Relief, and Kurdish Human Rights Watch (Refugee Council 
USA). As is clear from this listing, these US actors are overwhelmingly non-secular. 
These two countries are quite different in this regard (see Figure 4.4).75
                                               
75 This information was collected individually from Australian and US organizations funded to provide refug e 
settlement services. I developed a list of Australian organizations by combining all organizations that received 
Commonwealth Funding for the IHHS and SGP programs.  
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Figure 4.4: Faith-based and Secular Refugee Settlemnt Organizations 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
US AUS
Faith Based
Secular
 
Note: Author derived figures from the Refugee Council of USA list of Voluntary Agencies 
and from the Department of Immigration and Citizenship lists of organizations that 
received the IHHS and SGP tender. Please see 
http://www.immi.gov.au/media/publications/settle/ 
 
It is clear that the majority of policy implementers in the US context, and a 
fairly small portion in Australia, are faith-based organizations. This matters to South 
Sudanese activism because it shapes the individuals that refugee leaders are 
interacting with. This is the subject of Chapter 5. 
4.4: The Empirical Puzzle and Divergent Settlement Environments  
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In this chapter, I have presented and compared the settlement environments 
in Australia and the US, particularly the factors of settlement policies, sources and 
amounts of funding and policy implementers. As will be seen in Chapters 5 and 6, 
these variables have significantly shaped the political activities of Southern Sudanese 
refugees. Though both countries have somewhat similar histories of mass 
immigration and both have systems for refugee resettlement which have evolved 
greatly over the past hundred years – Australia and the United States have markedly 
different environments into which refugees settle. 
  Australia has a framework of top-down central government management, a 
concern that government must intervene to ensure settlement needs are met, and an 
emphasis on equal access to the provisions of a welfare-oriented system. The 
program is centralized and institutionalized. On the other hand, the US system placs 
greatest emphasis on meeting refugee needs through public-private partnerships, and 
immediate employment of refugees as a means of preventing welfare dependency. 
This program is decentralized and takes a hands-off approach. As a consequence, 
refugees are met with divergent programming and interact with different types of 
policy implementers. I have found a marked difference in the trajectories of political 
activism of the Sudanese refugee communities in the US and Australia due in part to 
these influences. 
I describe these factors in detail in the following chapters. I show that 
through a social networking mechanism, policy implementers influence whom 
refugees are interacting with, and thus their subsequent financial and emotional 
137 
 
support for particular types of political activities (Chapter 5). I also show how policy 
implementers direct refugee leader activism toward specific goals. Through 
implementation of Refugee Organization Building programs, policy implementers 
channel refugee activism toward domestic-oriented goals (Chapter 6).  
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Chapter 5:  Policy Implementers, Refugee Social Networks 
and Political Activities 
5.1: Introduction 
In this chapter, utilizing evidence from semi-structured interviews with 
refugees, service providers and government officials, I demonstrate mechanisms 
through which settlement policy influences refugee political activities. My over-
arching argument is this: the variance in settlement policy implementers – he 
professional service providers and volunteers, who ‘settle’ refugees – results in 
different refugee politics. Because refugee leaders’ goals are mall able, the social 
connections they develop can significantly influence what they do. Given that these 
policy implementers are the first individuals that refugees are interacting with, these 
individuals in particular can play a significant role in shaping what political activities 
refugee leaders decide to pursue. 
Two key points are made in this chapter. First, because settlement service 
organizations are engaged in daily settlement work and thereby have a significant 
role in determining the contacts refugee leaders make, the make-up of these policy 
implementers must be examined. The kind of contact made is based upon what type 
of settlement service organization is servicing the refugee leader. By ‘type’ I refer to 
the general composition of service providers in each country – whether they are 
secular or faith-based and if they are more or less supported by the federal
government. Whether or not refugees interact with non-professional (volunteer) 
policy implementers is a matter of importance. The evidence I present suggest  that 
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those policy implementers who support transnational activism are often volunteers. 
Given the decentralized, laissez faire approach in the US, Sudanese refugees in th  
U.S. are more likely to have developed relationships with non-professional 
(volunteer) service providers than those in Australia. Professional service providers 
are constrained by settlement policy objectives, and thus are unlikely to provide 
direct support for goals that extend beyond the domestic sphere. 
Secondly, the role of faith-based organizations in the US is a particularly 
salient factor in the transnational political activities of South Sudanese refugees 
there. Religious communities supported refugee leaders in various ways. In this 
chapter, I present two ways through which the US settlement environment fosters
faith-based social connections. First, it does so in a direct manner: local faith 
communities across the country provide volunteers for faith-based VolAgs. Valuable 
and lasting relationships are often developed between these volunteers and Sudanese 
refugees. Secondly, in some instances, refugee leaders have sought out church 
communities for support. Some evidence suggests that this is certainly a result of the 
industriousness of the refugee leaders. Yet, it is also because of the lower levels of 
social support provided by the more laissez-faire US government programming.  
As refugees move through the process of integration into their new society, 
they connect with the workers involved in their settlement and with various members 
of the local community. Gradually a network of persons interacting and contacting 
one another for mutual assistance and support develops. A social network of this sort 
is vital to the successful achievement of a refugee’s goals, as an individual an  as  
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group member. The following table outlines the two-stage process that is the focus of 
this chapter. In this process, first the type of policy implementer composition 
influences the type of refugee social network that in turn influences the target of 
refugee political activities (Table 5.1).  
Table 5.1: Policy Implementers, Refugee Social Networks and Political Activities 
Host Country Policy Implementers Refugee Social Network Sudanese Political Activities 
United States    Private-Volunteer              Heterogeneous                          More Transnational 
Australia     Provider-centric                 Homogeneous                             More Domestic 
 
The plan of the chapter is as follows. In Section 2, I demonstrate this first 
step of the causal process, in which refugees are interacting with different policy 
implementers in each context. In particular, I show how volunteers have been mor  
present in refugee settlement in the US context relative to the Australian context, 
especially during the period of Sudanese settlement. This is particularly true for 
faith-based volunteers. In the third section, I show first that refugees hav developed 
crucial enduring social relationships with policy implementers, both faith-based nd 
non-faith-based. Then, I present evidence that suggests that these social connections 
have influenced the target of Sudanese refugee political activities. This completes th  
second stage of the causal process. 
5.2: A Comparison of Settlement Policy Implementers 
As described in Chapter 4, in the US, 10 nationally organized non-profit 
agencies, the majority of which are faith-based, do professional refugee settl ment 
141 
 
work. They have a cooperative agreement with the US federal government that 
requires these organizations to get a substantial amount of private support for their 
service efforts. To provide the basic services for refugees, professional service 
providers, most of which as faith-based, in the US have no choice but to seek out 
additional support. Volunteers, originating from these various civil society 
institutions, are therefore heavily involved in the daily work of refugee settlement. 
The US has essentially decentralized policy implementation in their refugee 
settlement system. In contrast, the Australian settlement system is made up of almost 
200, mostly independent and secular locally based organizations. They too contract 
with the federal government, but as previously discussed, the Australian federal 
government provides ample settlement support, relative to the United States, and 
does not specifically require organizations to seek out additional support. The 
individuals providing the most service, who have daily interaction with refugees, are 
funded predominately by the federal government.   
Due to both historical circumstances and the institutional arrangements 
discussed above, each context utilizes private support, particularly volunteers, 
differently.76I show the more vital role that volunteers in the US context play.  
Refugee service organizations have established volunteer mobilization schemes. In 
the case of the Lost Boys of Sudan, VolAgs created specific educational resources to 
gain community support before their arrival. Given the restructuring of refuge  
                                               
76 I refer to policy implementers as both professionals and volunteers who provide social services to refugees. 
Volunteers in this field often provide a substantial amount of services, even those identical to typical paid social service 
workers. It makes sense logically and theoretically to see them both as implementers of refugee settlement policy. 
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settlement in Australia, volunteers have not been utilized or mobilized to the same 
extent.  
5.2.1: Volunteer Engagement in the US 
The role of volunteers in the US has shifted over the years, but as I describe 
in this section, it has always been a central element of the program. In the 1980’s the 
practice of recruiting volunteers was critical to U.S. refugee settlement, especially 
with faith-based organizations. At this time, many VolAgs would only accept an 
incoming refugee case if they had found a community volunteer to ‘sponsor’ them, 
meaning that they would provide much of the short-term support, including 
residence with the American family. But, as a current State Coordinator and former 
service provider notes: “The landscape here has changed radically.” In the mid-
1990s, this shifted from recruitment of community volunteers to recruitment of 
family members and then toward the current ‘agency-sponsorship’ model. This 
interviewee notes that the last shift was due in part to the on-the-ground realities for 
African refugees: “African refugees were not as willing or able to assist their 
relatives as they started coming - so it migrated to an agency-sponsored mod l” 
(Subject 41, November 2009). Additionally, several service providers noted that it 
became increasingly difficult to recruit community volunteers in this manner. 
Following the events of September 11, the refugee program stalled, volunteer 
recruitment waned and churches moved on to work on alternate pressing social 
concerns. Socioeconomic changes (such as the factor of a greater number of families 
in which both the wife and husband are working and have less free time per family 
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unit) have resulted in less time spent volunteering, particularly in this sponsorship 
model. This had institutional effects upon VolAgs as illustrated by this observation 
by one national VolAg representative: “we also went through budget reductions and 
we lost our sponsor developer staff, so we are not recruiting sponsors actively - so it 
is hard to go back to this model” (Subject 52, November 2009). 
Despite this decline in the sponsorship model, refugee resettlement is still 
highly dependent on volunteer support, and thus VolAgs still engage in volunteer 
mobilization. Central to the US public-private partnership is the reality that these 
agencies will bring their own resources to the refugee settlement system. 77Through 
their own connections, they are charged with raising funds, garnering in-kind 
donations and mobilizing volunteers to see that these short- and long-term services 
are provided to refugees.  Thus, due to this public-private arrangement, the 
individuals providing social services in the US, the policy implementers, include not 
only paid staff but also a variety of volunteers. 
For both short- and long-term services, VolAgs and their affiliates have little 
choice about utilizing volunteers: “… the feds would never be able to fund the 
program…They would never be able to completely fund all the needs of refugees. 
                                               
77 This also has political effects. The extensive use of volunteers from the beginning of the US resettlement has meant 
that a strong culture of private involvement exists n refugee settlement. This has created a source of a refugee system 
constituency, as this service provider turned coordinator comments: “this is a viable program reflected in faith based 
and community work…. this is good, [it] brings a resource to resettlement that government isn’t going to et you to. 
[It] gets community buy-in.” Indeed without this level of community support some believe the system would not 
function: “Private agencies have made this long-lasting - when government says, maybe we don’t want to se tle - these 
agencies say - we will provide such and such. They represent constituencies in important ways - people get committed 
to causes, they believe in specific things - they make it happen more than what government does. The private side is 
what has kept bi-partisanship support for the refuge resettlement program (Former provider, now State Refugee 
Coordinator).”….“Its [this public-private partnership] - that is what US Refugee resettlement needs to be built on - 
there is no way any government can change that. People are really the backbone - need people to believe in it - if 
government sanctions it, but communities begrudge it - it won’t work. They need to be in support of it- materially and 
in the spirit of it…”  (Subject 41). 
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And that is why VolAgs work at getting volunteers - getting with congregations to 
help,” stated a representative of a US State Refugee Coordinator (Subject 53, 
November 2009). This partnership, although obviously due to US government 
resource constraints, is also a result of the historical trajectory of the US program. It 
has not always been a public-private partnership. Originally, as mentioned in Chapter 
4, it was just a private program; it “was just NGOs doing resettlement. Then in 1980, 
the Act was implemented - then the government got involved in an institutional, 
structural way (Ibid).” Due to these historical and fiscal reasons, in the pres nt-day 
US refugee resettlement system, a much wider range of people provide servic s to 
refugees. These service providers have previously established relationships wit  
congregations, educational institutions and local non-profit organizations that sust in 
their volunteer base. Of all US service providers interviewed, 71% identified the 
central need of volunteers for the refugee settlement program (as compared to only 
23% of Australian service providers).  
Settlement actors have managed “to learn how to navigate that system” 
through mobilizing American volunteers to raise money, provide in-kind donations 
and their ‘time’ to work with refugees (Ibid). For the Matching Grant program, for 
example, VolAgs are required to match federal dollars at the rate of 50%.78 This 
matching of funds and other resources is essential, as this national VolAg 
representative’s words demonstrate: “It is vital also that we get that support from 
parishes and community - parishes are our mainstay. Millions of dollars are 
                                               
78 Before the Reception and Placement grant, the Matching Grant served as the key program supported by the US 
federal government to provide equal services for non-Cuban, non-Vietnamese refugee populations. This both mirrored 
and perpetuated the public-private partnership betwe n the US federal government and national Voluntary agencies.  
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generated through that too” (Subject 52, November 2009). 
Volunteers are much more engaged in the United States in part because these 
settlement actors mobilize them. Some VolAgs have specific educational campaigns 
to engage volunteers, especially through their churches and synagogues. For one 
national VolAg, World Relief, a key part of their brief is to engage congregation 
members to serve populations in need. The mission of the United States Conference 
of Catholic Bishops (USCCB) division on Migration and Refugee Services centers 
on having Catholics live out their Christian faith by providing service:  “ to serve and 
advocate for people on the move” (Subject 52, November 2009). 
In some cases, members of faith organizations will reach out to VolAg 
affiliates for service opportunities to help refugees. In this section, I describ  various 
methods of volunteer mobilization. 
Many national voluntary agencies had both public education and volunteer 
engagement procedures. At one VolAg, representatives spoke about specific staff 
procedures aimed at “work[ing] on church relations, church marketing, church 
engagement” (National Voluntary Agency Representatives, Subjects 42 and 43, 
November 2009). Through this initiative the VolAg determines the best materials to 
use and  means of approaching churches and volunteers. This particular VolAg has 
standard materials, a ‘Good Neighbor Guide’ to engage volunteers and churches. 
Another also had a guide, ‘People Helping People’ which was given to affiliates to 
engage church congregations. Additionally, some VolAgs still  “strive to get co-
sponsorships,” in which the VolAg will partner with the “church to co-sponsor a 
family” (US Advocate, Subject 12, November 2009). Yet, due to the historical 
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reasons discussed above, this specific type of volunteer-VolAg relationship, in which 
these volunteers almost replace the VolAg in the initial short-term period, is less 
frequent now. Many VolAgs are no longer comfortable granting this level of 
responsibility to volunteers. Nevertheless, volunteers continue to have substantive 
roles in refugee settlement in the US. 
Some Voluntary Agencies see this mobilization as a central part of their 
mission:  “Our mission is to work with the church - there is an intentionality - 
working with local congregations.” To engage local congregations, this organizatio  
asks affiliates to be reflective about: “how are you empowering the church? How are 
you engaging the church to serve refugees?” (Subjects 42, 43, November 2009). 
Furthermore, volunteer engagement is so essential that VolAg affiliate directors 
develop specific strategies to engage them. One former director described how s(he) 
utilized faith leaders to both mobilize and manage the volunteers in their 
congregations: “We decided to…find faith leaders within denominations. [We told 
these leaders:] We need this - we need these core volunteers - you, as the [fith] 
leader have to get them to be our volunteers - you be our whips - they were our 
generals - we always made sure they were in the community. [It was like] if so and 
so says it, they’ll do it.” Mobilizing faith leaders created additional benefits, 
including garnering “good media coverage, political and business 
support…[and]…they were hiring people [refugees]” (Former Director, US VolAg 
affiliate, Subject 41, October 2009). 
It is fairly obvious at this point that faith-based organizations play an 
enormous role in the United States’ refugee resettlement program. This has been true 
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from its inception. VolAgs educate and inspire local congregations to provide 
support to incoming refugees. Such congregations are an essential resource for 
refugee resettlement in the United States. They often provide the lion’s share of in-
kind donations that support refugees when they first arrive. They give cash and 
volunteers. One national VolAg representative notes: “we have a strong relationship 
with Lutheran congregations, mosques, etcetera. This is the reason why this agency 
has been so successful at resettling refugees. Without church involvement, 
volunteers, donations, our resettlement program wouldn’t succeed” (Subject 50, 
October 2009). And, although many faith-based organizations do draw on a majority 
of support from populations that follow their faith, the Catholics, Jewish, and 
Protestants are not only engaging their co-religious. A range of churches f om a 
variety of faith traditions are involved. In Utah, for example, the Mormon Church is 
greatly involved: “…unless you've been out here, it is hard to understand how 
pervasive the Mormon Church is.…There are all kinds of resources that the church 
makes available,” such as, “Goodwill-like stores, where refugees can receive 
vouchers or free stuff and food. And they also employ refugees - although this is 
limited to one year. They provide beds, mattresses and furniture to resettlement 
agencies. They help with emergency rental funds. So, the Latter Day Saints church is 
the one of our best partners” (State Coordinator, Subject 57 December 2009). 
Interview subjects discussed other examples of church involvement. One 
Presbyterian Church created art therapy programs for refugees and other churches 
developed missions to sponsor refugee families. 
Refugees themselves also mobilize volunteers. In the following instance, this 
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volunteer, who developed a strong bond with one Sudanese refugee, Chol, through 
her church’s relationship with one of the VolAgs, was mobilized to volunteer her 
services even more: “Chol came to me and said that [the Lost Boys] have nothing - 
Mom, can you help - I was horrified by what I saw with their resettlement. At that 
time I was really involved with the church, in the counseling area. I realized that all 
of the things that were missing we could give them. So, we worked with them for 
some time - over the first 3 years [of their settlement process]” (Subject 61, January 
2010). This quote highlights a central reason that volunteers are utilized more often 
in the US: governmental services that refugees receive can be less than adequate at 
times.  
5.2.1.1: Volunteer Mobilization for the Lost Boys of Sudan 
Public education strategies were highly effective in the case of the Lost Boy  
of Sudan. One national voluntary agency representative describes the utility of 
getting the message out about this particular refugee cohort: “We [the Voluntary 
Agencies] were all very interested in this population because of their story- they 
were alone, without parents, without guidance. So we’d heard of their great desire to 
be educated - info like that - just a wonderful story - and as we told that story in the 
US - the parishes, the communities - a great deal of emotional support was 
generated… People became really aware of the Lost Boys” (National Voluntary 
Agency Representative, Subject 52, November 2010). This ‘campaign’ involved a 
specific video that was “shown in parishes and to other community groups by all 
agencies. It generated fantastic support for the kids.” (Ibid).” This was reiterat d by 
other professional service providers: “the Bosnians, and other previous populations, 
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the Vietnamese, they got a lot of support - this has happened traditionally - those that 
get the most attention, they receive more support….People became really aware of 
the Lost Boys” (Subject 53, October 2009). These mobilization strategies wer  
ramped up for the Lost Boys of Sudan, whose story was particularly compelling.  
 
5.2.1.2: US Volunteer Roles 
In the United States, the ‘private’ component of this partnership would not 
function without the extensive support provided to refugees by volunteers: 
…“having these partnerships is an immense contribution to settlement…[Volunteers] 
will do a clothing drive, donate furnishings, clothes. Also take them to the grocery, 
teach them about the banking system, about different customs. These individuals 
serve as a support network…help[ing] beyond what caseworkers are able to do” (US 
Advocate, Subject 12, November 2009). Indeed, through partnerships with the Latter 
Day Saints church in Salt Lake City79, refugees receive vouchers for free clothing 
and food (as described in interview with Subject 57, December 2010). This work 
involves work to indirectly and directly support refugees: "Americans start by 
getting the apartment set up - get refugees things, things, things - but what they really 
need is time, time, time - to become an American” (U.S. volunteer, Subject 65, 
February 2010). It also includes teaching refugees important skills, such a driving 
and ESL, or enrolling them in school. Numerous interview participants commented 
on the nature of volunteers as “pseudo-case managers” (National VolAg 
representative, Subject 50, in October 2009). 
                                               
79 Ironically, they work in the ‘global relief’ packing factory, learning job-related skills (such as clocking in). 
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As is evident, volunteer efforts include more than simply donating material 
goods. Private sector involvement, as one service provider noted, “is not just 
fundraising.” In fact, in many instances, the more superficial, short-term work is 
often completed by caseworkers. Volunteers, in contrast, are connecting with 
refugees for more of the long-term settlement services: “those that act as proxy-
caseworker, that helped them set goals…On the whole, volunteers do a lot of the 
brunt, long-term work of the agency. Most Caseworkers do the short-term, 
contractual work. Volunteers get to do the more idealistic work [such as mentoring] 
(US Service Provider, Subject 31, October 2009).”80  
Volunteers, of various stripes – church members, college kids, professors and 
retirees, and the organizations they are involved with, help refugees do a multitude of 
things. They provide employment services, logistics, help refugees with their sc ool 
applications and scholarship applications, teach them local transportation services, 
etc. Through partnerships with churches, service provider affiliate offices sponsor 
events like an ‘American lifestyle’ course. Volunteers teach English language 
classes, US orientation, urban living and American cooking. This support, aimed at 
meeting refugees’ basic needs does not go unnoticed by refugees:  “When I came 
here, [I] observed good people from other churches. [In] Skaneateles – [they] helped 
us a lot - teach us computers, cooking every Sunday - appreciated it - saying thank 
you to them is not enough - really helpful, even now still helpful in any way 
(Refugee, Subject 1, May 2007). 
The accomplishments of volunteers often far exceed the tasks laid out for 
                                               
80 This can result in volunteer fatigue, if the volunteer does not set reasonable boundaries. 
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them by affiliate offices. One volunteer, serving refugees through Catholic Charities, 
an affiliate office of USCCB, is revered throughout the refugee community for her 
enduring help. The majority of her work involved supporting refugees in their 
educational endeavors, but her service surpassed even this. She sought out 
Americans to support and mentor refugees. She did not place typical professional 
boundaries; she visited the homes of the refugees and allowed them to call her at any 
time. This refugee describes the volunteer: “… she’s from Catholic Charity. She is 
just volunteering with Catholic Charity and then she decide[s)] this is what she 
need[s] to do and she has been helping [in] that area and she is not being paid for 
anything but she has been helping for anything, even at night- many Lost Boys 
call[ed] her at night and she never got tired of it” (US Refugee, Subject 2, July 
2007).  
Another volunteer’s efforts make this clear: “I came to the airport, I came to 
their apartment - some were starving, and sick - and I just sat with [them], and 
stroke[d] [their] forehead[s], telling [them] ‘I will take care of you.’ And I took them 
to get their first pair of sneakers - they just had cheap sneakers - I took them to g t 
[their] first pair of good shoes” (Subject 61, January 2010). Another volunteer, after 
meeting some of the Lost Boys in 2001 in church, stated, “I felt that helping them 
was not an option, it was a call to my heart from God and I responded. Initially, they 
needed instruction in the most basic tasks of everyday American life, such as how to 
cross the street at a red light, how to use electrical appliances and running water, 
forks and knives etc… However, they had an overwhelming desire to learn and soon 
mastered such difficult tasks as learning to drive cars” (Subject 62, January 2010). 
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This volunteer has worked with Sudanese refugees for over 8 years, and considers 
them “members of my family.” Her work has culminated in a non-profit foundation 
that assists with their health and education, called Alliance for the Lost Boy of 
Sudan. 
 As these quotes exemplify, some volunteers who initially intended to 
provide these basic services eventually found themselves doing much more – 
including being a surrogate parent. Another American volunteer, who developed 
relationships with the Sudanese refugee community through a typical volunteer role 
with an affiliate office, now often has Sudanese stay with in her home when they 
come through her town, or are looking for employment. While these volunteer roles 
are at one extreme of a spectrum, in general, US volunteers are more engaged 
relative to those in Australia. Given both the decentralized and laissez faire natu  of 
the US program, this volunteer support has been an essential component of US 
policy implementation. I turn to an examination of Australian volunteers now.  
 
5.2.2: Volunteer Engagement in Australia  
In Australia, volunteers were utilized in the refugee settlement program, but 
not at the same level as found in the United States. I found almost no evidence of 
large-scale volunteer mobilization, although certain organizations did engage 
volunteers more than others. Additionally, I found that in general, with the exception 
of one organization, most of this community-level support consisted of fulfillment of 
fairly shallow roles. My research suggests that this was the case for several r asons. 
Due to relatively greater levels of financial support for refugee settlement services, 
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and the top-down administration of settlement in the Australian context, the country 
has simply not needed to utilize a high level of community support. Additionally, the 
utilization of volunteers declined following the restructuring of the sector in the late 
1990’s, early 2000s.  
While there are many organizations that provide refugee services, in contrast 
to the US public-private partnership, historically speaking, the Australian 
government has supported the bulk of the refugee settlement system. Migrant 
Resource Centres, although now entirely autonomous entities, were created and 
funded by the Australian federal government for most of their lifetimes. These 
organizations were charged with providing services to migrants in order to foster the 
full participation of newcomers into Australian society and to foster multiculturalism 
by educating communities about the positive contributions of newcomers. Before the 
2003 Review of Settlement Services, these organizations received ‘core funding’ from 
the Department of Immigration and Citizenship. These funds were the lifeline of 
most MRCs – providing job stability for employees and ensuring overhead costs 
were met. When the Department moved toward project-focused funding, core 
funding was abolished and MRCs began diversifying funding sources and competing 
for DIAC funding.81  
This is an important part of Australian settlement history because it has left 
an enduring legacy regarding volunteer engagement. Despite a ‘private-like’ syst m, 
in which independent organizations compete for donor funding, in practice, the 
                                               
81 Before this system shift, MRCs did compete with etnic- and community-based organizations for smaller 
discretionary grants, but these were not significant pots of money relative to the guaranteed ‘core funding’ funds from 
DIAC.  
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federal government still tightly manages the refugee system. The government does 
so through extensive support of the programs for humanitarian migrants and through 
continued consultation with settlement service providers (although the providers 
don’t always listen to the government’s representatives). For the purposes of this 
chapter, this is significant because it means that service providers in practice are 
supported more and therefore have less need to seek out the same degree of civil 
society support, relative to the U.S. There is certainly involvement of volunteers, but 
nowhere near the same extent as found in the US. Refugees are likely to interact 
predominately with professional service providers that are ‘doing their job.’  
 
5.2.2.1: Volunteer Mobilization in Australia 
As I described in Chapter 4, historically, the Australian refugee settlemnt 
program did have private involvement but not to the degree found in the US. The 
restructuring of the program only resulted in a further decrease of volunteer support 
and increased centralized management of the Australian system. The Refugee 
Council of Australia’s Annual Consultation Submission described the effects of the 
IHHS program on volunteers. With the introduction of the IHHS system in the late 
1990’s, “most spheres and some groups, in particular community volunteers, were 
left feeling uncertain about the future (Sec 4.2; 2001).” The Community Refugee 
Support Scheme, which started in 1979, charged with mobilizing and training highly 
skilled volunteers, was not added into the new refugee program framework. This 
scheme helped Indochinese and Eastern European newcomers who weren’t being 
serviced by the Good Neighbor program (that often focused only on Anglo-Saxon 
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migrants). The new IHHS system “didn’t recognize the needs to nurture and support 
volunteers (Refugee Council of Australia 2003 – 2004, p 68).” In a 2007 – 2008 
Refugee Council of Australia report, they wrote that only ‘some’ organizations were 
engaging volunteers (Australia’s Refugee and Humanitarian Program 2007 – 2008, 
RCOA Submission). 
 Some organizations servicing Sudanese in particular, and refugees in general, did 
utilize volunteers. The AMES organization of Sydney, who received the IHHS 
tender to provide incoming services for refugees in Sydney, utilizes a volunteer force 
of 1500 – 2000 volunteers and seeks to bridge the divide between refugee 
newcomers with the local community. SAIL, an organization that brings English 
education, and mentoring programs specifically to the Sudanese community, links 
Australian volunteers with Sudanese students. They had about 350 volunteers and 
almost 450 students in the Melbourne and Sydney areas at the time of the SAIL 
interview in June 2008. An additional organization, Melbourne-based Ecumenical 
Migration Centre’s Given the Chance program establishes relationships with 
refugees and Australian volunteer mentors. Two important points are warranted here. 
First, these organizations are the exceptions in an environment where private support 
has been waning. Second, service providers mentioned that volunteers are often 
individuals who are interested in a career in social services, rather than church
members, as is the case in the US context. Again, this is no surprise given the 
centralized, institutionalized approach of the Australian refugee system. Unlike the 
US system, a great deal of volunteer support is not necessary to meet refugee needs.  
5.2.2.2: Australian Volunteer Roles 
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In Australia, while I did find evidence that volunteers are utilized to provide 
services to refugees, relative to the US, their roles are shallower. Staff of service 
organizations either did not see a key role for volunteers or pointed to a more 
superficial role, namely as a source for in-kind donations, such as clothing and 
furniture.82 This quote by a refugee service professional (and former refugee) 
highlights this nicely. When asked the role of Australian citizens in refugee 
settlement, he replied: 
“Australians are very, very generous. It happens a lot…It’s like I get second-
hand used items. [The Australian tells me] please tk his for members of the [refugee] 
community…they really contribute…Someone I met on the str et…asks me how long I 
have been here, where do I work. And he works at Christian Mission International, [and 
he says:] we have some bags of clothing or stuff, would you like them for members of the 
community? The level of generosity is so much” (Subject O, June 2008). 
 Despite the current situation in Australia, volunteers were much more involved 
prior to the introduction of the IHHS model, as previously mentioned. In fact, they 
played similar roles to those in the US, such as “airport ‘meet and greet’ on arrival, 
accompanying clients to medical appointments and ongoing support and friendship 
(Evaluation of the Integrated Humanitarian Settlement Strategy 2003; p 22). 
According to some reports, some volunteers are still doing these tasks (Ibid). Yet, 
volunteer roles were not considered fully with the IHHS transition, leaving 
volunteers out of the refugee settlement loop. This happened for several reasons, 
including some provider’s IHHS contracts specifically barring them from “us[ing] 
                                               
82 Other sparse examples of volunteer involvement include one volunteer that helped refugees with their organization’s 
financial management 
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volunteers for activities that are part of the IHSS service provider’s role (Ibid, p 23).”  
 
5.2.3: Reviewing Comparative Volunteer Engagement  
Relative to Australia, US volunteers are more highly mobilized and involved 
in substantive ways. Tasks that Australian professional service providers take on, 
such as picking refugees up at the airport, furnishing and setting up the refugee’s 
apartment, orientation and mentoring refugees throughout the settlement process ae 
often done by volunteers in the United States. This differentiation in private support 
is related the to historical and contemporary factors of specific to the refugee 
settlement systems I have previously discussed. Given the public-private policy 
implementer structure and the lower levels of social services in the US refugee 
system, this type of support is necessary. Low levels of governmental support are 
supplemented by private support. But, what does this have to do with refugee 
political activities? In the following section, I demonstrate the second step in his 
two-step process of policy feedback. I show how due to these different compositions 
of policy implementers, refugees are privy to different social networks. These 
networks influence the political trajectories of refugee political leaders. 
 
5.3: Refugee Social Networks and Political Activism 
The nature of these policy implementers -- including their mandates, 
programs and social networks and their relationship with their national government – 
can have material and symbolic effects on refugees and their ambitions to engage in 
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various types of politics. During the ‘settling’ period - a transformative period in the 
lives of refugees -it is the policy implementers who shape refugee leaders’ ideas and 
access to resources, especially because they are often the Americans or Australians 
with whom the refugees interact the most.  
In the US, refugee social networks are more diverse than those in Australia. 
As highlighted in the previous section, the refugees in the US interact not only with 
formal service providers, but also a variety of other ‘types’ of people. This results in 
heterogeneous social networks for refugees, simply because they are meeting a wider 
swath of citizenry while they are receiving services to ‘settle’ in the US. In this 
section, I argue that transnationally motivated refugees in the US are more likely to 
meet people who are interested in helping their ‘cause’ resulting in greater support 
for transnational political activities. In contrast, refugee social networks in Australia 
are mainly comprised of professional service providers. These policy implement rs 
are constrained by government mandates and thus transnationally motivated refuges 
in Australia are not likely to receive much support for their transnational goals. In 
this section, drawing on interview data, I show how differences in the social 
networks of refugee leaders have stimulated different political activities for Sudanese 
refugees in each country. 
Why does this connection between Sudanese refugees and American 
volunteers, particularly faith-based volunteers, factor substantially in refuge  
political activities? Although, one national VolAg representative rightly notes: “the 
main driver for starting organizations is the individual refugee,” my research 
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suggests that the support received by nationals in the settlement context is highly 
consequential (Subject 51, October 2009). In decentralized contexts, where 
individuals who implement policy have more diverse interests, refugees with 
transnational ambitions are more likely to receive the support they need to see thes  
ambitions come into fruition.  
 
5.3.1: US Policy Implementer Agendas, Social Connections and Sudanese Political 
Activities 
Simply put, volunteers do not have the same objectives or motivations in 
working with refugees as service provider staff. Volunteers are not required to 
implement certain services nor do they have a material interest in seeing that certain 
programmatic targets are met. As this US provider notes: “[Volunteers] all have their 
own agendas… they become so attached to the refugee that they collect goods, 
services [and] go beyond the expectations of the program” (Subject 40, October 
2009). This can include paying for refugees’ college tuitions, for example – and 
partnering with them for their political goals. This happens so much in the US that 
one provider, and now State Coordinator stated that “a lot of refugees will tell you 
that they love their volunteers, but not the government” (Subject 41, October 2009). 
These private ‘agendas’ have proven to be helpful for some Sudanese refugee 
leaders in the United States. The social bonds that refugees have created with 
volunteers have at times extended to include political partnerships. As one 
representative of a VolAg describes: “with churches, there are different types of 
support. Sometimes they provide support for the settlement community, by providing 
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them with places to worship. Then those that are more involved will empower these 
refugee groups to do community development in their home countries, some will go 
to southern Sudan - this is the case in Southern Sudan - really creating these groups. 
But, it is not just churches - it is also employers, community members” (US National 
VolAg representative, Subject 50, October 2009). This particular provider (a former 
Southern Sudanese refugee) knew first hand, as she had begun to create her own 
transnational-oriented organization with the help of American volunteers.  
Undoubtedly, these partnerships are cultivated after a certain level of trust is 
established, and when refugees and American volunteers identify shared goals. Sally 
and the Sudanese refugee leaders she works with provide an example of how 
organizations are catalyzed by these relationships. Sally, a volunteer who started
working with Sudanese refugees close to the time when they first began settling in 
the US in the 1990s, developed such strong bonds with one refugee leader that he 
moved in with her family. One result of this bond is the development of an 
organization targeting Lost Boys of Sudan, helping them to organize for their own 
well being (more domestic-focused political activities) and for the development of 
southern Sudan. Although the refugee approached her, as this quote indicates, Sally 
already had the desire to create an organization: “[When he told me that he wanted to 
start an organization,] I told him - it was ironic - because I wanted to start an 
organization, a national organization myself - or to find one - I knew that there were 
wonderful Americans all over the US - and that everyone was figuring out things for 
themselves. And my main goal was to try to help the Lost Boys complete their 
education….I wanted to start an organization of Americans helping them get 
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education. That was my goal” (Subject 65, January 2010). 
With the support gained in these relationships, Sudanese refugee leaders are 
enabled to act on their political intentions. Volunteers have helped refugees with the 
nitty-gritty of building organizations. Often the motivations of the volunteers have 
differed from those of the refugee service providers. One law firm, motivated to 
provide help to Sudanese refugees after meeting them through another volunteer, 
decided to help the Ayual Community Development Corporation file for non-profit 
status. The founders of the law firm were European Jews who resettled in the US. In 
another instance, another volunteer, Jillian, who first met Sudanese refugees when 
they started attending her church, is now the president of one of their organizations. 
Professional service providers, given their mission and resources, simply do not have 
the time or ability to develop these same types of relationships. 
5.3.1.1: Faith and Social Connections  
One central factor for strong relationships between Sudanese refugees and 
many American volunteers is a shared Christian faith and religious practices. These 
connections have been catalyzed by the structure of settlement policy in the US in 
two ways. First, in some instances, VolAgs directly connect faith-based volunteers 
with incoming refugees. One refugee describes this connection: “We were sponsored 
by Catholic Charities and at Catholic Charities there were people from different 
churches that are working for Catholic Charities and as I came here I was going to 
church and I met some families who were willing to help me out in the churches” 
(Subject 1, May 2007). One Refugee State Coordinator, tasked at times to implement 
long-term social services, described that the extensive connection that a refugee had 
with the Episcopal Diocese, a connection that was ‘probably’ made by the 
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resettlement agency, actually impeded the agency’s work because refuges were less 
inclined to interact with the agency (Subject 53, October 2009).  
In other instances, the Sudanese community members sought out church 
communities on their own. This is certainly due to the broad connections made with 
particular Christian denominations prior to resettlement, but also a result of the lack 
of comprehensive social support in the US refugee settlement program. This next 
quote, worth quoting at length, provided by a faith-based volunteer who was working 
with Lutheran Social Services when she first became connected to Sudanese 
refugees, describes this process:  
“There is disparity across cities, of different support services. So in 
the places where there weren’t lots of support - not all had sponsors, or 
wonderful people helping…Not everyone had someone like me - and in 
fact those who did , did really well, they had American sponsors. Some 
didn’t have sponsors - those in D.C. and Jackson, Mississippi. They 
walked into a church. In Sudan there was the Episcopal Church and 
Catholic Church - so in DC they simply walked in St. Stevens Church on 
16th street and started going to church. And, they stick out -they are very 
tall, with black skin - and the church members – Ann, she was at the 
mission’s committee and helped them. And Julie in Mississippi – [when 
the refugees] showed up in church. And so, it was just a natural thing - 
they see a church - and everything looks weird and strange - but had a 
church” (Subject 61, December 2009).  
 For many Sudanese refugees, the church is the institution that they are 
already familiar with. Connecting to church members is a ‘natural’ activity, one that 
continues even in this tumultuous settlement period.  
 This shared faith, as well as the fact that Sudanese refugees had Christian names, 
particularly the Lost Boys of Sudan, also helped Americans more easily form social 
connections. One volunteer describes this: “culturally it helps that they are Christians 
and  [have] Christian names…Being Christian and their Christian names make them 
more approachable - especially [for volunteers] who haven’t done refugee 
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resettlement before” (Subject 65, January 2010). 
Faith-based volunteers have provided an immense amount of resources, as 
has been described in the above section.83 Some examples highlight this fact. The 
creation of the St. Bhakita’s clinic, in Naru, South Sudan would not have been 
possible without the funding and organizational support of the members of St. 
Vincent De Paul church in Syracuse, NY. This particular church effectively 
‘auspiced’ this transnational endeavor, allowing all funds to go through the parish 
first. According to one refugee informant, church involvement was helpful for 
fundraising purposes at first because it gave confidence to individual donors (Subject 
3, June 2007).  
 The role of a Presbyterian church in central New York in the transnational 
endeavors of the John Dau Foundation also highlight the significance of the faith-
based-refugee leader link. One American volunteer (who met John Dau, a southern 
Sudanese Lost Boy, at an educational institution) described how once Dau had “sold 
the church members” on the “vision of the clinic,” “they did it.” Of course Dau’s 
movie project, “God Grew Tired of Us,” and his national speaking engagements 
brought attention and funds. But, this volunteer highlighted the essential role of the 
church. He went on to say that, in general, churches are the key factor in the 
transnational endeavors of the Lost Boys: “These Lost Boys are usually hosted by 
                                               
83 Refugee informants also felt like their connection with churches encouraged church leaders to lobby the US 
government to help out with the Comprehensive Peace Agr ement. This next quote highlights their perspectiv : “So, 
how much does religion play a role in your experience here?” Reply: “It was a key part - played a huge rol  – it put 
pressure on the US government … So it made our voice be heard through religious people and they are the ones who 
focus more and donate more to the people that are suffering - so they played [a] part in [the] peace agreement.” He felt 
like it was advantageous to be a Christian. Christian  are a majority in the US, and they were essential to gaining peace 
in Sudan because they were able to lobby their Congressmen and Congresswomen after hearing stories in churches 
(Subject 5, July 2007, Atlanta, Georgia). 
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some church - if [they] get some churches into [it] - they raise money” (Subject 64, 
September 2009).84  
This goes back to the varying interests that volunteer policy implementers 
have. A USCCB (one of the 10 national VolAgs) representative, when asked about 
linkages between refugee settlement, churches and transnational projects c mmented 
that although he did not know of specific projects, that parishes “have that 
mentality.” He went on to say that these congregations are likely to get involved if 
they trust who they are working with, if “they are connecting to someone they know 
- who they have worked with, and love.” His final words are telling: “It feels good.” 
The faith-based volunteer policy implementers simply have different objectives 
relative to professional service providers (Subject 52, November 2009). 
Social connections foster many different types of support for Sudanese 
political activities. This can include direct organizational support as describd in the 
above paragraphs, but also indirect support such as development of refugee skills as 
well as ideas and models for transnational development.  An interchange I had wit 
one refugee a highlights this:  
Hannah: “Do you play a role in bringing peace in Southern Sudan?”  
Refugee: “We pray for peace. Because our people, they die for freedom. And some 
people they died because of the hunger, disease, so many things. So, really, we’re struggling. [We 
are asking,] how can we get our freedom? Now, the majority of us [Sudanese refugees] in the US 
know people in southern Sudan.  The [American] people, the churches - they work with 
us…Maybe 5 or 10 years, our life is going to be changed.”       
 Hannah: “What will it be like?” 
 Refugee: “In the US, you can plan what you want to do. We need schools [in Sudan}, 
[here] we’ll get good ideas. Now, we are looking for what we are going to need…Some people are 
getting a good education, when people (Americans) are working with them. Like maybe you, you 
                                               
84 Within the John Dau Foundation, volunteers too play an enormous role. According to one interview subject, over 
80% of staff work is completed by volunteers. One key volunteer, who is over 80 years old, works everyday on 
Foundation tasks, including correspondence, arranging shipments, attaining visas for international employees, and other 
logistical matters. This same interview subject said that this volunteer is “the glue that holds everything together.”  
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are working with other Lost Boys, and maybe other people are working with other Lost Boys” 
(Subject 3, May 2007). 
 
5.3.2: Australian Refugee Social Networks and Political Activities  
 In Australia, the networks of Sudanese refugee leaders often remain less 
developed than those in the US. Given the centralized, institutionalized structure of 
the refugee settlement program in which policy implementers are most likely to be 
professional service providers, refugee leaders are less likely to interact with a broad 
swath of Australian citizenry, at least in the initial phase of settlement. Similarly, 
while there is certainly a connection between the faith-based community and 
Sudanese refugees, it is not as extensive as it is in the United States, and is not 
facilitated by the professional service providers there.  
 The few exceptions, where Sudanese refugee leaders have developed strong 
relationships with private community members, only prove the point. Some 
providers, as introduced in the second section, have fostered refugee-civil society 
connections through programs such as the Ecumenical Migration Centre’s Given the 
Chance. This program had a marked effect on one young man, who was a well 
established Sudanese refugee leader. During his involvement in the program, Deng 
made lasting relationships with university professors who helped him take the steps 
to eventually get into university, and make additional social contacts. This program 
also introduced him to his future advisor, a prominent civil society leader in 
Melbourne. Through these kinds of connections refugees are able to create positive 
relationships and to build their networks beyond service providers in Australia.  
 These relationships have contributed to the expansion of support for refugee 
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political activities, leading usually to greater social and financial opportunities than 
professional service providers could provide alone. Deng’s advisor, John, has opened 
many doors for this Sudanese leader. In this next quote, John described how he 
helped broaden Deng’s social networks and helped him learn some political ins and 
outs of Australia. He has helped this Sudanese to build social networks with 
churches, government, and the police.  John sees his role as building this leader’s 
“awareness of how to deal with bureaucracy and government because I have worked 
with them. I helped tie and solidify him into networks. I help because I am already 
higher up in the networks (Subject OO, July 2008).” He encouraged the leader to 
increase his lobbying efforts, and this resulted in him confidently meeting the 
Minister of the Department of Planning (Subject OO, July 2008). Through these 
efforts, Deng was able to acquire a $30,000 grant for strategic planning for his
domestic- and transnationally-focused organization.  
 This account begs the question, what is the role of churches in Australia? My 
research indicates that these institutions are involved with the Sudanese community. 
They have provided space for the Sudanese to worship, but interactions there have 
not resulted in the same level of connection as is found in the US. These findings are 
bolstered by many comments made to me by Sudanese refugees in Australia. They 
knew about, and commented that they didn’t have the same volunteer ‘support’ that 
Sudanese refugees in the US had received. One refugee, struggling to get his 
transnational organization off the ground noted that the lack of private support is one 
reason why he and others had not realized their educational and transnational goals. 
This same refugee has worked primarily with two settlement service provide s in the 
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Sydney area.  
5.3.3: Comparative Sudanese Refugee Social Networks and Political Activities 
In this section, I presented evidence regarding the connection between 
volunteer support and refugee transnational endeavors. In the US, private support has 
resulted in substantial financial and motivational support for many Sudanese leaders’ 
transnational endeavors. Faith-based communities provided the bulk of this support. 
My research indicates that this type of homegrown social connection between private 
policy implementers and Sudanese refugee leaders is almost absent in Australia. 
Some evidence suggests, however, that where it is occurring in Australia, Sudanese 
leaders have been successful at starting to realize their transnational ambitions. This 
suggests that having social connections to volunteers can play a significant role i 
spurring transnational political practices for transnationally motivated refugees. I 
argue that this low level of private support in Australia is a factor has contributed to 
the relatively lower level of transnational political activities emanating from the 
Australian context. Because of the more institutionalized practice of settlem nt in 
Australia refugee leaders, even those with transnational ambitions engage in 
domestic related political activities. They do so with professional service provide s. 
In the next chapter I will examine more closely the role of professional Australian 
service providers in influencing the political choices of the Sudanese refugees.  
 
5.4: Conclusion 
In this chapter I detailed how settlement policy in both contexts directly and 
indirectly influenced the political activities of South Sudanese refugees. In the 
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decentralized, laissez faire US, the historical and contemporary practices of 
settlement, derived from a strong public-private partnership, has resulted in a greater
involvement of volunteers, especially those that are faith-based. In contrast, the 
Australian system, top-down management and governmental support of refugee 
settlement, has resulted in a lower amount of private support. There, the private 
sector has not stepped in to do settlement work because it is not necessary. These 
divergent sets of policy implementers are part of the reason that the social networks 
and political activities of Sudanese refugee leaders in each country differ. Natu ally, 
the specific motivations and interests of policy implementers determine how they 
will interact with refugee leaders, and what projects they will support. In the US, this 
has resulted in a greater degree of collaboration in refugee transnational ctivities.  
It is important to note that the purpose of this dissertation is not to present 
one settlement model as being superior to another. Rather, I have sought to 
understand differences in the contexts that account for the differences in political 
activism discovered. In the US, the strong role played by the private sector crtainly 
has its fair share of problems, particularly because private groups are relied upon to 
provide basic human social services. US service providers noted that conflict can 
arise when providers and volunteers disagree about the appropriate way to ‘settle’ 
refugees. Also, and co-dependent relationships between refugees and volunteers 
occur. This can result in less independence and potentially less empowerment of 
newcomers. Although it was more rare, providers also acknowledged that volunteers 
and refugees had exploited these relationships at times. For example, one State 
Refugee Coordinator mentioned that an American asked to host a refugee so that the 
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refugee could clean her house. At times, faith-based volunteers proselytized as w ll.
Due to the nature of these highly personal relationships, it is likely impossible to 
eradicate this behavior, and perhaps it is not always harmful, depending on the needs 
of the refugee. Perhaps most importantly, the heavy use of volunteers and volunteer 
contribution can have deleterious effects on the overall health of the refugee 
settlement system when there are downturns in the national economy, as has been 
felt in the sector over the last 3 years. During this time, volunteer support and 
financial contributions greatly waned. In this chapter and dissertation, however, 
rather than making normative claims about what national refugee settlement system 
is better or worse, I have tried to focus on the consequences of two different models 
of refugee settlement.  
I have also sought to highlight the positive role that policy implementers, 
professionals and volunteers, as actors on the stage of settlement, can and do pl y. 
Some scholars who have examined policy implementers underscore how their efforts 
can silence service recipients (Soss 1999). They question the levels of dedication of 
policy implementers, and ask about the ‘real’ motivations of implementing actors. 
These are important questions, of course. But, a focus and discussion solely on 
instances where policy implementers have not met high standards loses sight of the 
many individuals who dedicate their lives to be of service to those who are less 
fortunate than they are. This chapter has illuminated the positive roles that many of 
these professional and volunteer policy implementers have played in the lives of 
Sudanese refugees. In the following chapter, I examine a vital function of 
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professional policy implementers, that of empowering refugees who have the internal 
drive to effect social change.  
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Chapter 6:  Channeling Political Activities through Refugee 
Organization Building Programs 
 
6.1: Introduction  
In this chapter, I have three broad objectives. First, I argue that empirical 
differences in Sudanese refugee political activities across the United States and 
Australia are partly due to how much host countries manage refugee political 
organization through policies and programs. I aim to show how policy programs 
beget politics in the refugee settlement field. Policy programs are another way in
which these two countries’ levels of institutionalization and centralization play a part 
in shaping Sudanese refugee political activities.  
Second, I demonstrate how this channeling process occurs. In these Refugee 
Organization Building (ROB) programs, participating refugees receive mat rial and 
social benefits. In order to receive these benefits, refugee leaders must enact political 
activities that are suitable to the host country. As political learners and str tegic 
actors, refugees adapt to these constraints and go after these benefits. In ROB-heavy 
contexts, such as Australia, in which host countries utilize these programs 
extensively, refugee activities will be slanted toward domestic-related activities. In 
ROB-light contexts, represented here by the US, refugees will engage in political 
activities more suitable to their own agendas (although many factors will influence 
their capability to do this) because of greater autonomy. 
Finally, I discuss the unintended consequences of channeling refugee 
political activities. Without sensitivity, these programs may undermine the very 
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essence of refugee community capacity building. I find evidence that in some 
instances, these programs created distrust and animosity between refugees and 
service providers and created barriers to refugee self-determination.  
I utilize evidence from interviews and policy data from both countries. First I 
define what I mean by Refugee Organization Building Programs. I demonstrate that 
most characteristics of these programs – their purpose, eligibility requirements and 
other design components – are actually very similar in the United States and 
Australia. In the third section, however, I describe the key cross-national difference 
in terms of this policy: its overall prioritization in each context. In Australia this 
program is a key method to engender self-reliance of refugee communities. It is 
another tool of this highly institutionalized refugee settlement system. In theU.S. 
other activities such as finding refugees early employment takes precedence. ROBs 
are used as a side program. Essentially, Australia manages refugee political 
organization more extensively than the United States. I then demonstrate specific 
ways that, when these programs are utilized, Aussie and U.S. Sudanese refugees are 
guided toward domestic-focused political activities through material and social
incentives. I conclude with a discussion of the unintended consequences of 
channeling transnationally-motivated refugee leaders toward domestic politi al 
goals. 
6.2: Refugee Capacity Building Programs 
Host countries can manage the development of refugee organizations through 
community capacity building programs. Countries aim to accomplish two goals 
through such programs: to empower refugee communities, and to deliver necessary 
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settlement services. By encouraging refugees to help themselves, host countries meet 
their own goals. In the United States, refugee organizations are funded to provide 
settlement services for newly arriving refugees. This is similar to Australia’s 
‘Developing Communities’ pillar. And, New Zealand’s ‘Settling In’ program aims to 
‘build [refugee communities] knowledge and capacity” to “develop and deliver 
services identified by the [refugee] communities themselves (Country Chapters, 
Refugee Resettlement Handbook, UNHCR).” As an example of capacity building, a 
general tactic now commonly advanced by community-based advocates to provide 
services to those in need, these programs can be both helpful and harmful, depending 
on how it is implemented.  
In Australia and the United States, Refugee Organization Building programs 
are utilized to encourage integration of refugee communities and are a part of these 
countries’ broader community capacity building schemes. These ROB programs 
target the creation and strengthening of refugee community organizations. In thi  
chapter, I demonstrate how although both countries’ ROB programs have similar 
goals, but utilize these programs differently according to their overarching 
institutionalized/laissez faire approach to settling refugees. The US simply does not 
utilize this tool of integration to the degree that Australia does. 
These countries have common qualitative features when it comes to their 
refugee organization capacity building programs. Each country’s objective wi h this 
program is to integrate refugee communities that are struggling to connect with host 
country community resources and members. Building refugee organizations is a key 
way to encourage self-reliance and to perpetuate mutual assistance for resettled 
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refugees. The policies in each country are also both targeted toward refugees that are 
new arrivals. Each country funnels federal funds toward established refugee 
community organizations, service providers and local or state-level governments. In 
the following section I describe these characteristics in more detail. In practice, these 
funds engender the growth and sustainability of refugee community organizations 
through material and social benefits afforded to refugee community leaders and 
settlement actors. In the third section I present evidence indicating that Australia 
prioritizes ROB programs much more relative to the US. These differences, like the 
policy implementer differences explained in Chapter 5 are in great part due to 
differences in the levels of institutionalization and centralization in each countries 
settlement system. 
 
6.2.1: The Purpose of Building Refugee Organizational Capacity   
In this section, I describe these ROB programs, including their purpose, 
eligibility requirements, and central programmatic activities. In both cuntries, 
community capacity building programs have two inter-connected objectives aimed t 
fostering the broad goal of integrating refugee communities. According to 
policymakers, refugee organizations are key mechanisms through which refugees are 
able to make connections with host country community members and services. The 
first objective is to see that through refugee organizations, communities are able to
identify their collective needs (including long-term settlement needs such as housing, 
employment, health and education) and get linked into local services to meet these 
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needs. As refugees get linked into mainstream services, their level of participation 
with the host society increases – the second key goal for these programs.  
In the US, these programs are implemented through the Department of Health 
and Human Service’s Office of Refugee Resettlement discretionary grant, the Ethnic 
Self Help Grant. As listed on the grant tender: ‘the objective of this program is to 
strengthen organized ethnic communities comprised and representative of refugee 
populations to ensure ongoing support and services to refugees after initial 
resettlement (US Office of Refugee Resettlement, 2008).’ Indeed, as a national US 
advocate notes, ‘ethnic Community Based Organizations fill in the gaps when 
funding for VolAgs  run out” (Subject 12, November 2009). One settlement policy 
implementer stated that building refugee organizations was the best way to build 
refugee capacity (July 2009 Interview US Refugee State Coordinator and Service 
Provider, Subject 57, December 2009). 
In Australia, building refugee community organizations falls under the 
Developing Communities pillar, one of the three domestic priorities of the 
Department of Immigration and Citizenship’s broader Settlement Grants Programme 
(see Chapter 4). This pillar aims to ‘help newly arrived humanitarian communities to 
identify common goals and interests and develop a sense of identity and belonging” 
through initiatives to build their organizational capacity (Australia Department of 
Immigration and Citizenship 2010).”  In practice, as is clear in one service provider’s 
grant proposal, community development is essentially about creating organizations 
so that refugees can help themselves: ‘Successful settlement is fostered through the 
development and funding of refugee community organisations to deliver projects to 
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communities (New South Wales Service for the Treatment and Rehabilitation of 
Torture & Trauma Survivors 2008).’ A representative of the Australian federal 
government’s Settlement Grants Program seconds this strategy: “Community 
development strategies for some groups have consisted of helping people establish 
CBOs (Community Based Organizations) to help people organize, and advocate for 
their own needs.” And, another Settlement Grant’s Programme official notes: “we 
recognize that it is still important to fund small organizations because of thedepth of 
support they can provide – so we try to do this, so long as new refugees are still 
coming in” (Subject PP, July 2008). As this comparison highlights, the two 
countries’ programs share similar objectives: to build refugee capacity and to meet 
refugee settlement needs.  
 
6.2.2: Eligibility Requirements 
Perhaps each country services different refugees. Do levels of eligibility help 
explain why Sudanese refugees are engage in alternate political activities? In both 
countries refugee communities with populations that are newly arrived are targeted 
with these grants. In the United States, refugees originating from countries from 
which refugees are currently being resettled and who are ‘slow to integrate’ and yet 
to receive citizenship are eligible to receive services through the Ethnic Self-Help 
Grant (Office of Refugee Resettlement, 2001, 2004, 2008). For Australia’s Settlement 
Grants Programme, only communities that have arrived in the last 5 years, and that 
continue to receive refugees are eligible (D partment of Immigration and 
Citizenship’s Settlement Grants Program).  
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Eligibility requirements in Australia have shifted over the last decade to 
center more toward newly arrived, ‘emerging’ refugee communities, who have t e 
‘greatest need.’ Before 2005-2006, Australia (through the Community Service 
Settlement Scheme and Migrant Resource Centres) did not have specific targets. In 
fact, established communities such as the Greek and Italians were receiving apacity 
building funds. After a 2003 evaluation of settlement services, it was recommended 
that these funds focus down to only to the newly arrived (2003 Review of Settlement 
Services). In the U.S., while priorities have generally been on the newly arrived, in 
2001, the grant specified particular communities (including the Sudanese), but in 
2004, only specified that populations who have arrived in the last 10 years were 
serviced. In the 2008 standing announcement, this changed to newly arrived 
communities with significant populations (Office of Resettlement, 2001, 2004, 2008).  
The rationale to focus on newly arrived populations derives from the notion 
that new arrivals have more needs and are less able to fulfill them due to lack of 
organization, knowledge and connections to do so. The Sudanese are included in this 
‘emerging’ designation. As previously discussed, in both countries, the first decade 
of the 2000’s was the height of their resettlement.  
Professional settlement policy implementers support these fledging 
communities through community capacity building initiatives: “ the best way to [help 
refugee communities] is to have the assistance of another organization that is already 
gone through that process, that can be supportive through that process” (Australian 
Settlement Service Provider, Subject E, June 2008). In both countries, many ‘types’ 
of organizations are allowed to apply for these grants, including established refugee 
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communities organizations, professional settlement service providers and local and 
state government entities.  
 
6.2.3: Capacity Building Activities 
Perhaps each country utilizes different programmatic differences. Would 
these help explain why Sudanese refugees are engage in alternate politicalact vities? 
Building refugee organizational capacity includes many tasks and varies from 
refugee community to refugee community, but generally involves extending 
resources to refugee communities to create their organization, linking them into 
service provider networks, socializing leaders and supervising their efforts. 
At its most basic form, this task involves educating the community about just 
what is involved in starting an organization in a western industrialized context: 
“Capacity building with Sudanese was basically how to set up an MAA. How to 
receive 501(c)3 status, create by-laws - it was basically a 101 set up not-for-profit” 
(US Service Provider, Subject 57, December 2009). But, it also involves finding or 
cultivating leadership, getting refugee organization funding and helping communities 
to meet reporting requirements when funded: “…as the community becomes 
established, that’s when they start to come to you…They get incorporated; can you 
help us with this funding application? They get the money. They suddenly realize 
that they have to do a financial report, so you can see them slowly moving through 
the stages of development as a community comes established” (Australian Service
Provider, Subject HH, July 2008). 
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What exactly does this involve, however? Australia’s Settlement Grants 
Programme guides settlement actors with suitable settlement actor capacity building 
activities, including “assisting community leaders and members to organise, ad 
promote their community positively; assisting community organisations to hire r 
source venues for meetings, recreation and social activities; raising awareness of 
how to engage and communicate with relevant organisations and service providers; 
developing creative strategies to assist communities to strengthen and thrive through 
sponsorship by more established communities, both ethno-specific and mainstream, 
including finding sources of funding” (Australia’s Department of Immigration and 
Citizenship’s Settlement Grants Program). 
In practice, as is implicated above, this work involves an extensive amount of 
education about logistics and socialization into western ways. Settlement actors are 
educating refugees about the utility of organization: “the way to access th e services 
is if you form yourself into a structure where there is someone who can organize, or 
advocate - someone you can go to, and then they can go to whoever the service 
providers are” (Australian Service Provider, Subject KK, July 2008). These actors
use information sessions and trainings to “we provide info sessions, letting them 
know what is available (Australian Service Provider, Ibid).” This involves a certain 
degree of socializing them into western ways: “So sometimes, it is a whole new ball 
game. So, it’s not something you [- the refugee leader] can compare and say, oh, I 
have seen this before. It’s new (Australian Service Provider, Subject KK, July 2008). 
 In order for newly established refugee community organizations to receive 
grant funds and/or donations, funding bodies often require organizations to have 
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formal non-profit status, pre-set governing and financial structures. At the refugee 
organization’s inception, service providers often act as an 'auspicing' agent, mea ing 
that they manage any procured funding, essentially lowering the perceived risk to 
fund these new organizations. I paraphrase one Australian federal grants manager: 
“communities don’t have skills to manage funds, so large organizations auspice these 
organizations. These [refugee] organizations then get experience…One of my roles 
is to train organizations who are funded [to auspice refugee organizations 
effectively]…The primary goal is to see that funds are used efficiently a d for the 
clients” (Subject PP, July 2008). 
Another key aspect of community capacity building in practice is that 
settlement service providers coordinate most of this work through refugee leaders. 
Refugee leaders’ are able to straddle linguistic and cultural divides between their 
refugee community and host country people and institutions: “most leaders speak 
English… And they are people who understand the culture, the way of life here 
much better. [The service providers] might not understand community..[so]…it is 
better to go through a leader…[and it is] easier to build rapport with a leader rath r 
than with the entire community (Australian Service Provider, Subject O, June 
2008).” The strategic benefits for providers to work with refugee leaders are similar 
for all settlement services, including building organizations.   
In both countries, as is evident from above, there are a variety of activities 
that grant recipients can undertake to build refugee organizational capacity. Within 
both countries, there are also specific activities that are barred: anything that is 
considered ‘political,’ activities that are geared toward cultural preservation for a 
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specific ethnic community and transnational activities. This capacity building 
program results in specific outcomes: refugee community organizations, with 
structures that fit western standards and western-like leaders, and can receive
funding by western bodies.  
In this way, the effect of this social policy program is functional and 
straightforward. The host country is helping refugees build their ability to help 
themselves within the host country. As this section demonstrates, I find that the 
specific qualities, or characteristics, of community capacity building policy programs 
in Australia and the United States do not vary significantly. These qualitative factors 
do not explain these empirical differences. I describe in the following section, 
because the program is used so extensively in Australia, and not so much in the US, 
two distinct refugee political paths within these two host countries have taken shape. 
In the next section, I detail the key community capacity building difference across 
these countries: the level of prioritization. These findings suggest again that the 
highly institutionalized Australian system manages refugee political org nization, 
while the more laissez faire US is more hands off with their refugee newcomers.  
 
6.3: Differences in policy priorities 
As demonstrated in the previous section, the over-arching objectives and 
practices of creating, building and sustaining refugee community organizatio s re 
almost identical across the United States and Australia. For the purposes of this 
project, one key difference stands out sharply: Australia prioritizes this program 
much more. This difference matters greatly because when this program is utilized 
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more often, refugee community organizations and the projects they implement, are 
managed, or nudged by settlement actors toward settlement actor goals, specifically 
long-term settlement benchmarks. When they are managed in Australia, they re 
done so through organizations that have strong financial and historical ties to the 
government. Therefore, refugee community organizations in Australia, particulrly 
when formed using settlement actor resources are channeled toward domestic-
oriented initiatives. Before describing this mechanism, I demonstrate how refugee 
community organization is prioritized much more in Australia relative to the United 
States.  
In the US, the same amount (or less) of refugee organization building funds 
are provided to a much higher amount of newly arrived refugees (see Figure 6.1).85  
                                               
85 For a review of total funding for Refugee Organization Building Programs and the amount of refugees rsettled in 
the US from 2000- 2007, please see Appendix E. 
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Figure 6.1. Refugee Organization Building Funds per efugee (2000 – 2007) 
Note: Australia’s figures were drawn from Australia’s Department of Immigration and Citizenship 
(former Department of Multiculturalism and Immigration Affairs) Portfolio Budgets for Australia’s 
Department of Immigration and Citizenship (former Department of Multiculturalism and Immigration 
Affairs). Annual reports (years 1999-2000 to 2010-2011) can be found at 
http://www.immi.gov.au/about/reports/budget. US figures were located on each Office of Refugee 
Resettlement’s Annual Report to Congress. 
In Figure 6.1, the difference in distribution of funding for capacity building 
programs per refugee is clear. Because this is a pillar of Australian refugee services, 
the government funds it more extensively. Each refugee community, in each 
settlement city is more likely to participate in these activities. This is not the case in 
the US, where a smaller amount of funds are scattered throughout many more cities. 
Thus, while it is likely that many refugee communities will benefit from these 
services, it will not happen in each city for each community. 
The interview data support these conclusions. Service provider comments 
reiterate how the US federal government is not prioritizing refugee community 
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organization capacity building. While the act of building refugee organizational 
capacity was almost taken for granted in Australia – with each provider going into 
great lengths to describe their programs – it was rare to hear this as a key initiative in 
the United States. As one US provider notes: “of the federal funding - it is not 
capacity building funds - they are just program funds” (US State Coordinator, 
Subject 40, November 2009). The overwhelming majority of settlement actors I 
interviewed in the US reiterated the basic fact that the US program is geared toward 
refugee self-sufficiency by means of employment.  
 
6.3.2: Systems to sustain building refugee community organizations 
We see these different levels of prioritization play out in the ways that these 
two countries do, or do not, create the necessary mechanisms to a) keep refugee 
community organizations going through small grants and b) sustain the institutional 
knowledge of building refugee community organizations. 
In Australia, refugee organizations, once they are off the ground, often 
acquire new funds through local government funding. The federal government and 
local service providers often work in sync with these local governments to help build 
refugee community capacity. The federal government supplements local government 
funds, and requires service providers to work in tandem with these entities. 
Consequently, local governments along with settlement service providers end up 
providing much-needed resources to fledging refugee community organizatio s: 
…. [the] Kingston government, another local government in the area, 
provided the [settlement service provider] with a number of buildings that 
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community groups could use free of charge - so [a refugee leader] was 
provided access to office space where they could meet - and then [the 
refugee organization] got incorporation status, and we helped [the refugee 
leader] write funding submissions to the state government…and to local 
councils in the area - particularly Monash and Kingston - and as a result 
they got more sums of money – 3 – 5 thousand dollars to do particular 
projects. (Australian Settlement Service Provider, Subject KK, July 2008) 
In the US context, despite getting off the ground, organizations cannot always 
remain financially afloat: “We developed an Umbrella organization for Africans – 
[but] it was hard to fund” (US Settlement Service Provider, Subject 53, November 
2009). Due to the decentralized nature of US social policy, the federal government 
does channel refugee service funds through state governments – but these funds are 
solely for cash and medical assistance. Local-level actors, such as city nd municipal 
governance bodies are not generally involved in funding refugee organizations, or 
refugee settlement services in general (which is becoming a particularly hot political 
button in refugee resettlement).  
Australia’s extensive federal funding for refugee organization capacity 
building has also established the necessary institutional structures and knowledge to 
sustain these programs. Many organizations have specific staff whose sole purpose is 
to build refugee community capacity. For example, several organizations I 
interviewed had Community Development Workers or Specialists. This was not the 
case in the United States. Because this is not a component of their core funding, staff 
members do not generally do this as their sole task.  
 
6.3.3: Trade Offs 
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US advocates point out that essentially this is about trade-offs. Due to the 
large number of individuals receiving refugee status in the US, there just cannot be 
the same extensive services. 
When you are looking at the federal government’s definition of success - 
we need to be fair and look at the big numbers. The only country that is 
even close to this number is Canada. There is a huge gap in numbers - 
US is by far the largest. When that many numbers are being resettled, 
other countries may be providing more, but it is a tradeoff (US National 
Advocate, Subject 12, November 2009). 
On the whole, a supportive culture of refugee organizational capacity 
building is present in Australia and lacking in the United States. The funding and 
institutional support for these programs has reinforced and perpetuated programs in 
Australia, while these elements are missing in the United States context. Th  overall 
prioritization of capacity building programs is quite different in Australia nd the 
United States. In this section this was demonstrated through significant differences in 
levels of funding, distribution of funding to sustain organizations, and in the overall 
cultures in these countries, as seen through the interview data. In the next section, I 
demonstrate how due to the high level of prioritization in Australia, the political 
organization of refugees is ‘managed’ much more than in the United States. In thi 
process of ‘managing’ refugee leaders are guided toward domestic-focused political 
activities. This management takes place through an educative process in which 
refugee leaders receive material and social benefits.  
 
6.4: Nudging Refugees  
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Australian and US bureaucrats aimed to shape refugee political organization 
with community capacity building programs for purposes that were suitable for both 
the host country and for incoming refugee populations: they sought to ‘nudge’ 
refugee leaders toward specific activities, namely settlement issues in their refugee 
communities. Yet, bureaucrats and providers are not the only decision-makers in this 
social process. Savvy refugee political leaders, who want to effect change, are 
incentivized to follow the material and social goods provided through community 
capacity building policy programs; as one refugee leader describes: “We work d 
with [a service provider], who connect[ed] us with others, [and who] helps us with 
grants, trainings” (Subject S, June 2008). That these are necessary political 
prerequisites are no mystery to refugee leaders. In this section I describe these 
material and social benefits. I show how in the process of acquiring these benefits, 
refugee leaders and their organizations are channeled, or nudged toward domestic-
related political activities.   
 
6.4.1: Material Nudges 
In both countries, refugee organization building programs, through settlement 
actors provide an obvious, key, tangible political good: material resources for 
fledging refugee organizations and leaders. These material goods include in-kind
support for fledging refugee organizations and pathways to money for organizations 
and salaries. Through the provision of these goods, settlement actors (or providers) 
nudge refugee leaders to engage in certain domestic activities over others, and away 
from transnational political activities. 
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These material benefits provide support for refugee organization’s 
infrastructure. This includes places to work, a mailing address, and office supplies 
and support. For example, when one leader came to the Ecumenical Migration 
Centre in the mid-2000s, a provider notes that they realized “the need for him to 
have an office … and then it was a question of, how can we best support him and his 
organization. And that’s when we offered him space (Australian Service Provider).” 
Another refugee leader commented that he received office space and furniture 
through a community supporter through the help of Springville Aid, an Australian 
settlement organization (Subject Z, July 2008).  
Settlement organizations guide refugee leaders through the development of 
their refugee organization, including helping them receive funding. During this 
guiding process, refugee leaders are often nudged from one goal to another. Many 
providers saw this ‘translation’ – from eager refugee leaders’ goals, to something 
more do-able, something more fund-able, as a common part of community capacity 
building. “…The communities, they are really keen, but it's a challenge to translate 
that keen-ness into actually where you want [them] to go,” said a Melbourne 
Settlement Service Provider (Subject KK, July 2008). This nudging is no surprise: as 
settlement service providers, these entities are mandated to implement the policies
they are being funded for.  
This nudging includes shaping what ‘type’ of domestic activity these refuge 
community organizations undertake. One Melbourne-based provider’s comments 
reflect a common provider sentiment. She reflected that because refugee 
organizations need to strategically propose projects suitable to donors, she has had to 
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redirect refugee leaders away from their original funding proposal ideas: “it might be 
great to do a cultural event, but increasingly it’s difficult to get funding for that.” She 
noted that she offers an alternative domestic focus for them: “maybe look at issues of 
positive parenting” (Subject HH, July 2008). For refugee organizations in Australia, 
their ‘donors’ are generally local and state governments, who often receive larger 
grants from the federal governments for refugee organizational activities.  
Provider nudging also shifts refugee political leaders’ foci from transn tional 
goals toward domestic-related goals. The development of one prominent Australian-
based Sudanese organization epitomizes this nudging process. Another refugee 
leader initially approached a settlement organization telling the provider: “w  are 
very worried about our community back home, how can we help?” The provider 
comments that she “explained that as an agency, our focus is on refugees in 
Australia, so you know, we talked about that with him. We said we understood his 
concerns with the community back home, but he wasn’t going to be able to - it would 
be difficult to attract funding for money back home because there were also very 
high needs within the immediate community here, within the southern region [of 
Sydney].” This leader “listened to that, and acknowledged that and agreed that there 
was also a lot of worthwhile work that he could be doing here.” The organization 
went on to guide this leader through the organizational incorporation process, find 
office area, link up to other leaders in refugee service provision and write funding 
submissions. Over several years the organization became more reputable and was 
able to slowly procure larger grants (as recounted by Interview Subject KK, July 
2008).  
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In order to create a viable organization, refugee leaders are encouraged to 
follow the funding. They are also nudged by the work opportunities that arise from 
both doing domestic settlement activities, and getting their organizations funded. 
This includes traineeships with service providers and “funding for them to work in 
their own communities” (Australian service provider, Subject O, June 2008).  
A final source of nudging through material benefits happens when settlement 
actors ‘auspice’, or manage the financials of any grants that refugee organizations 
procure. In Australia, donors are more likely to provide funding to fledging 
organizations when the funds are secured by an established Australian organization. 
This too is a critical benefit provided during the community capacity building 
process and one way that organizations are nudged: “although [the Women’s 
Refugee Network] have their own funds, and they are incorporated, basically our 
organization handles the money for them and [we] point them in the direction that 
this is a better way.” (Australian Settlement Service Provider, Subject KK, July 
2008). 
Nudging is an essential part of community capacity building, especially g ven 
specific funding constraints – in regard to both funding for settlement actors and 
fledging refugee organizations. For settlement organizations, helping refugees 
engage in transnational work is not a part of their missions. My research indicates a 
dearth of nudging happening in the US context. As demonstrated in section 3, the US 
does not prioritize Refugee Organization Building programs, and thus refugee 
leaders and professional settlement actors are often not interacting in this way. While 
on one hand refugee leaders are missing out on these financial resources to build 
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community organizations, they do have greater autonomy in creating organizations 
that suit their particular desires. As seen in Chapter 5, these leaders are creating these 
organizations with the help of private policy implementers more. Nevertheless, when 
US refugee leaders are working with professional service providers, this ame 
nudging takes place. For example, when I asked a US provider involved with one 
Sudanese organization’s development about whether or not she is has supported any 
Sudanese transnational activities, her comment echoed Australian providers: “I’m 
focused on America.’ Instead, she suggested that refugees are better suited in 
partnering with organizations already involved in transnational work (a difficult task, 
especially when a refugee has not developed strong social networks) (Subject 40, 
October 2009).  
This nudging does not entirely preclude refugee organizations from engaging in 
transnational activities in the long term. Although it is not in the ‘brief’ of settlement actors, 
once a refugee organization “is on their own, they can look at how they can help others at 
home. If those group can on their own decide they want to do something specific to their 
country - they raise funds for building schools over there” (Subject KK, June 2008).  
 
6.4.2: Softer Nudges through Social Network Expansion 
 Another seminal political prerequisite for fledgling refugee leaders is a social 
network that is helpful to reach their goals, as discussed in Chapter 5. Through 
Refugee Organization Building programs, refugee leaders are linked into broader 
social networks, which leads to more resources, as this quote from a Sydney 
Sudanese Refugee, Organizational leader and Lost Boy: “In Australia - we have 
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agencies, and so you connect [with them] - so if I have an idea - these people connect 
me - they show me the agency - or the way you get the funding” (Subject S, June 
2008).  
 In Australia, these capacity building programs expand refugee social networks 
with a diverse set of societal members. Refugee leaders are encouraged to attend 
interagency meetings with multiple social service providers (in one case ‘over 80’), 
including the police, fire brigade, legal officers, the media and more. They discuss 
issues such as crime and discrimination, and cultural misunderstandings (Australian 
Settlement Service Provider, Subject D, June 2008). Other interagency meetings 
involve local and state government officials and health care service providers, whee 
participants discuss ways to better work together to respond to specific domestic 
issues (Australian Settlement Service Provider, Subject QQ, July 2008). Settlement 
organizations arrange these meetings with the specific objective of making these 
social connections for refugee leaders, as they see themselves as “ an intermediary” 
between refugees and mainstream service providers, as the following professional 
service provider’s quote highlights: 
So, I actually started a meeting called the Sudanese Community Action 
Network - the purpose is to bring leaders together to meet with service 
providers - so leaders, fire brigade, police, different welfare organizations, 
the state government, the local government are represented, and 
sometimes the state government (Australian Settlement Service Provider, 
Subject QQ, July 2008). 
 These connections foster relationships between refugees and mainstream actors 
and deepen cross-cultural understanding. One Australian service provider established 
a ‘Sudanese Leadership Dialogue’ involving refugee leaders and Australian local and 
193 
 
state officials. This allowed for a facilitated discussion between leaders on key 
domestically-related topics such as consequences of not understanding family law 
and driving regulations. This resulted in identifying key settlement needs, and 
finding innovative solutions. For example, after one family court justice, after 
attending one of these Leadership Dialogue sessions, took dowry into account in one 
court ruling. Due to these expanding social networks, refugee leaders also became 
more and more involved with new projects, or new political activities – issues that 
are domestically-focused.  
 In Chapter 5, I demonstrated that due to different policy implementers, refugee 
social connections varied from host country to host country. In the United States, 
because of its more laissez faire, public-private structure, settlement providers rely 
on volunteers for much of the settlement work. Refugees there, find themselves 
connecting with more diverse Americans – including church members. Conversely, 
in the more institutionalized Australian system, federal and local governments fund 
the program pretty much its entirety. These providers do not rely on volunteers to 
implement their projects. The Australian government more tightly manages refugee 
settlement. This reduced the scope of refugee social networks. Community capacity 
building policy programs are one specific way through which these divergent social 
networks develop, and then shape the target of refugee political activities. For 
example, when leaders meet with mainstream service providers, they start projec s 
that these providers also want to pursue. This quote, an interaction between myself 
and a representative of a US Refugee State Coordinator, exemplifies this reliance on 
private support for refugee capacity building in the case of the Lost Boys: 
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Hannah: Did you all do any capacity building? 
Interview Subject 53: “The people who really built their capacity were 
really some of the groups that came a long side of them - American 
volunteers - Friends of the Lost Boys.”  
 
Through community capacity building programs settlement providers connect 
refugee leaders to a variety of other actors, particularly mainstream s rvice 
providers. The development of refugee social networks in turn educates and 
socializes both refugees and mainstream social providers. These are political 
resources and skills that refugee leaders acquire, and can use to their benefit. In this 
process of acquiring political prerequisites, refugees are more subtly nudged towar
domestic-related political activities. Capacity building policy program also have 
unintentional consequences that run contrary to the essence of the program. In this 
next section, I describe this in more detail. 
 
6.5: Unintended consequences  
The entire process of getting a refugee community organization from a group 
of people interested in effecting social change, to a sustainable and independent 
organization has multiple consequences. On one level, as I have described in the 
previous sections, it has a tangible, almost technical effect on refugee political 
participation: it confers skills, resources and social networks onto refugee lead rs 
and channels these same leaders’ efforts toward domestic-related settl ment 
activities. These are intentional consequences: policymakers hope the policies they 
create will result in those particular effects. Through this nudging process 
unintentional consequences also surface. Two particularly salient inadvertent impac s 
include: a) creating barriers to refugee self-determination through messages that ‘we 
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know better than you;’ and b) generating distrust and animosity between refugee 
leaders and settlement actors when refugees perceive that settlement actors are more 
concerned with their funding then refugee well being. 
6.5.1: Who knows best? 
Settlement actors consciously and unconsciously bring about barriers to 
refugee self-determination by sending the message that they ‘know what’s best’ for 
refugees during the capacity building process, a message that may not be the best 
way to build refugee capacity. Through the process of educating and socializing 
refugee leaders about how to establish and sustain organizations, settlement actors 
send these de-motivating messages by unconsciously using their power to take 
charge. They often define what projects refugee organizations will pursue and how 
the capacity building process will take shape.  
In the previous section I showed that settlement actors are often constrained 
by what donors (namely Australia’s Department of Immigration and Citizenship and 
local governments) want; donors do not want to fund cultural events, but do want to 
fund, for example, refugee community parenting classes. In this way, settlemen  
actors are bound the contracts they tender. Yet, this is not only about donor 
constraints, but also about the practice of capacity building. Several refugee leaders 
expressed a concern that settlement organizations do not involve them in the more 
practical decision-making processes such as what projects to engage i for specific 
settlement issues. This can unintentionally send the message that refugees do not 
have their own ideas about how to solve prickly settlement problems. One provider, 
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seeking to overcome these issues helped establish new systems in which the 
settlement actors would guide rather than control projects. 
This also plays out in regards to refugee leaders pursuing domestic versus 
transnational activities. Several refugee leaders (one who is now president of a well-
established migrant services organization) noted that oftentimes providers do not 
understand the importance of transnational responsibilities. When refugees bring 
these concerns to settlement actors, the latter often views this as a ‘mental health’ 
issue – something for the refugee to ‘get over.’ These refugee leaders see this more 
as a socio-political problem, and one that they are keen on dealing with. The act of 
channeling refugees toward specific domestic-related activities, while not inherently 
bad, can send the message that ‘we – not you – know what’s best for you and your 
community.’  
This message may be sent even more regularly through the daily interactions 
between settlement actors and refugee leaders when building refugee organizational 
capacity. As alluded to earlier, educating refugee leaders about creating and 
sustaining a community-based organization involves both a technical and socializing 
aspect. Technically, settlement actors will teach refugee leaders the legal and 
bureaucratic logistics of creating an organization, of “set[ing up] an organization 
according to Australian norms and the Australian legal system” (Settlement service 
provider, Subject KK, July 2008) and of “what it means to work with the community, 
[establishing] a board of directors, responsibilities…then [how to handle] fiscal 
management, measuring results, [and] raising money” (US service provider, Subject 
197 
 
57, December 2009). They also socialize leaders on how to engage in “appropriate” 
organizational practices according to western organizational values (such as 
democratic governance, transparency and accountability). 
While it is true that Sudanese refugees often come to western countries with 
little or no experience with certain institutions – this does not mean that they are 
‘uncivilized,’ a term that one settlement provider used to describe them (in front o  a 
Sudanese refugee who worked in the same organization) (Subject E, June 2008). In 
my interviews, I got the sense that some settlement providers only saw these 
communities as incapable. One provider commented four times about the lack of 
appropriate leadership in the Sudanese community – saying that they needed to 
realize that one person cannot be ‘El Supremo’ or ‘El Presidente’ (Subject HH, July 
2008). This same person was frustrated with what she saw as a lack of ability to 
engage in ‘appropriate’ amounts of dialogue between leaders. Instead, Sudanese 
leaders were either making all the decisions on their own, or taking ‘ten hours’ t  
discuss every detail with other organizational members. Helping refugee leaders 
master these leadership and organizational skills is certainly a laudable aim, but it is 
not clear whether or not having this attitude toward refugee communities is the best 
way to effectively build their capacity.  
This next provider’s comments, worth quoting at length, describes how she 
realized that how capacity building was being implemented by her organization was 
unintentionally de-motivating refugee leaders.  
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“So we’ve been in this room, and we’re having meetings and we’re talking 
and they are listening. To the point where I had to stop and say, ‘What is 
going on here?” And they would say “We don’t know what you’re talking 
about.” And the western, or Anglo, the professional way of approaching a 
meeting is that you go through this, this [pointing, like at agenda items], 
and this to go through, and if there are no objections, you move on. Where 
as I think their way of – a cultural difference, that needs to be respected, 
and acknowledged, and I think we have a lot to learn from them. Because 
the feedback…was that we weren’t actually listening and we weren’t on 
the same page. So one of their committee members that was present had 
not said anything at all and the feedback was that he was the most vocal 
out of all of them, but the way that the meeting had been run, he had been 
disempowered. And that’s how they feel out in society, out there – they 
feel that the power – they felt that the power was with us – we had the 
power without even realizing. We were thinking, this is for them, this 
project. But the way the meeting was run, it was saying the opposite 
(Subject GG, July 2008). 
This service provider’s power came from having a better command of the 
English language, and using certain terminology. Power derived from this provider 
setting the agenda and the practices of the meetings, of defining the entire process. 
Unbeknownst to the provider, this served to exclude the refugee participants. After 
reflection, and extensive feedback with the Sudanese refugees of this group, this 
same provider took notice to the “cross-cultural aspect” and the power inequities of 
community capacity building and worked toward “mak[ing] space for them – not in a 
patronizing way.” This new way was accomplished when the provider consciously 
chose “not assume that things should be done in a particular way. That’s been a 
learning experience for us [the provider, my emphasis added].” This involves a 
continual process of negotiation in which refugees’ practices are respected: “the 
negotiation aspect is really important, and its about the parties having equal power – 
so they are a subject of that negotiation – rather than an object of that negotiation.” 
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In the end, this may not be the efficient process that is more characteristic of the 
organizational practices in Australia, and any other western industrialized country, 
but it could be the more effective capacity building strategy:  “So, its respecting that 
the decisions make take longer, but the process was more important than the 
outcome” (Ibid). 
Before establishing new ways of interacting with refugees, this particular 
provider’s practices sent refugee leaders the message: ‘we know better than you.’ 
Creating a new practice took effort on the part of the provider – asking and accepting 
feedback, and making changes; and for the refugee participants – giving honest 
feedback, despite power differences. My impression from these interviews is that this 
providers’ transformation - from seeing refugees as objects of negotiation toward 
seeing them as the subjects of negotiation - is an exception for settlement providers 
who remain accountable more to the federal government than toward refugees.  
 
6.5.2: Whose side are you on? 
Refugee settlement actors, like most service organizations, are constrained by 
the objectives and regulations of their donors. At times these actors’ concern with 
donor wishes can overshadow their concern with refugee needs. In this case, I found 
that these constraints engendered various outcomes that spurned suspicion about 
whose “side” settlement actors were really on, or in other words, whose interests 
were they were concerned with. One example includes, when former Immigration 
Minister Kevin Andrews publicly stated that Sudanese refugees were not able to 
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integrate, most providers did not speak out against these comments. Some providers 
stating that this was the role of Sudanese organizational leaders; in order to avoid 
‘mission creep’ organizations speak out against the Minister’s comments. (Subjects 
TT, SS, July 2008). Others pointed to specific regulations in their funding contracts 
that barred them from doing anything ‘political’ in nature (Subject C, E, J, Q, June 
and July 2008). To many Sudanese leaders, this was an indication that providers 
were more interested in keeping their funding then being an ally to Sudanese 
refugees. That providers are often closer to emerging refugee populations than other 
host country citizens, this was a particularly hard blow to the Sudanese community. 
One former African refugee noted that if providers are not on refugees’ sides, ‘then 
who is’ (Subject DD, July 2008).  
 
6.6: Conclusion  
Settlement programs, including Refugee Community Capacity Building 
programs directly shape the political activities of refugees in the US and Australia. In 
essence, through these educative processes, service providers not only educate, but 
also channel refugees towards particular political goals. In this chapter I 
demonstrated how settlement policies channeled refugees toward particular country-
specific political goals in Australia, and how the sparse use of similar prog ams in 
the US resulted in the absence of professional service provider nudging. US refugee 
leaders remained more independent from these settlement policy institutions. I also 
demonstrated how some professional settlement policy actors, utilizing these 
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programs, indirectly dis-empowered refugees through such processes of political 
channeling. 
202 
 
Chapter 7: Conclusion 
7.1: Introduction 
 In this chapter I re-examine the empirical puzzle in light of the findings pre ented 
in the dissertation. Given these conclusions, I discuss the implications for Sudanese 
refugees and South Sudan, the practice of refugee settlement in the US, Australia and 
globally and the connection between migration and international development. I also 
detail implications for current theory, particularly institutional theoris pertaining to 
migrant political participation. In light of the importance of policy implementers and 
specific policy programs, institutional theories will benefit from having a more 
pointed eye toward how policy influences refugee and other newcomer social 
networks.   
7.2: Re-examining the Empirical Puzzle 
In this section I return to the main research questions. Why are there such 
stark differences in the political activities of similarly situated Sudanese refugees in 
Australia and the US? What institutional structures of host country refugee 
settlement programs have directly impacted these refugee leaders? And how do these 
institutions influence refugee political efficacy? 
7.2.1: Influential Institutions  
My findings suggest that refugee settlement system attributes, derive  f om each 
country’s over-arching approach to dealing with social policy, have played a 
significant role in shaping refugee political activists. Despite many settlement system 
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similarities, South Sudanese leaders in each country are engaged with different sets 
of individuals and certain settlement programs.  
In Australia, professional service providers charged with establishing refu ee 
community organizations have guided refugee leaders toward domestic-focused 
activities. In the US, the private sector’s deep involvement in refugee settlem nt, 
particularly the involvement of faith-based volunteers, has provided extensive 
support to Sudanese leaders’ transnational political activities. Generally speaking 
when these leaders were resettled, they encountered two different settlemen  
environments – the US system that allows, even dictates greater refugee autonomy 
and the Australian system that manages the lives of refugees more heavily. Within 
these two environments, refugee leaders met divergent policy implementers, 
individuals who facilitated their settlement. Over the course of this stage of 
“settling”, refugee leaders were channeled toward certain goals at times, and at other 
times, supported toward other goals.  
Policy implementer actions toward refugee leaders -- channeling versus 
supporting – was in great part due to where they were situated within the system of 
refugee settlement in each country. Professional policy implementers have little 
choice but to  channel ambitious refugees to engage in domestic political activities 
that will serve the main goal of refugee settlement: refugee integration. These 
professionals are paid to do exactly this. Volunteer policy implementers certainly 
have an interest in seeing that refugee needs are met, including needs pertaining to 
integration, but they are less tied to the state (and many were quite interested in 
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international development work), and therefore more open to supporting refugee 
leaders toward their transnational goals. 
7.2.2: Institutions and Refugee Political Efficacy 
Have these institutions influenced the political efficacy of refugee leaders, a 
critical political pre-requisite? Do specific policies and policy implementers 
empower or dis-empower refugee leaders? My research suggests that these policies 
can empower and dis-empower refugee leaders.86  
                                               
86 It is quite hard to measure ‘empowerment’ for two reasons. First, the act (or lack thereof) of empowerment is 
incredibly specific to each person. Second, a seemingly disempowering action can actually catalyze individuals and 
vice versa. 
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I find two important conclusions pertaining to this research question. First, when 
policy implementers try to control meetings, set agendas and speak in terms 
unknown to refugee participants, refugee leaders have felt discouraged and unheard. 
When this occurs, despite the presence of capacity building programs, refugees may 
not actually be ‘empowered’ to take on the necessary responsibilities to effect 
change in their own lives and communities. Additionally, I find that  Sudanese 
refugee leaders  were highly motivated to  bring about change in south Sudan. When  
the refugee leaders were persuaded to disregard these concerns, such actions ad 
deleterious effects,  indirectly disempowering them  When these concerns were not 
taken seriously, refugees were left again with feelings of discouragement.  
How does this influence refugee political activities? This is certainly  matter of 
concern for the key individuals who are seeking to build relationships with 
newcomers in order to promote their integration. It also matters because these 
motivations to aid and develop their country of origin are a vital source of  strength 
that can be tapped. Arguably, personal motivation is a key component of self-
                                                                                                                                            
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
206 
 
sufficiency, the stated goal of both of these refugee settlement programs. These 
findings have broad and specific implications to theory  as well as to the subject 
involved in this project. I now turn to a discussion on these more practical concerns. 
7.3: Practical Implications 
 This research has implications relating to several different subjects: South 
Sudanese refugee leaders, the Republic of South Sudan, the institution of Refugee 
resettlement in the US, Australia and globally, and the intersection of migrants, 
systems of integration and international development.  
7.3.1: South Sudanese Refugees and South Sudanugees and South Sudan 
In July, South Sudan, after over roughly half a century of war, will become 
an independent nation. Most South Sudanese refugees have known nothing but this 
struggle for autonomy. What insights can be drawn from this project regarding this 
momentous event?   
South Sudanese refugees are highly motivated to effect social change for 
their people and country. This motivation is a critical component of the economic, 
social and political development of the world’s newest country. Will current refuge  
transnational initiatives have a substantial effect? Given the state of South Sudanese 
development, it is clear that a school, or water pump here and there will not have an 
enormous impact. The assets of South Sudanese refugee organizations explored in 
this dissertation are chump change relative to those of the Southern Sudanese Multi-
Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) and of international NGOs currently working in the 
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country. By the end of 2011, the MDTF will have spent close to 500 million dollars 
on South Sudanese development (World Bank). The South Sudanese refugee leaders 
will likely have to scale up their efforts in order to make an enduring impact on their 
country. 
Second order effects of South Sudanese refugee political mobilization, 
however, should not be overlooked for two reasons. First, refugee leaders are 
acquiring valuable human capital that they may potentially take back to South Sudan. 
As one volunteer put it :one of these Lost Boys is bound to be president of the new 
Republic some day. Second, refugee political mobilization has not only involved 
South Sudanese individuals. Savvy South Sudanese leaders in both countries 
understand that in order to generate resources and on-going support for South 
Sudanese development, the help of US and Australian nationals is critical. This 
transnational social capital may be an important element of continued financial, 
emotional and social support throughout the tough years ahead.  
These second-order effects are not b und to happen, however. South 
Sudanese leaders must continue to cultivate skills and networks after the 
international frenzy about Sudan has died down. These leaders will have to work 
through volunteer and international community burnout and donor fatigue in an era 
where people and their money are pulled toward multiple worthwhile ends. One 
interesting strategy that many leaders in the US have employed can serve a  a 
counterbalance. Enlisting volunteers to travel and spend time in South Sudan may 
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provide the personal connection necessary to provide support that extends beyond 
the occasional check.  
Nevertheless, none of these efforts will replace a well-governed South Sudan 
state. Critics of international development rightly point out that international charity 
does not replace well functioning national governments that are accountable to their 
citizens. The transnational activities of South Sudanese refugees, such as the creation
of schools, health clinics and critical infrastructure like water pumps are beneficial in 
the short-term. In the coming years, to ensure the long-term development needs are 
met, these same refugee leaders must enact, or at least participate in, domestic 
political efforts toward the government of South Sudan. These efforts can include 
participating in decisions that allocate oil revenue resources toward the social, 
political and economic development of the people of South Sudan. This dissertation 
demonstrates that many Sudanese refugees in the West are situated quite nicely for 
such a role – they have pursued education, are involved in politics and are strongly 
motivated to effect change in their country. My research also has implications for the 
settlement programs in the US, Australia and globally. 
7.3.2: Refugee Settlement 
 The findings also suggest recommendations for policymakers in each of 
these countries, as well as those dealing with global refugee protection. First, 
policymakers should review the unintentional consequences of the use of 
professional and volunteer policy implementers. This includes a pointed look at how 
policies and service provider-refugee interactions foster or impede refugee social, 
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political and economic activities and their effects on refugee self-determination. 
Second, evaluation and dialogue about refugee resettlement should be markedly 
ramped up. In so doing, new and older refugee settlement countries will benefit. 
These efforts are likely to enhance integration efforts by supporting refugees toward 
self-sufficiency. 
This project has demonstrated that refugees respond to their interactions with 
policy implementers. Through these settlement-refugee interactions, policy
implementers have multiple inadvertent influences on refugee leaders. These can 
alter the paths of their activities and their political efficacy and hinder the 
development of overall self esteem and self-determination. Each country’s sincere 
examination of these unintended consequences is recommended. With regard to the 
former, the US and Australia would benefit from acknowledging and evaluating how 
their programs and policy implementers influence refugee social and political 
practices and how these  in turn impact paths to and levels of integration. For 
example, given differences in centralization and institutionalization of national s ci l 
policy, will refugee political, social and economic activity be more individual stic in 
some countries? Will we see more individuals, rather than groups, within a 
community enact political activities? Unfortunately I was not able to assess this 
aspect utilizing the data I collected. My hunch is that we are more likely to see 
individuals prompting these activities in the US relative to Australia. These questions 
are important questions for policymakers and service providers alike. Given the 
constraints in government funding (particularly in the US), it is likely that refugee 
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settlement decision-makers will do best to cultivate relationships with academics to 
do this type of review.  
With regard to the second unintended consequence, I find two specific outcomes 
of refugee-policy implementer interaction that should be remedied: a) the creation of 
barriers to refugee self-determination through messages that ‘we know better than 
you;’ and b) the generation of distrust and animosity between refugee leaders an  
settlement actors when refugees perceive that settlement actors are more concerned 
with their funding then refugee well being. In order to reduce the ‘harm’ done to 
newcomers, US and Australian settlement service providers can become more 
mindful during interpersonal exchanges and also when channeling or guiding 
newcomers toward specific activities. These effects are certainly related to 
limitations of resources  available to settlement policy implementers. Some providers 
would aptly explain that their time is short, and they cannot always spend the extra 
time explaining things, and reflecting on their own interactions. This is certainly 
understandable. Nevertheless, the importance of building rapport, ensuring critical
information is conveyed and building the esteem of refugees cannot be understated. I 
recommend that providers receive on-going training in creating proper boundaries 
with refugees and help in developing coping mechanisms to deal with stress. 
I also suggest that settlement countries consider seeking creative ways to 
empower newcomers’ transnational endeavors by combining them with their own 
international development initiatives. This is not entirely out of the question. Indeed, 
Canada, and some European countries have already begun to make this link and 
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develop the appropriate institutional mechanisms to enact it. With South Sudanese 
refugees’ overwhelming support of Independence from Sudan, this development-
migrant link is only more vital. Transnational political action on the part of Sudanese 
refugees has not yet reached its fullest potential. Host countries could mobilize these 
efforts even more and serve their own interests in seeing to the healthy development 
of future South Sudan.  
, My research suggests that the policy makers and implementers of these two 
refugee settlement programs could benefit immensely from a cross-dialogue with 
one another and that the strengths of these programs combined could be offered as a 
new “model” of refugee settlement services. To this end, I recommend that the 
UNHCR increase its evaluative and information exchange resources in the specific 
area of Third Country Resettlement, and specifically at the level of domestic 
assistance following the refugee’s arrival in the new host country.  
 All of these recommendations require action, and therefore funding of some sort. 
Unfortunately refugee resettlement across these two countries as well a glob l 
refugee protection, are under-funded. Although this is already widely known, it 
would be irresponsible not to recommend that countries extend greater resources f r 
these efforts. 
7.4: Theoretical Implications 
These findings have interesting implications for scholarship pertaining to 
refugee and migrant political participation, migrant transnationalism and migrant 
political incorporation. First, most obviously, the project’s findings suggest that a 
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closer look at the policies and programs that daily influence newcomers is called for. 
The Policy Feedback model can be utilized for this end. Second, I argue that scholars 
would benefit from continued creative synthesis of key theories pertaining to mi rant 
and refugee political activities. This includes cross synthesis within the political 
incorporation literature and across it and the migrant transnational literature.  
7.4.1:Utilizing the Policy Feedback Model  
The Policy Feedback model offers new insights and begs new questions. Many 
scholars have utilized an all too broad or vague political opportunity structure 
approach to examine refugee and migrant political activity outcomes. They hav  
focused either on institutions governing the processing and admittance of refugees, 
or on more macro-level institutions within a context (like media rhetoric, and 
national government leadership). With the exception of citizenship and naturalization 
policies and regulations, they do not focus on specific policies and programs targeted 
toward migrants. This work has presented evidence that, as the Policy Feedback 
model would suggest, settlement policies, programs and policy implementers have 
political effects. I find that in the first stage refugee settlement, specialized policy 
implementers and programs guiding the settlement process are the institutions hat 
matter to refugee political activities the most. What implications do these findings 
have for previous scholarship? 
With regard to other institutionalist theories, my findings suggest that the 
reception inclusion/exclusion model remains overly simplistic and underspecified. 
Rhetoric pertaining to migrants certainly influences newcomer access to the 
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policymaking arena, and their resultant political outcomes. My findings, however 
suggest that the Koopmans model should be revised in two key ways. First, at least 
in the case of South Sudanese refugees, both pro- and anti-migrant rhetoric spawned 
political mobilization on the part of South Sudanese. Exclusionary and inclusionary 
media served to create attention around this particular population that was ultimately 
used to its favor. Thus, this model would benefit from a slightly more complex 
understanding of the interaction between societal rhetoric, newcomer political 
mobilization and newcomer political outcomes.  
This brings me to my second point: the reception model is underspecified. Here 
again, I do not discount the notion that pro- or anti-minority rhetoric influences 
migrant political outcomes. But how does this happen? What is the process? And for 
whom does this matter? Is it that in anti-minority contexts media elites will not allow 
newcomers to voice their grievances? Or do societal members engage in acts of 
discrimination in multiple public venues, thus generally sending a message of 
exclusion? My findings suggest two key things. First, in the case of South Sudanese 
refugees in the US, host country policy implementers played a key role in shaping 
rhetoric. Second, in both countries, it was these policy implementers (and refugee 
capacity building initiatives in Australia) that provided refugees with social, financial 
and emotional resources necessary for South Sudanese political activities. Revised 
reception models could take these institutions as the central aspects of ‘reception.’  
Using a Policy Feedback model, future research could answer other important 
questions. What other newcomer political activities are influenced by these polici s, 
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and their implementation? How do these policies and implementers influence the 
issue area on which newcomers focus? Or the ways that refugees group (or do not 
group) together to realize their political goals? This type of examination requires the 
researcher to look for the ways in which newcomers and their contexts were changed 
by their interactions with one another. Thus, the analyst does not see the receiving 
context as solely a political opportunity structure that migrants navigate through in 
order to implement their goals. My research findings suggest that this type of 
approach is beneficial. When material and social support was lacking, Sudanese 
refugees sought it out. They mobilized volunteers. They endeared themselves to 
Americans and Australians to achieve their goals. In some instances they also took 
steps back from their original, transnational objectives, when resources and messages 
indicated that domestic-focused activities were the best choice for their political 
trajectory.  
Refugees, and all recipients of policies, are not simply navigating through a 
system (or a ‘political opportunity structure’). They have agency and are mall able – 
they make the best decisions for themselves, but this notion of ‘best’ changes due to 
environmental circumstances. This includes changing their goals, and courses f 
action. A particular context then will not be a maze through which refugees wander, 
trying to achieve their pre-defined goals. Instead, the refugee and his/her cont xt can 
be likened to   a person making  his/her path through life, in which the “whos” and 
“whats”  that are encountered alter the path-maker’s understandings and desires. The 
“whos” and whats” are in turn altered by the path-maker.  
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Additionally, like the policy feedback literature suggests, my research 
indicates that theories should be sensitive to how these systems and relationships 
may change over time. Many migrant political participation scholars have noted the 
correlation between political activity (both domestic and transnational) and length of 
residence in a context. My research, which focuses on a population that is recently 
resettled, highlights the potential for different circumstances to shape migrants in 
different periods of their settlement, particularly because they are interacting with 
different government institutions over time. 
7.4.2: Cross Fertilization ili i  
This project’s findings suggest that combining insights from the political 
incorporation (Gerstle and Mollenkopf 2001; Andersen 2007; Bloemraad 2006) and 
international migration literatures (Al-Ali, Black and Koser 2001; Basch et al 1994; 
Portes 1999; Guarnizo et al 2003; Levitt 2001) can be quite fruitful. Along with 
Morawska 2003, and Waldinger and Fitzgerald 2004, I argue that much can be 
gained from bridging these literatures. Strengths from each literatur can be utilized. 
Migrant transnational scholars would greatly benefit from cross national rese rch 
designs that many political incorporation scholars have utilized, as well as their 
identification of numerous host country influences on newcomer behavior. Political 
incorporation scholars would be remiss to overlook the evidence that migrant 
transnationalist scholars have identified including the role of the origin country state, 
the migration experience, and the enduring social connections that newcomers have 
with their countrywomen and men.  
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New, innovative questions could be answered using bridged literature. As has 
been done in this project, we can ask more questions about what changes newcomer 
political goals, or at least their current actions toward these goals. Are there instances 
where host countries directly or indirectly mobilized newcomers to engage in 
transnational activities? How does the engagement of transnational activities 
influence integration? Do specific transnational activities increase newcomer 
integration, while others do not? Other sets of questions along these lines could 
examine different qualitative aspects of newcomer political activities. Do certain 
policy implementers support different types of transnational activities? For example, 
are host country nationals less open to certain transnational initiatives, like helping to 
arm rebels?  
7.4.3: Refugee Studies  
Finally, given my findings, refugee studies can benefit greatly by expanding 
scholarship that examines the refugee as a political agent. This is important bec use 
refugees, like all other populations of humans, have political ambitions. The extent to 
which communities are able to pursue these ambitions directly relates to the self-
perceived efficacy of refugees – their own sense of their power to change their lives 
in positive directions. This is vital not only for the realization of the refugees’ 
political goals, but also for the refugees’ wellbeing more broadly. More research 
could examine how refugee processing, and domestic assistance for refugees 
independently influence refugee efficacy. Further research could examine s w ll, in 
what ways these may (dis) empower refugees.  
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7.5: Concluding Remarks 
Policies have unintentional political effects. Policies and policy implementers, 
particularly those with whom recipients are directly interacting, can cause 
unintended political consequences. The political activities of Sudanese refugee 
leaders were catalyzed, in part, due to policies that had quite different objectives and 
means of implementation. The goal of settlement in the US is to economically 
integrate refugees, while in Australia there is more concern with ensuring equal 
access to Australian social services. In the US, policy implementation is 
decentralized and the overarching structure of programs can be characterized as 
laissez faire. In contrast, in Australia, policy implementation is centralized at the 
level of the Commonwealth and it is highly institutionalized. These policies and the 
individuals who implemented these policies had second-order effects that the policy 
implementers themselves often overlooked. Many professional service providers ha 
never made the connection between what they did and the political activities of 
refugees. Given the policy implications I have described above, making these 
creative analytical connections, between policies and the political actions of policy 
recipients is a worthwhile endeavor that more scholars should undertake.   
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Appendix A: Interview Protocol: Refugee 
Refugee Characteristics 
1. Name? 
2.  Where you are from? Briefly tell me history of path to Australia/US? Kakuma 
refugee camp? 
3. Level of education? 
4. Job? 
5. When did you arrive in Australia/US? 
6. Region of Sudan? 
7. Connections home? Number of people? Frequency? What type of connection? 
(telephone, email, postal service) 
Refugee Political practices 
8. What goals do you have for yourself? Your future? 
9. Broadly, what types of things do you do to help the Sudanese community here in 
Australia/US? Africans in Australia/US? How much time do you spend doing 
these things? What is the frequency? 
10. What types of things do you do to help the Sudanese community at home? How 
much time do you spend doing these things? What is the frequency? 
11. What types of things do you do to help the South Sudan? How much time do you 
spend doing these things? What is the frequency? 
12. Do you volunteer for any organizations? Do you vote? Do you engage in protests? 
Other political activities here in Australia/US? How much time do you spend 
doing these things? What is the frequency? 
13. Are you involved in a Sudanese political party here in Australia/US? What ways? 
How much funds do you contribute? Time? Elected official? Have any leadership 
role? How much time do you spend doing these things? What is the frequency? 
14. Do you have any involvement with political officials in Australia/US? If so who? 
How did you get to know them? What is your relationship? How frequently do 
you interact? 
15. Do you have any involvement with southern Sudanese political officials? If so 
who? How did you get to know them? What is your relationship? How frequently 
do you interact? 
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Origin of these practices 
16. How did you get involved in practice X,Y, Z?  
17. Did you initiate these activities? If so, where did you get the idea? If not, who 
gave you the idea? How did you meet this person/these people? 
18. Who supports these projects? Money? Time? Leadership? Logistics? Office 
space? Technical support? 
19. From where and whom did you learn to do these projects? Activities? Where did 
you learn the skills necessary for these activities? 
20. Where do you complete the logistics? Organization of these projects? 
Resettlement Experience 
21. What resources were you given when you arrived? How long did you receive 
these resources? (money, tangible resources, skills, edu?) 
21. How did you get a job?  
23. How did you get into school? Other technological skills? 
24. In general, how has the experience of being resettled to Australia/US been for 
you?  
25. What organizations have helped you out? How so?  
26. What individuals helped you out? Where and how did you meet them? 
27. What has been a barrier to getting a job, education, skills, home?  
28. What have been barriers to the goals you discussed above? 
29. Fill in the blank – If you accomplish X, you are a successful person. 
30. Fill in the blank – I need X from Australia/US to be successful. 
31. Australians/Americans generally think X about me, and other southern Sudanese 
refugees. 
32. How have you responded to recent events (AUS: violence, gangs, Immigration 
Minister’s responses) between the Sudanese community and the media? The 
state? Different local communities? Why? 
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Appendix B: Interview Protocol: Professional Policy Implementers 
Organizational Characteristics 
1.What is the mission of the organization? Central projects? Can you tell me a bit about 
them?  
2.Does the organization provide more services? Advocacy? Both? Percentage? 
3.How old is the organization? 
4.How many staff members does the organization have? Specifically for migrants? 
Refugees? Sudanese refugees? 
5.What are the primary sources of funding for the organization? State? Membership? 
Private? 
6.What is your position? Role? 
 
Relationship to other organizations servicing/advocating for migrants/refugees 
1. What is your relationship to the state?  
2. In your opinion, what are the central organizations/institutions that provide 
services or advocate for/against migrants/refugees? (if not mentioned -- 
Churches? Universities?) 
3. Do you consider your organization a central organization? 
4. What, if any, formal or informal relationships does the organization have with 
these other organizations that provide services or advocate for migrants/refugees? 
a. For example, a contract with Australian/US Refugee Council to 
collaborate on building language educational capacity for migrants would 
be a more formal. On-going relationships with certain jobs that employee 
refugees, or schools that are more likely to admit refugees, churches that 
can provide services, etc would be examples of more informal 
relationships. 
5. If applicable, can you tell me about some of these collaborations?  
 
Types of resources provided to migrants/refugees 
1. What can a refugee/migrant get from this organization?  
a. Funds? How much? Any literature about this? 
b. Skills? What types? How? Any literature about this? 
c. Jobs?  
d. Access to educational institutions? 
e. Political skills? (Lobbying) 
2. Does the organization lobby local, state or federal government on behalf of their 
clients? On behalf of migrant services in general?  
3. Does anyone ever encourage migrants to get involved politically? If so, to what 
extent? What types of things does the organization do to this end? Any 
canvassing? 
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4. Does the organization provide office space, technology, funds, time, coordination 
or logistics help for the development of migrant community organizations? Other 
migrant projects? 
5. Do any staff members, outside of the organization provide funds, training, or time 
to migrants/refugees for their organizations? Projects? Political obbying? Etc? 
6. Does anything that the organization does bring divergent migrant groups 
together?  
7. Does your organization see a difference between working with the “Lost Boys” v 
the broader Sudanese migrant community? 
 
Messages from organization to refugees/migrants 
1. Fill in the blank -- If a refugee/migrant community does X – your organization 
has successfully completed its job. 
2. What does the organization teach refugees/migrants? Or what do you think 
refugees/migrants should learn? Know? 
3. What are the typical interactions between staff members and clients? Sudanese 
clients? 
4. How do you characterize the relationship between your organization and 
migrants/refugees? Your organization and the local community? Your 
organization and the local, state and federal government? Refugees and the local 
community? Refugees and broader Australian/US country? 
5. How has the organization responded to recent events (AUS: violence, gangs, 
Immigration Minister’s responses) between the Sudanese community and the 
media? The state? Different local communities? Why? 
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Appendix C: Interview Protocol: Government Officials 
Interview Subject Characteristics 
1.  Name? 
2. What is your occupation with the Australian/US government?  
 
Interaction with Sudanese refugees 
1. What does the Australian/US government provide for refugees? Money, skills, 
other tangible resources? Do you have any literature you can provide? 
2. How is this accomplished? 
3. What is the objective of resettlement of refugees for the Australia/US 
government? 
4. Fill in this blank – If refugees X, the Australian/US government is successful. 
5. What is the perception of southern Sudanese refugees? Has this changed over 
time? If so, why? 
6. How has the Australian state and its officials responded to recent events 
(violence, gangs, Immigration Minister’s responses) between the Sudanese 
community and the media? The state? Different local communities? Why? 
 
Involvement in Refugee Political practices 
1. What is your specific involvement with southern Sudanese refugees? How much 
funds do you contribute? Time? Official or leadership role? If you have no 
involvement – why?  
2. If so, did you initiate these activities? If so, where did you get the idea? If not, 
who gave you the idea? How did you meet this person/these people? Were you 
lobbied? 
3. From your awareness, who else supports these projects? Money? Time? 
Leadership? Logistics? Office space? Technical support? 
4. How long have you been involved? 
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Appendix D: Interview Protocol: Volunteers 
Involvement with the ‘Lost Boys of Sudan’ 
1.When did you first hear about this group of Sudanese refugees, including the Lost 
Boys of Sudan? 
2.Why did you first get involved?  
3.How did you first get involved (through a friend, a church, through another 
organization?) 
4.What activities did you do with these refugees when you first got involved?  
a. Has this changed?  
5.What are the key ways that you now connect with the Sudanese refugees?  
6.Can you tell me more about this? 
b. How frequently are you in contact with them?  
c. How did you form the projects you are now currently working on (did the 
Sudanese want to create the project, or was it more your idea?) 
7.How has it been to work with the Sudanese refugees? 
d. What have you learned about them? Yourself? The world? The US 
government? 
e. How has this changed your life? 
8.If you have formed an organization with Sudanese refugees, can you tell me more 
about it? 
f. Why did it form? How did it form? 
g. What are the primary purposes for the organization? 
h. What is the structure of the organization? 
i. How involved are the Lost Boys in the organization? (for example, do 
they receive services? Participate in decision-making of the organizatio ) 
i. Please provide examples if possible.  
j. How do you fund this organization?  
 
Thoughts on refugee resettlement, particularly with the Lost Boys of Sudan. 
1.What are your general thoughts about the resettlement of South Sudanese refugees? 
(enough money and services; trainings; access to language classes for example?) 
2.Did you ever work or interact with any of the resettlement agencies? Any other 
people in the resettlement field? If so, why? And How was it?  
3.Would you have liked anything to be different for South Sudanese settlement 
experience? 
4.What do you think was positive about their settlement? 
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Appendix E: Funding for Refugee Organization Building Programs (2000-2007) 
Year  Australia  United States 
2000  $7,759,667  $2,680,866 
2001  $8,024,000  $4,025,994 
2002  $8,225,000  $7,781,202 
2003  $8,869,000  $8,011,363 
2004  $9,044,000  $9,491,874 
2005  $9,190,667  $8,011,363 
2006  $9,931,000  $7,258,667 
2007  $10,277,667  $8,481,926 
Note: Australia’s figures were drawn from Australia’s Department of Immigration and Citizenship (forme 
Department of Multiculturalism and Immigration Affairs)Portfolio Budgets for Australia’s Department of 
Immigration and Citizenship (former Department of Multiculturalism and Immigration Affairs). Annual 
reports (years 1999-2000 to 2010-2011) can be found at http://www.immi.gov.au/about/reports/budget. US 
figures were located on each Office of Refugee Resettlem nt’s Annual Report to Congress. 
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Appendix F: Refugees Resettled in Australia and the United States (2000 – 2007)  
0
10000
20000
30000
40000
50000
60000
70000
80000
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Year
Australia
US
 
Note: These figures are found at Australia’s Department of Immigration and Citizenship 
and the US’s Office of Refugee Resettlement. 
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